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Abstract 
This study examines the historical emergence of the photographer by turning to the writings of 
three important photographers of the nineteenth century: Henry Peach Robinson (1830-1901), 
Oscar Gustave Rejlander (1813-1875), and Julia Margaret Cameron (1815-1879). The 
photographic works of each of these photographers has been the subject of much historical and 
interpretive analysis, but their writings have yet to receive significant scholarly attention. It is the 
claim of this study that this archive opens a new set of questions: What did it mean to claim: “I 
am a photographer” at photography’s advent? How did these individuals come to identify 
themselves through a new technology, medium, and practice whose identity itself was 
constituted by a set of contested and competing techniques, aesthetics, discourses, and critical 
perspectives? Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s texts speak to the fractious field of early 
photography and to how that discursive field positioned practitioners in novel ways. This study 
develops a historically specific and theoretically general conceptualization of the photographer, 
making a case for the ways this figure can be addressed as an object of study in its own right. 
This study’s focus on the writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron constitutes an effort to 
move beyond the well-plowed field of image analysis towards a consideration of how 
subjectivity is constituted and shaped by photographic practice. 
 
Keywords 
Photographer, Photography, Robinson, Rejlander, Cameron, Autobiography, Nineteenth 
Century, Foucault, Sloterdijk  
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
A passerby takes a photograph. It’s an everyday scene, a contemporary commonplace—a 
banality. But this very banality signifies something historically remarkable. At the advent of 
photography in the mid-nineteenth century, such a scene was scarcely conceivable. Nineteenth-
century photography was the province of specialists who possessed the requisite skills, science, 
and resources necessary for the production of photographs. Over the course of more than a 
century, photography exited the sphere of specialists and professionals and came to inhabit the 
realm of the everyday. Professional photographers still exist of course. But many who possess 
the tools and the technique do not see themselves as photographers. In fact today it is no longer 
clear precisely what the term “photographer” denotes. The term “photographer” is sometimes 
used to designate one whose livelihood, passion, or art is photography. But one can with equal 
justice call one a photographer who simply takes a photograph. Today being a photographer and 
taking photographs do not necessarily inhabit a continuous space. How did this happen? How did 
the photographer develop? 
This study examines the historical emergence of the photographer by turning to the 
writings of three important photographers of the nineteenth century: Henry Peach Robinson 
(1830-1901), Oscar Gustave Rejlander (1813-1875), and Julia Margaret Cameron (1815-1879). 
The works of each of these photographers has been the subject of much historical and 
interpretive analysis. But their writings have yet to receive significant scholarly attention. It is 
the claim of this study that this archive opens a new set of questions: What did it mean when one 
said “I am a photographer” at photography’s advent? Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s texts 
speak to the fractious field of early photography and to how that field positioned practitioners in 
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novel ways. These texts constitute an autobiographical archive. Each text is marked by the 
narrative struggle to make sense of the claim of what it meant to be a photographer. But this 
autobiographical archive is not solely a set of “personal” statements. These texts undoubtedly 
reflect the personal interests and concerns of each photographer, but those interests and concerns 
are also indicative of the wider regime of early photographic discourse. These texts can be read, 
then, as simultaneously reflecting the personal concerns of each photographer and the field of 
concern that was early photography. This study develops a historically specific and theoretically 
general conceptualization of the photographer. Its overarching aim, therefore, is to make a case 
for how the photographer can be addressed as an object of study in its own right. This study’s 
focus on the writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron constitutes an effort to move beyond 
the well-plowed field of image analysis towards a consideration of how subjectivity is 
constituted and shaped by photographic practice. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault and 
Peter Sloterdijk among others, this study interrogates the formation of the nineteenth-century 
photographer from an “interior” perspective. It focuses on how the process of writing on the 
experience of being and becoming a photographer, as evidenced by the texts of Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron, forged novel ways of seeing and constructing selfhood and interiority.  
1.1 The Photographer 
The nineteenth-century photographer occupied a unique position in the strata of material 
and discursive practices that included optics, chemistry, aesthetics, art and science. It is this 
complex assemblage that is conveniently called “nineteenth-century photography.” My 
conceptualization of “the photographer” as a subject position, node, or point within the 
constellation of nineteenth-century photographic discourse and practice draws principally on the 
work of Michel Foucault.  
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A subject for Foucault is constituted in and through historically specific discursive and 
material practices: knowledge, power, and discipline primarily. These factors or forces 
“position” and condition the subject in a particular way at a particular moment in history. The 
Foucauldian subject is positioned by an epistemic system—a system of knowledge—that is 
regulated by disciplinary procedures, processes, norms, and power. This view of the subject 
opposes the conception of the subject enshrined by Descartes. 
 Descartes’ famous invocation—“I think, therefore I am”—grants sovereignty over 
knowledge to the “I” of consciousness and identity. Descartes’ instantiation of the “I” as the 
foundation for the possibility of knowledge rests upon the axiom that the “I” of thinking (res 
cogitans) is fundamentally different than the world of spatially extended bodies it perceives (res 
extensa). The “I” of Cartesian thought maintains a critical distance from the world. It is supposed 
that this distance allows the “I” to remain impartial in its judgment of perceptual stimuli. This 
conception posits the “I” as an internal eye that judges perceptual objects as true or false. As 
Richard Rorty notes in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Descartes’ institutes “a conception 
of the human mind as an inner space in which…ideas pas[s] in review before an Inner Eye.”1 
Foucault rejects this model of the subject. The subject for Foucault is not the foundation 
or final arbiter of knowledge. Rather the “I” is itself a subject of knowledge. For Foucault, the 
subject is not the sovereign, immobile center upon which trans-historical knowledge (and truth) 
is inscribed, but rather an effect produced by a specific regime of knowledge. According to 
Foucault, every system or regime of knowledge produces a particular subject. The subject in this 
view is not a causal agent of knowledge, but rather a “knowledge-effect” – an effect of a 
particular historical mode of discursive and material practices. Foucault writes: “The positions of 
                                                          
1
 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 49-50. 
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the subject are...defined by the situation that it is possible for him [or her] to occupy in relation to 
the various domains or groups of objects; according to a grid of explicit or implicit 
interrogations” or knowledge practices.2  
Discursive and material practices—that is to say, knowledge—define the parameters 
within which a historical subject is positioned and, to an extent, subjects the subject to a set of 
historically determinate conditions that regulate what it is possible for that subject to say, think, 
or do. Foucault, especially the early Foucault, draws a rigorous distinction between a subject and 
the individual. The former designates a subject position within a knowledge/power structure; the 
latter is a way of speaking about the subject that can be traced to a specific historical situation, 
namely, the early modern period. “Subject” for Foucault has effectively the same meaning as it 
does in the context of monarchical power. One is called the king’s “subject” in that one is subject 
to the king’s power of rule. Similarly, for Foucault one is a subject insofar as one is subject to a 
specific regime of knowledge and power that governs and maintains a given socio-epistemic 
order. The position one occupies with respect to a knowledge-power structure defines “who” a 
subject is or can become. Foucault puts it eloquently and economically when he writes that a 
subject position designates both “the space in which we are and which we are.”3 It is in this sense 
that here the photographer is defined as a subject position.  
The nineteenth-century photographer was historically conditioned by the positions it 
came to occupy within the discourse of early photography. The historical category of “nineteenth 
century photography” does not name one thing, but a complex set of technological, aesthetic, and 
social practices. Even that most privileged metonym of photography – the camera – is not itself 
                                                          
2
 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1972), 57. 
3
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 
4. 
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one thing. The camera names a complex amalgam of technologies (optics and chemistry, 
primarily) and a host of aesthetic and scientific practices. 
The genealogy of the photographic camera traces back to the camera obscura. This 
device was known to ancient philosophers including Aristotle and Euclid but it gained 
exceptional prominence among artists and scientists of the seventeenth century.
4
 A camera 
obscura is made by completely sealing off a room or small chamber from any light source save 
for a pinhole-sized aperture. Light is focused as it passes through the narrow opening, and the 
result is that an inverted image of the world outside forms on the inside wall opposite the 
aperture exactly as it does in the modern day mechanical camera. Thus the basic technology of 
the modern camera was already existent well before the nineteenth century. Seventeenth-century 
thinkers including Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz were intensely interested in the camera 
obscura and optics generally.
5
 The device is frequently referenced in their writings. The camera 
obscura offered a fitting material analogue to the rationalist conception of the subject as an 
“inner eye” (pace Rorty) that sees the world from within the hermetically sealed chamber of the 
mind. The idea that the world could be best seen and understood from a specified distance with 
the aid of a rational representational schema prepared in advance the discursive space for 
nineteenth-century photography.  
The technological and discursive continuities between the camera obscura and the 
camera notwithstanding, the two technologies are very different. Each technology makes 
possible very different modes of observation, and hence gives rise to very different kinds of 
observers. As Jonathan Crary notes in Techniques of the Observer, “the camera obscura and the 
                                                          
4
 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1990), 27. 
5
 Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 42-48. 
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photographic camera, as assemblages, practices, and social objects, belong to two fundamentally 
different organizations of representation and the observer, and the observer’s relation to the 
visible.”6 The observer standing in a camera obscura sees the world as an inverted projection on 
the wall opposite the aperture. The observer stationed behind the camera looks out onto the 
world. The positioning of the observer—the subject position—circumscribed by the camera 
obscura and that framed by the camera lens are spatially and even psychically distinct. The way 
the world is seen in the camera obscura versus the camera, and how in each case that seeing is 
seen and understood by the observer, are radically dissimilar. 
The photographic camera developed from centuries of research into light but it was 
chemistry that provided the means to fix fragile and fleeting images. The origins of photographic 
chemistry are notoriously complex and seem almost a conspiracy on the part of history to 
confound any historian who seeks and elegant and simple narrative. The diorama painter Louis-
Jacques Mandé Daguerre (1787-1851) is popularly regarded as the “father of photography.” 
Daguerre’s name quite literally entered photography history when in 1839 the French Academy 
of Arts and Sciences awarded him a patent for a photographic process – daguerreotypy – that 
employed photo-sensitized copper plates. While Daguerre has become a virtual metonym for the 
origin of photography, there were many others who played significant roles in photography’s 
development, including Daguerre’s research partner Nicéphore Niépce (1765-1833). Indeed 
Niépce’s View from a Window at Le Gras of 1826 is the earliest known photographic image. One 
must also mention the work of William Henry Fox Talbot (1800-1877)—Daguerre’s chief 
rival—for his work on the calotype or talbotype process. Talbot’s 1844 book, The Pencil of 
Nature, which outlined both the aesthetic and scientific potential of photography, marked a 
                                                          
6
 Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 32. 
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highly significant discursive event in the history of early photography. Further still one would 
have to include the name of John Herschel (1792-1871) who made remarkable botanical studies 
by laying plant specimens on photo-sensitized papers and exposing them directly to the sun 
thereby circumventing the need for the camera entirely. Finally one would also have to make 
mention of Thomas Wedgwood who in the late eighteenth century pioneered chemical processes 
for the fixing of silhouettes. Suffice to say, the history of photographic technology did not follow 
a singular trajectory. Already by 1839, as Geoffrey Batchen has clearly shown, there were 
multiple and very different processes competing for the title of “photography.”7 But certainly the 
official recognition of photography by the French Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1839 was a 
watershed moment in the constitution of photography as a historico-discursive object. The 
publication in 1839 of the “Report” on photography by François Jean Dominique Arago (1786-
1853) did much to establish and bolster the nineteenth-century image of photography as at once a 
scientific and aesthetic phenomenon.
8
 Walter Benjamin was to later remark in his seminal essay 
“Little History of Photography” that the “beautiful thing” about Arago’s “Report” is “the 
connection it makes with all aspects of human activity....In a great arc, Arago’s speech spans the 
field of new technologies, from astrophysics to philology: alongside the prospects of 
photographing the stars and planets we find the idea of establishing a photographic record of the 
Egyptian hieroglyphs.”9  
The chemistry of photography provided the technological capability to fix what seemed 
to be an indubitably empirical picture of the world. Yet the very fact that this world was a world 
                                                          
7
 See Geoffrey Batchen, Burning with Desire: The Conception of Photography (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 
8
 See François Jean Dominique Arago, “Report,” in Classic Essays on Photography, ed. Alan Trachtenberg (Stony 
Creek, CT: Leete’s Island Books, 1980). 
9
 Walter Benjamin, “Little History of Photography,” in The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological 
Reproducibility and Other Writings on Media, ed. Michael. W. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, Thomas Y. Levin, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott, Rodney Livingstone, Howard Eiland, and Others (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 
275.   
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of pictures meant also that photography opened a new aesthetic field rife with argument and 
contest. Hence nineteenth-century photographic discourse was obsessed with the question of 
whether photography was a science or an art. Very different material practices emerged from this 
divided constitution. Pictorialism, for example, the first art movement of photography (discussed 
in chapter three) codified an aesthetic program for photography in order to raise it to the cultural 
respectability of the fine arts. But simultaneously photography was pressed into the service of the 
sciences, particularly sociology and criminology, with the aim of making them more “objective.” 
Nineteenth-century photography’s divided constitution – divided between art and science – 
struggled over what the veridical status of photography was. Was photography objective or not? 
Could it express or only record? The photographer of the nineteenth century, like the field of 
photography itself, was also divided by philosophical, aesthetic, and scientific contestations. This 
fractured figure of the photographer is imaged in the writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and 
Cameron in the form of explicit arguments and, just as frequently, through implicit rhetorical 
tensions, lapses, contradictions, and paralogisms. At the level of argument and rhetoric there is a 
marked symptomatic ambivalence and uncertainty in these texts concerning what photography 
was and what as a consequence it meant or could mean to be a photographer. Each text also has a 
marked psychological dimension insofar as each poses the question: Who (or what) am I as a 
photographer? 
1.2 A Photographer 
To access this psychological dimension, it is necessary to press beyond the theoretical 
confines of subject position theory. Whereas Foucault, or at least the early Foucault, was content 
to theorize the subject solely in terms of its position in a field of historical discourse and 
knowledge practices, it is the claim of this study that it is necessary to also take note of how that 
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position was experienced, lived, and narrated by those who occupied it. The strong form of 
subject position theory, which deemphasizes the subject’s lived life, fails to account for the fact 
that the way historical subjects understand their experience recursively affects how they are 
socially positioned at any given time. Hence subject position theory is here supplemented with a 
view that theorizes the relation between the discursive positioning of the photographer and how 
a photographer understands and experiences that positioning as a dialogical and dynamical 
system. This dissertation seeks a third way between the structural view of the subject as a 
position in a knowledge-power grid and a psycho-biographical view that sees a knowledge 
subject as an embodied and psychical being. Methodologically, this study aims to maintain a 
double vision: one eye is focused on the photographer as a subject position and the other is on a 
photographer, in their respective cases, Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. This study thus 
takes a “parallax view” in Slavoj Žižek’s sense in its attempt to methodologically oscillate 
between the perspective of the photographer and the perspective of a photographer.
10
 In order to 
properly situate the arguments of this study, it will be helpful at this point to sketch the 
genealogy of photography studies. What this sketch reveals is a theoretical convergence of two 
lines of inquiry—photography theory and biographical criticism— that stretches from at least the 
1960s to the present. It is at the juncture of this theoretical convergence that this study is situated.  
1.3 Photography, Theory, and Biographical Criticism 
 Despite the abundance of studies on the lives and works of individual photographers as 
well as the expanding corpus of theoretical writings on photography, there has yet to be any 
sustained investigation of the photographer’s emergence as a historical subject. Monographs on 
photographers typically follow either implicitly or explicitly the methodological cues of art 
                                                          
10
 See Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge; London: MIT Press, 2006). 
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history. The force of art history’s impress on photography studies is due to the simple fact that 
art history was the first discipline to take photography seriously as a subject of academic inquiry. 
The art-historical institutionalization of photography by the mid-twentieth century led by major 
institutions such as The Museum of Modern Art in New York catalyzed a vast academic 
territorialization of photography. Edward Steichen (who was also a photographer), Helmut 
Gernsheim, John Szarkowski, and many other art historians developed historical models as well 
as formal criteria with which to aesthetically assess photographs and the achievement of 
individual photographers. Szarkowski’s work in particular offers a precedent for this study.  
Szarkowski curated an exhibition titled The Photographer’s Eye for the Museum of 
Modern Art in 1966. The exhibition’s catalogue essay lays out five elements that Szarkowski 
claims characterize the essential features of the photographer’s way of seeing: the thing-in-itself, 
time, frame, detail, and vantage point.
11
 The photographer, Szarkowski argues, sees the world as 
a series of spatio-temporal cuts – “slice[s] of time as well as space” in Susan Sontag’s words.12 
The photographer’s eye prizes the spatio-temporal fragment: the photographic analog to the 
thing-in-itself of philosophy. The photographer according to Szarkowski is principally a way of 
seeing or observing (a thesis that presages Crary’s to some extent). Szarkowski’s reading of the 
photographer ingeniously presses beyond the coordinates of art history. Szarkowski is less 
interested in arguing that the photographer is an artist than in showing that the photographer is a 
way of being conditioned by the particular and peculiar exigencies of seeing the world through 
the camera. Despite its promises, however, Szarkowski’s project passed into history 
underdeveloped in part because the intellectual climate of the mid-1960s was soon to change in 
                                                          
11
 John Szarkowski, The Photographer’s Eye (New York: MOMA, 1966), intro.  
12
 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Picador, 1977), 22. 
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ways that would prove hostile to Szarkowski’s seemingly subject-centric account of 
photography. 
 The humanities underwent a profound shift in the late 1960s. Politics, history, the subject, 
the unconscious, and much else were radically re-theorized in an effort to forge a path beyond 
the enclosure of rationalism. One text in particular defined the emerging theoretical climate of 
the 1960s: “The Death of the Author” by Roland Barthes, who as will be shown, all but reversed 
his position in his last book on photography. In “The Death of the Author,” Barthes memorably 
argues that the Author (always capitalized) is a metaphysical idea: the literary equivalent to the 
god of theology and the “subject” of Cartesianism. Against the theological imposture of the 
Author, Barthes asserts the reader’s interpretive rights. The essay’s last lines are among its most 
memorable and polemical: 
The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed 
without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin [the Author] but in its 
destination [the reader]. Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is 
without history, biography, and psychology…We are now beginning to let ourselves be 
fooled no longer…we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the 
myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.
13
 
These impassioned lines sum up Barthes’ thinking at this time. His critical work of this period 
advocates an anti-humanist and anti-psychological mode of criticism in favor of one based on the 
findings of linguistics. A literary text in Barthes’ view is to be studied not as the psycho-
biographical expression of an Author but rather as a constellation of linguistic structures, rules, 
and conventions that condition and regulate a text’s meaning. Barthes’ strident call to liberate 
                                                          
13
 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: The 
Noonday Press, 1977), 148. 
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literary studies from the theological thrall of the Author and subject resonated with similar calls 
to “deconstruct the subject” and to dispense with humanism issued by Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Derrida, Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan, and many others. However, Barthes’ critical stance 
steadily transformed throughout the 1970s. By the time of his last publication in 1980, it had 
changed radically. Barthes’ last text—Camera Lucida—is about photography.  
Camera Lucida is intensely personal and intensely speculative. Barthes’ text traces out a 
theoretical trajectory from the search for the essence of photography to the search to find in 
photographs the essence of the author’s mother who had recently died. That this seeming 
reversal of Barthes’ critical stance—from a largely anti-humanist, anti-authorial, and anti-
biographically oriented criticism to an autobiographical, pathos-laden, and deeply subjective 
mode—was effected through a critical engagement with photography should not go unnoticed. 
The critical strategies Barthes had employed in his studies of literature and culture seemed to 
break down in the case of photography. 
Barthes sees photographs as affective instruments. Hence the psychological state and 
status of the viewer or the spectator is taken by Barthes to be a necessary component of the 
critical project he undertakes in his “reflections on photography.”14 This concern for the 
spectator echoes Barthes’ privileging of the reader in “The Death of the Author.” But the 
spectator of Camera Lucida is not synonymous with the reader of “The Death of the Author.” 
The spectator, Barthes’ “I,” is a melancholic subject and not that purely positional void or open 
“space” that he had earlier identified as the reader. Barthes’ takes his “I” with all its emotional 
baggage as both the final arbiter and subject of his analysis of the affective power of 
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photography. Barthes writes: “I decided to take myself as mediator for all Photography.”15 
Barthes dispenses with the voice of the dispassionate critic and gives free reign to his taste and 
his emotional state. He writes: “I decided to take as a guide for my new analysis the attraction I 
felt for certain photographs.”16 Barthes then proceeds to systematize this attraction by dividing 
his responses into two sets to which he gives the Latin names: studium and punctum.  
Studium names that part of a photograph that the viewer instantly recognizes because the 
viewer belongs to the world of signs of which it is a part. It is the part of the photograph that is 
subordinated or subject to one’s cultural knowledge. Barthes writes that the studium is that 
which “I invest...with my sovereign consciousness.”17 The punctum by contrast, Barthes notes, is 
that part of a photograph that surprises and can at times even overwhelm the viewer with 
affective force. It leaps out, writes Barthes, “like an arrow and pierces me” and with it the 
surrounding banality of the studium.
18
 While many scholars have made much use of the 
studium/punctum contrast for the analysis of photographs, the significance of Barthes’ insight 
lies elsewhere.
19
  
Studium and punctum are less elementary building blocks for a theory of photography 
writ large than elementary motifs of Barthes’ singularly therapeutic attempt to come to grips with 
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a confounding chiasmus of desire and grief: the desire he feels for certain photographs and the 
grief that attends his desire to find his mother in them: 
at the moment of reaching the essence of photography in general, I branched off; instead 
of following the path of a formal ontology (of a Logic), I stopped, keeping with me, like a 
treasure, my desire or my grief; the anticipated essence of the Photograph could not, in 
my mind, be separated from the ‘pathos’ of which, from the first glance, it consists. I was 
like that friend who had turned to Photography only because it allowed him to 
photograph his son.
20
 
Barthes rather abruptly shifts his focus away from speculating on the ontology of photography. 
He opts instead to do what he calls a “casual phenomenology” of his personal reactions to a 
select set of photographs.
21
 This highly personal mode of criticism marks a complete break with 
his earlier critical commitments. Camera Lucida marks Barthes’ turn from a theory based on the 
sign to one based on psychical and embodied experience. The radically subjective approach 
Barthes’ forges in Camera Lucida cancels out the possibility of deriving anything like a general 
theory of photography or photographic spectatorship. What is nominated as studium and 
punctum in every instance reflects the particular and peculiar view of Barthes – a psychically 
situated and culturally specific spectator.  
 Shawn Michelle Smith has pointed out that the problematic subjectivism of Barthes 
analytic schema – studium/punctum – is most strikingly revealed in the racist and paternalist tone 
he strikes in his reading in Camera Lucida of James Van Der Zee’s family portrait of 1926.22 
Barthes sees the photograph as evidence of the photographed family’s “touching” attempt “to 
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assume the White Man’s attributes.”23 Barthes goes on to assert that one of the two women 
pictured in the photograph is wearing a necklace, a “slender ribbon of braided gold.”24 This 
necklace reminds Barthes of one worn by his aunt. He then recalls that his aunt had died an “old 
maid” and that he is “saddened” whenever he thinks of “her dreary life.”25 Smith points out, 
however, that both women in the Van Der Zee photograph are wearing necklaces and neither of 
them is made of gold. Both are in fact necklaces of pearl. Smith writes: “Barthes’ failure to 
remember the precise attributes of a piece of jewelry is only a slight offense…What is disturbing 
is not the erasure of a pearl necklace for a gold but the effacement of an African American 
woman under the sign of Barthes’ aunt.”26 
 Barthes’ reading of the Van der Zee photograph reveals less about the photograph and 
more about Barthes’ cultural and historical location, perspective, and habit of mind. What is 
specifically “white” about dressing up for a family portrait, and why does Barthes so uncritically 
assume that his aunt led a “dreary life” simply because she did not marry? Barthes presents his 
point of view as if it is a matter of fact, but in fact it is an ideological expression of racism and 
paternalism: the studium here is composed of the cultural codes of race and sex. Barthes’ reading 
of the Van der Zee family portrait, as Smith shows, provides a cautionary tale in the use of the 
studium/punctum dyad. Every invocation of studium and punctum is bound to reveal something 
about the spectator, but may reveal little to nothing about the photographic image in view. The 
strident subjectivism of Camera Lucida undermines its theoretical and critical value. Indeed, 
scholars such as James Elkins have gone so far as to argue that ultimately Camera Lucida is a 
failed project. Elkins notes: 
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It is strange that after all the critical writing of the last twenty-five years on Barthes’s 
‘little book’—so he called it, reminding us how much is really in it—it remains a central 
text, cited almost by default as a source of insights about photography’s ‘essential 
features’… despite the fact that readings by Derrida and others have shown how the text 
fails to provide the theory it initially promises.
27
 
Elkins’ point about Barthes’ failure is important but arguably more so for reasons he overlooks. 
Barthes’ initial project to uncover the ontological essence of photography is importantly seen to 
fail in the text as it runs aground on the grief stricken shoals of Barthes’ stubbornly personal and 
problematic reflections. The text in this sense dramatizes the experience of loss in two ways. It 
dramatizes the loss of Barthes’ mother and dramatizes a theoretical loss of finding the 
ontological essence of photography. Camera Lucida, however, does accomplish a critical feat. 
By foregrounding the importance of the psychical and embodied spectator, Camera Lucida 
extends the reach of photography studies beyond the interpretive confines of the photographic 
image. Camera Lucida exposes the social, psychical, sensuous, personal, and biographical 
complexity of the photographic spectator. But while the spectator figures prominently in Camera 
Lucida, the photographer is all but left out of the picture. 
Barthes makes only a passing comment on the photographer, whom he terms the 
“Operator.” He writes, “of that emotion (or that essence), I could not speak, never having 
experienced it; I could not join the troupe of those (the majority) who deal with Photography-
according-to-the Photographer. I possessed only two experiences: that of the observed subject 
and the subject observing…”28 Barthes’ terms—“subject observing,” and “observed subject”—
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bears a family likeness to Foucault’s conception of subject positions in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge cited earlier. Barthes, like Foucault, defines a subject as a position within a relational 
field. Barthes’ quasi-subject position, however, is not a mere node or point locked in a grid of 
knowledge/power relations. Barthes’ spectator is a body with emotion, feelings, histories, and 
biographies:  a subject of pathos, desire, and grief – or one might say simply – a spectator with 
interiority.
 29
 Sitting for a photograph, Barthes notes, exposes to view “utter interiority without 
yielding intimacy.”30 A photograph of a person, Barthes suggests, enables one to see a being that 
has an interior or even secret life that lies beyond the pale of what can be seen. The photograph 
of a stranger, for example, does not afford the spectator an intimate glimpse into the depths of 
the being in the image, but the very opacity of the photographed subject’s interiority is itself an 
intimate reminder that what is visible in the photograph is also a negative index of what is 
invisible – a psychical and embodied depth that necessarily escapes the photograph’s depthless 
surface.  
It is the argument of this dissertation that what is true of the photographed subject is also 
true of the one who identifies as a photographer. The appellation “photographer” like the 
photograph both accommodates and limits the one who is framed by the term. This study seeks 
to flesh out the operator or the photographer as position and passion. This requires constellating 
elements of biographical criticism with that of its seeming opposite – subject position theory. 
This move is not without precedent. Barthes’ critical enthusiasm for autobiographical thinking 
late in his career set precedent for certain postmodernists eager to find a way to revive the study 
of biography and autobiography without reanimating a Cartesian metaphysics of the subject. The 
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renewal of scholarly interest in biographical criticism took a decisive turn in 1991 with the 
publication of a volume of essays titled Contesting the Subject: Essays in the Postmodern Theory 
and Practice of Biography and Biographical Criticism. 
 Contesting the Subject forges a third way between the critical binary of life and text. 
Contributors to the volume identify as “postmodern” insofar as they challenge modern 
conceptions of the author and its philosophical correlate, the unified self. But they part ways with 
many postmodernists in that they see much of postmodern criticism as offering a simplistic 
critique of the author and subject. The volume deepens the study and critique of the author and 
the subject through a sustained engagement of the canonical texts of the post-authorial critical 
tradition. 
 Stanley Fish strikes a strident tone in his contribution to Contesting the Subject. Fish 
argues that to interpret something is to ascribe an intentional agency responsible for the thing’s 
existence. To interpret something according to Fish is to see it as the product of “intentional 
behavior.” According to Fish, one simply cannot interpret rivers, snowflakes, beaches, icicles, 
and so on. But one can interpret utterances, buildings, paintings, bird calls, photographs, cars and 
the like. Fish writes that “the act of construing meaning is ipso facto the act of assigning 
intention…you just cannot do one without the other.”31 The only logically legitimate subject of 
interpretation, argues Fish, is intentional behavior; this is the only subject to which one can 
ascribe meaning.  Snowflakes are, for example, meaningless in and of themselves. If snowflakes 
are said to be meaningful by some person, then it is to that person that one must turn for further 
clarification. The same is true of statements. Fish agrees that it does seem right to think that a 
critic can choose to interpret a statement as either the product of an intentional subject or solely 
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as a linguistic specimen. But this apparent choice, Fish argues, is an illusion since “the one thing 
you cannot do is read or hear [a] sentence without already having received it as the expression of 
an intentional being, with a particular, as opposed to a universal, history.”32 Fish argues thus that 
it logically follows that one cannot read any statement “independently of biography, of some 
specification of what kind of person – and with what abilities, concerns, goals, purposes, and so 
on – is the source of the words you are reading.”33 To interpret the meaning of any statement, 
according to Fish, necessitates inquiring as to who or what is speaking. And to understand a 
speaker means understanding something of the life of the speaker. 
While Fish’s view of interpretation seems clearly opposed to postmodern conceptions of 
the subject promulgated by Barthes and Foucault among others, Fish rightly points out that 
Foucault acknowledges that to an extent the question of the Author cannot be resolved by simply 
turning the page as it were. In “What is an Author” of 1969, Foucault writes: “It is obviously 
insufficient to repeat empty slogans: the author has disappeared; God and man died a common 
death.”34 Foucault argues that facile attempts to dispense with the author by relegating the 
invention of texts to social, historical, political, or linguistic codes and conventions are as 
unsatisfactory as ascribing metaphysical powers to authorial figures. Foucault notes that in 
reading a work by “delimiting psychological and biographical references, suspicions arise 
concerning the absolute nature and creative role of the subject.”35 But he avers that the subject 
should not be entirely “abandoned” but rather “should be reconsidered.”36 Having glanced at this 
possibility, however, Foucault quickly turns his back on it. Foucault reaffirms that questions of 
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the author are best confined to asking “under what conditions and through what forms can an 
entity like the subject appear in the order of discourse; what position does it occupy; what 
functions does it exhibit; and what rules does it follow in each type of discourse?”37 Foucault 
readily admits, however, that this critical strategy effects an ultimately unsatisfactory 
transposition of “the empirical characteristics of an author into a transcendental anonymity.”38 
Fish concurs and responds by extending and radicalizing Foucault’s concern. Fish maintains that 
even “if the originating author is dissolved into a series of functions…, then we have not done 
away with intention and biography, but merely relocated them… [T]o read something as the 
product of any one of these ‘transcendental anonymities’ is to endow that anonymity with an 
intention and a biography.”39  
Fish’s argument can be transposed into photographic terms. A photograph can be 
interpreted solely in terms of its formal properties. But even a formal interpretation, Fish argues, 
implicitly ascribes an agency and a biography to it. To say that a photograph is composed is to 
state that it is marked by a structure of formal significance. The only reason this structure is 
significant is because it is meaningful and it is only meaningful, Fish argues, because it is the 
product of intentional behavior. 
Fish’s argument is fascinating. It points up the weaknesses of taking either a hardline 
intentionality or anti-intentionality stance. Fish argues that agency and intentionality are 
categorically inescapable in that they are constitutive presuppositions of criticism itself. His 
argument retains the concept of authorial intent as a matter of logic. In this respect, Fish’s 
position reverses Barthes’s. Whereas Barthes positions himself against authorial intent by 
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drawing on linguistic-logical arguments, Fish uses the same form of reasoning to buttress an 
opposing claim. Barthes uses logic and language to pronounce the concept of the Author dead; 
Fish uses the same reasoning to grant the Author critical immunity. Neither Barthes nor Fish, 
however, press beyond the realm of language and logic to interrogate authorship as an 
experience. For Barthes and for Fish, the Author is a linguistic concept and not a mode of being.  
Cheryl Walker, by contrast, seeks to understand authorship as an embodied and lived 
experience. Walker’s contribution to Contesting the Subject, “Persona Criticism and the Death of 
the Author,” argues contra Fish that authorial claims do not institute a biography per se, but 
rather construct a “persona” or “personae.”40 For Walker, Barthes’ contention that the Author is 
simply a metaphysical, even theological, fiction that must be put to death grossly inflates an 
author precisely into the Author. Walker views this inflation of the author as unnecessary and 
misguided. The author for Walker is a persona that emerges halfway between the text and the life 
of the writer. The claim of authorship does not itself make any particular claim on intentionality 
in anything more than a provisional sense. In the course of writing, Walker argues, it is in fact 
difficult to discern “who” is writing or whose intentions are at play for, to an extent, the author’s 
biography changes each time he or she writes since the biography comes to include whatever text 
the writer is writing at the moment. Thus rather than seek to reify a model of the author as an 
intentional subject, a god to be killed, or an inescapable law of language, Walker advocates the 
view that the author is as variable and various as the texts the writer writes. Each text gives rise 
to its own subject, its own personification, or persona that retrospectively comes to represent the 
author. On Walker’s view there is, for example, a persona germane to Capital by Marx and 
another persona germane to The German Ideology. This is the logic behind the oft-heard 
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construction “the Marx of The German Ideology is ultimately still Hegelian” or the “Marx of 
Capital is the mature Marx,” and the like. These “Marxs” are personae born of text, time, and 
interpretation. Personae exist in the interstices between texts and contexts. Hence Walker writes 
that “the persona critic” should “reflect on the way the forms of authorial representation 
available in the text open it to other texts.”41 This critical strategy draws attention to the 
“diversity of investments” open to the writer, which “allows one to speak of authorship as 
multiple involving culture, psyche, intertextuality, as well as biographical data about the 
writer.”42 Walker’s persona criticism plays a significant role in this study because it offers an 
invaluable means to conceptualize how an individual consciously and unconsciously shapes the 
image of themselves through creative action, which is always embedded in social and historical 
contexts.  
By the late 1990s scholars of visual culture also began to rethink biographical criticism. 
Linda Haverty-Rugg’s Picturing Ourselves of 1997, for example, studies the relation between 
autobiography and photography. Haverty-Rugg’s interest is primarily in photography’s capacity 
to create a fiction of the self. She approaches the theme of the fabrication (and fictionalization) 
of the self by taking a case study approach to four writers: Mark Twain, August Strindberg, 
Christa Wolf, and Walter Benjamin. Her inquiry into each case study is framed by contemporary 
concerns over linguistic and historical reference. Haverty-Rugg writes: “Over the past two 
decades, an essential question has been debated by scholars of autobiography: can we ‘touch the 
world’ in writing? Can an autobiographical text refer to a subject outside the text? Does a self 
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create its autobiography, or does autobiography create its self.”43 Haverty-Rugg argues that 
photography intervenes on this question in a unique and powerful way. Noting the complexity of 
the life/text relation in biographical theory and practice, Haverty-Rugg writes that closely 
paralleled with this is the question of “the relationship of photography to the world.”44 
Photography and biography both reveal the tangled complexities of representation and reference. 
Haverty-Rugg’s aim is to understand how the concept of referent in both biography and 
photography is shaped by one’s relationship to each as a reader or spectator. Haverty-Rugg is 
interested in how biographical and photographic referents are inferred through the embodied 
experience of reading and seeing. She thus resists the textualist temptation to reduce biography 
to a system of rhetoric or a photograph to a combination of light and shadow. Haverty-Rugg’s 
work is invaluable. But her focus on individuals leaves the larger social sphere of photography 
largely untouched.   
 Ariella Azoulay, by contrast, has forged a unique analysis of the social dimensions of 
photographic production and circulation. In The Civil Contract of Photography, Azoulay draws 
on eighteenth-century models of social contract theory in order to conceptualize how social 
formations arise though photography and what politically follows from them. Azoulay 
conceptualizes photography as a field of action in which the taking of a photograph constitutes a 
social “event.”45 The actors involved in this event—the photographer, the photographed, and the 
photograph’s spectators—constitute what she calls a “photographic situation.”46 The 
“photographic situation” theoretically spans the present location of the photographic event and 
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its future viewers situated in other times and locales. The “photographic situation” thus 
constellates together diverse social actors in different times and places that are brought actually 
and virtually together through photography. Photography as imaged by Azoulay is a contracting 
medium that binds people and places together.  
Azoulay’s key argument is that no single photographic actor can reasonably claim 
sovereign ownership over the photographic situation since the event of photography establishes a 
sociality that is shared. In an essay simply titled “Photography,” Azoulay writes: “Human 
subjects, occupying different roles in the event of photography, do play one or another part in it, 
but the encounter is never entirely in the sole control of any of them; no one is the sole signatory 
to the event of photography.”47 The form of seeing made possible by photography, argues 
Azoulay, is technologically, and therefore socially and historically, mediated. Each participant in 
the photographic situation effectively signs away the “right to preserve his or her own 
autonomous visual field.”48 Photography consigns them to a form of social belonging “not 
synchronized or controlled by a sovereign power,” but one that is instead constituted at once in 
“different places and by different people who are bound together in civil association on account 
of photography.”49  
 Azoulay opens to view aspects of the social and political dimensions of photographic 
action, but her model neither accounts for the psychical specificity of the roles played by 
spectators, photographers, and photographed subjects nor the historical process by which they 
emerged. Media theorist, Celia Lury, attempts to cross this chasm by conceptualizing 
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photography as a prosthetic engagement that binds individuals, technologies, and social bodies, 
and produces novel modes of individuation and socialization.
50
  
In Prosthetic Culture, Lury poses the question of how subjects come to see themselves 
and others though the prosthetic perspective of photography. Lury terms this practice of seeing 
simply “seeing photographically.”51 The camera, for Lury, is a prosthetic that simultaneously 
constructs and enables subjectivities to move into and inhabit what Azoulay calls “the arena of 
photography.”52 Because photography alters one’s perception of the world, it necessarily impacts 
the perception of oneself and others, whether consciously or not. Lury is ultimately interested in 
the psychical and cultural histories of how people come to see themselves though prostheses of 
their own making. The history of photography is Lury’s prime example. Photography gives its 
user a prosthetic eye and memory with which to capture and hold an image of others. This very 
capacity, however, changes the camera operator by reorienting her position and perspective with 
respect to the photographed subject and vice versa. Lury’s project admirably recounts the 
emergence of prosthetic culture by tracing the dissemination of photographic technologies and 
practices, and their impact on knowledge fields, but it does not specifically address the psychical 
and social novelty of the subject position of the nineteenth-century photographer since her focus 
is primarily on the development of twentieth-century prosthetic culture.  
As previously noted, a groundbreaking account of the role of photography in subject 
formation is given by Jonathan Crary in Techniques of the Observer. Crary breaks with art-
historical (and art-history inspired) accounts of nineteenth-century visual culture. Crary’s 
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innovative work jettisons the narrative convention according to which changes in visual 
representation (and perception) in the nineteenth century are seen as the outcome of a dialectical 
antagonism between avant-gardism and academicism. As Crary puts it: “What this book takes as 
its object is not the empirical data of artworks or the ultimately idealist notion of an isolable 
‘perception,’ but instead the no less problematic phenomenon of the observer.”53 Crary locates 
the emergence of the nineteenth-century “observer” at the nexus of a set of optical technologies – 
photography primarily – and related practices of seeing. 
Crary’s Foucauldianism is clearly visible throughout Techniques of the Observer. While 
Crary’s focus on the “observer” might suggest a traditional subject-centered account, Crary is 
quick to clarify his theoretical intent. He writes: “If it can be said that there is an observer 
specific to the nineteenth century, or to any period, it is only as an effect of an irreducibly 
heterogeneous system of discursive, social, technological, and institutional relations.”54 The 
italicization of the term “effect” in the above passage signals Crary’s methodological 
identification with Foucault’s argument that a subject is produced by, and is an effect of, 
discourses and knowledge/power practices. Crary writes: “I want to delineate an observing 
subject who was both a product of and at the same time constitutive of modernity in the 
nineteenth century.”55 Crary argues that this novel observer of the nineteenth century, constituted 
by “a process of modernization,” became the prototypical modern subject – a subject “adequate 
to a constellation of new events, forces, and institutions that together are loosely and perhaps 
tautologically definable as ‘modernity.’”56 
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 Despite some similarities to Crary’s project, this study is in detail radically different. 
Firstly, this study argues that technical and technological processes, while important, are not as 
singularly determinant as Crary’s study suggests. The relation between techniques and 
technologies and subject positions is understood here not as unidirectional causal processes 
whereby a technologically specific technique (say of observation) effects the production of a 
specific subject position. This study instead advocates a dynamical, bidirectional model as will 
be explained in chapter two. Secondly, this study is concerned with the emergence of a much 
more specific subject position – the photographer – which is both an observing and producing 
subject. Thirdly, this study argues that it is necessary for historical and theoretical reasons to 
stress the role played by autobiographical narration in the production of the nineteenth-century 
photographer. Fourthly, the argument of this study is built on individual case studies. This 
difference is not only a matter of methodological preference, but of argumentative necessity. 
Whereas Crary seeks to de-personalize his account of the observer, I argue it is necessary to 
account for how practitioners understood themselves as photographers since that very self-
understanding is part and parcel of the historical record. 
1.4 Scope 
 The scope of this study is at once restrictive and expansive. It is restrictive in that it 
restricts itself to a detailed reading of three texts by three of the most important photographers of 
the nineteenth century: Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. But it is expansive in that my aim is 
to sketch the broad historical and theoretical contours of the nineteenth-century photographer. It 
is my argument that the photographer qua historical subject position cannot be adequately 
described or theorized without reference to a photographer. But a photographer only makes 
sense when understood in the broader context of the emergence of the photographer as a novel 
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subject position. The photographer and a photographer are inextricably entwined: discussing one 
invariably circles round into discussing the other. But the relation between the two is not simply 
circular. The photographer, I argue, came into being through the interrelation of photographic 
technologies, discourses, and practices on the one hand and modes of self-understanding, 
including autobiographical narration, on the other. 
1.5 Outline of Chapters 
 Chapter two lays out a theoretical framework for reading the case studies. I combine 
elements of Foucault’s concept of the subject position with the work of Peter Sloterdijk, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, and Walter Benjamin. Foucault, particularly the early Foucault of The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, provides a way of interpreting the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and 
Cameron as what I call “points” that pinpoint specific discursive sites within the historical epoch 
of nineteenth-century photography. Robinson marks a site at which a discourse of the 
photographer as at once artist and bourgeois subject comes into focus; Rejlander indexes the 
fractious rhetoric of the art versus photography debate that divided the subject position of the 
nineteenth-century photographer; and Cameron illuminates the constraining norms of nineteenth-
century photographic practice, particularly the norm of “still” photography, as well as the 
constraining norms of Victorian domesticity and femininity. I supplement this “point” reading of 
Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron with the “spherological” perspective provided by Sloterdijk’s 
Bubbles, the first installment of his philosophical trilogy titled Spheres.  
 Bubbles offers a compelling retelling of the history of the Western conception of the 
modern subject, subjectivity, and selfhood as imaged by the sphere. With reference to a dizzying 
array of examples drawn from philosophy, literature, religion, medicine, cosmology, and more, 
Sloterdijk convincingly shows how the sphere has been central to the subject of the Western 
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imaginary. Sloterdijk’s main argument is that modernity – beginning sometime in the early 
fifteenth century – underwent a succession of traumatic events from Copernicus to Freud. The 
protective shells or spheres that had metaphysically protected the human subject were 
successively shattered. With each de-shelling of the subject, modernity responded with various 
social, political, psychical, and spiritual therapies that sought – but always failed – to reestablish 
the protective metaphysical enclosure of the pre-modern world. Sloterdijk’s perspective 
resonates, as I show, with Merleau-Ponty’s recasting of the subject as a subject of embodiment 
and Walter Benjamin’s vision of the modern subject as traumatized by the onslaught of the 
modern world. Together Foucault, Sloterdijk, Merleau-Ponty, and Benjamin enable me to read 
the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron with an eye to their significance both as historical 
documents that speak to the emergence of the nineteenth-century photographer in and through a 
set of discursive contexts, and as autobiographical attempts to hollow out a space – a bubble – to 
house and develop Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s emergent sense of themselves as 
photographers.  
 Chapter three examines the case of Henry Peach Robinson. I focus largely on a close 
reading of Robinson’s 1891 text – The Studio and What to Do in It. I argue that the text presents 
a vivid picture of the ontological crisis that attended pictorialist photography, art-photography’s 
first major aesthetic movement, of which Robinson was a pioneer and chief theoretician. I argue 
that despite repeated and failed attempts to ground photography, and the photographer, on the 
seemingly contradictory bases of art and middle class values, Robinson’s text ultimately fails to 
provide a coherent ontological definition of photography. What precisely one is to do in the 
photography studio ironically is unanswered by Robinson’s text despite its confident, 
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pedagogical tone. Hence the text negatively points to the problematic nature of the cultural 
identity of the nineteenth-century photographer. 
 Chapter four examines the case of Oscar G. Rejlander. My reading focuses largely on 
Rejlander’s 1863 text, “An Apology for Art-Photography.” The text’s title suggests that it 
provides a defense or an apology for art-photography. It does not. The text is actually a strange, 
often baffling, autobiographical fragment in which Rejlander attempts to retrace his entrance into 
photographic practice. Multiple personae and sudden shifts in scene and setting undermine the 
text’s coherence. But this incoherence, I argue, reveals Rejlander’s struggle to narrate and come 
to grips with what he had become in becoming a photographer. The “Apology” provides the 
reader with a personal and paradigmatic portrait of the advent of a photographer, and thus also 
the photographer. 
 Chapter five examines the case of Julia Margaret Cameron. The chapter focuses on a 
reading of Cameron’s autobiographical text – Annals of My Glass House – published in 1874. 
Like Rejlander’s “Apology,” Cameron’s Annals presents the story of Cameron’s entrance into 
photographic practice. But unlike Rejlander’s writing, and for that matter Robinson’s, Cameron’s 
text is apparently free of ontological anxieties concerning the nature of photography. Her text 
rebounds with the joys of becoming in ways otherwise than those prescribed by nineteenth-
century norms of photographic practice – her use of soft-focus being the most obvious example 
of this – as well as the joys (and trials) of becoming otherwise than the norms of Victorian 
domesticity and femininity demanded. Cameron’s writing opens to view the emergence of the 
photographer who saw the identity crisis of early photography as an incentive and an opportunity 
to transcend its conventions and prescriptions, and in so doing change not only how photography 
could be made but also what one could become in and through that making. 
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 Chapter six offers a conclusion in which I return to where I began – to the contemporary 
photographer. Using my mother as an example of the contemporary photographer’s position, I 
ask: what is different and the same about the contemporary photographer as compared to its 
nineteenth-century predecessor? I argue that the question of the identity of photography and the 
photographer has lost the existential gravitas it held in the nineteenth century. But nonetheless 
this very shift is in part a historical consequence of the advent and development of the 
nineteenth-century photographer. 
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Chapter 2 
Framing the Cases 
 The photographer qua subject position and a photographer are historically intertwined. 
The social and historical forces that converged to produce photography opened operational 
positions that new subjects called “photographers” came to occupy. Photographers have 
historically inflected the social and historical condition of photography and in turn opened other 
ways to be a photographer by incorporating photography into the sphere of self-understanding. 
The self-conscious photographer is at once a position in the historical and social field and a set of 
lived practices. To do justice to the words, works, and lives of Robinson, Rejlander, and 
Cameron and to the history of the photographer’s emergence, it is crucial to resist reductionism 
in either direction. Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron are neither solely a set of points that mark 
the historical emergence of the nineteenth-century photographer nor are they names for three 
irreducible biographical singularities. These names mark points in the emergence of the 
nineteenth-century photographer and they signify a set of lived practices. 
 The processes by which each photographer came to an awareness of himself or herself as 
a photographer is a case study in the formation of identity through photography, a technology 
which in the nineteenth century was still in its infancy. At that time photography’s position in the 
social and historical field was constitutively unsettled and fraught with contest and controversy 
by the ontological dispute that split photography between art and science. Thus the writings of 
Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron are cases studies in the formation of autobiographical 
personae within the contested space of early photographic discourse and practice. 
 This chapter theorizes the photographer as iterated in texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and 
Cameron by combining aspects of Foucault’s conceptualization of the subject as a position in the 
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social and historical field with Peter Sloterdijk’s re-thinking of human interiority in Bubbles, 
Merleau-Ponty’s prizing of embodiment, and Benjamin’s concept of modernity as traumatic 
condition. I begin with a brief introduction to the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. 
Section two draws on Foucault’s early work, particularly The Archaeology of Knowledge, in 
order to situate the subject position announced in these texts as well as to point out the 
methodological limits of this approach. Section three supplements Foucault’s privileging of 
positionality with Sloterdijk’s re-conceptualization of interiority through what he calls a theory 
of “microspherology.”57 Whereas Foucault sees the subject as historically produced by external 
(social and political) forces or more broadly “power,” and is generally dismissive of psychology, 
Sloterdijk is interested in the history of how subjects have developed interiorizing perspectives. 
Neither embracing nor rejecting the metaphysics of various forms of Cartesianism, Sloterdijk 
instead seeks to describe the historically human impulse to picture oneself as a container of 
emotions, thoughts, dreams, fantasies, fears, and hopes. I go on in turn to supplement Sloterdijk’s 
model of the subject with the concept of embodied discourse provided by Merleau-Ponty, and 
finally end with Benjamin’s thinking of the modern subject as a subject of trauma, which 
resonates with Sloterdijk’s picture of the fragile, always-about-to-be-de-shelled subject. In sum, 
the chapter seeks to forge a third way between Foucault’s subject position and Sloterdijk’s 
sphere in an effort to establish a perspective from which it is possible to see the photographer as 
at once a subject position and a photographer as a set of lived practices.  
2.1 The Cases 
 Nineteenth-century photography was a diverse amalgam of discourses, practices, and 
technologies that constructed new ways of seeing and knowing that in turn engendered 
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competing theories on the nature of photographic vision. Confusion and controversy centered on 
the question of whether photographic practice was a means to reveal objective optical truth or 
whether it was a medium for subjective expression. Cutting through this complex discursive 
manifold were social, cultural, and political concerns with what it meant to be a photographer, 
who had the right to call oneself a photographer, and what openings and obstacles confronted the 
effort to envision oneself as a photographer. The contestations that constituted nineteenth-
century photography positioned the photographer in multiple and differing ways. Each case 
study offers a unique perspective on the incredibly diversified field that was early photography. 
It will be useful at this stage, then, to briefly introduce my three case studies. 
 Henry Peach Robinson was born in Ludlow, England and died in 1901. He was the eldest 
of four children born to John Robinson, a teacher, and his wife Eliza. The young Henry took 
drawing lessons for a brief spell before taking up an apprenticeship in the bookselling trade. He 
stayed in the book trade through the early part of his adult life. He first started taking 
photographs in 1855. In the same year he opened a portrait studio in the town of Leamington.
58
 
Portraiture provided a stable source of income for Robinson, but he was avidly seeking to do 
something more aesthetically adventuresome. At that time a trend was beginning to take shape 
amongst aesthetically ambitious photographers in England. These photographers, later known as 
“pictorialists,” took their cues from the so-called Pre-Raphaelites of England. The Pre-
Raphaelites and the pictorialist movement are discussed at greater length in chapter three, but it 
is important to point out for the moment that the Pre-Raphaelites were a group of painters, poets, 
and critics who opposed the doxa of nineteenth-century realism. They rejected both the idealized 
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realism of the Renaissance and that of their contemporaries such as Manet. They instead sought 
to reinvigorate a pre-modern, pre-Renaissance, or pre-Raphaelite aesthetic committed to 
allegorical and spiritual illumination. The Pre-Raphaelites were anti-modernists. Collectively 
they sought to re-enchant realism for the purposes of moral edification. In time Robinson would 
become one of pictorialism’s most steadfast champions and its chief theoretician. 
 Robinson’s pictorialist work met with high praise and his studio practice flourished. But 
at the age of thirty-four he was forced to retire from photography due to ill-health brought on by 
prolonged exposure to hazardous photographic chemicals. His retirement from studio work 
provided him with the opportunity to reflect and, eventually, to write extensively on the practice 
of photography and to engage in the ensuing debate on the aesthetic and artistic merit of the new 
medium. Beginning in 1869 and continuing on for roughly thirty years, Robinson wrote 
instruction manuals for students of photography. Robinson’s The Studio and What to Do in It, 
published in 1891, which is discussed at length in chapter three, exemplifies Robinson’s strategy 
for securing the cultural legitimacy of pictorialist photography. Rather than enter into the 
academic debate on the question of the artistic merit of photography, Robinson sought to secure 
photography’s cultural legitimacy by codifying and disseminating in teachable form pictorialist 
techniques. Rather than win the case for the legitimacy of art-photography through academic 
discussion, Robinson sought to win it practically by training a generation of photographers in 
pictorialist principles. The strategy of converting abstract aesthetic concerns into practical, 
teachable principles centered on an effort to codify a set of techniques for the formation of a 
particular kind of photographer, a particular subject position, namely, that of the pictorialist 
photographer.  
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What Robinson was unable to do, however, as will be shown in chapter three, was to 
identify what photography specifically was beyond vague and unconvincing comparisons to the 
arts of painting and poetry. Likewise too, Robinson gives no account of what it might mean to be 
a photographer in ways not prescribed by pictorialist principles. Robinson’s fidelity to 
pictorialism betrayed a profound anxiety concerning what photography and the photographer 
was or could be. 
 Oscar Gustave Rejlander was born in 1813 in Sweden and relocated in England as a 
young man.
59
 He studied art in Rome in the early 1850s. He married a woman named Mary 
Constable and settled in the industrial town of Wolverhampton. He pursued a career as a painter 
but with limited critical or financial success. In 1852, Rejlander travelled again to Rome where 
he first encountered photographs that struck his interest – reproductions of artworks. Rejlander 
sensed what a benefit these could be to painters who wished to study the Masters but who did not 
have ready access to museums. On his return to England he and his wife moved to London where 
Rejlander began to actively pursue a career as a photographer, first by making photographic 
studies for use by painters. It was through this practice, which proved to be financially 
rewarding, that Rejlander began to experiment with photography in a more profound way. 
Rejlander pioneered the technique of combination printing in which multiple negatives are 
printed together to form the illusion of a single photographic image. It was his mastery of this 
technique that enabled Rejlander to make his most famous photograph, titled The Two Ways of 
Life of 1857. With its forthright depiction of naked women, Two Ways of Life, upset many 
photography critics, including Thomas Sutton who all but dismissed the work as obscene. The 
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ensuing controversy prompted Rejlander to write a short paper that year, titled “An Apology for 
Art-Photography.” He read the paper first at the London Photographic Society, to which he had 
been elected president. It was soon after printed and circulated widely through the photographic 
press.  
Despite its academic sounding title, the “Apology” is really a brief autobiography in 
which Rejlander retraces the steps that led him to take up the study and practice of photography. 
The writing follows an aleatory, meandering path. Unlike Robinson’s writings, this text neither 
presents a case for art-photography in any detail nor does it address the question of how it should 
be made. Rejlander speaks from a place of ambivalence and uncertainty as to what he himself is 
doing in doing photography. The life-story told in the “Apology” is a stitched together collection 
of multiple and conflicting accounts of Rejlander’s origins as a photographer. These accounts are 
told through a series of narrative personae that consistently undermine the essay’s 
autobiographical coherence. The essay demonstrates a self-conscious admission of the crisis of 
identity that haunted early photography and those that practiced it. The “Apology” represents a 
nascent attempt to come to grips with photography on its own terms, which meant embracing the 
crisis of identity that marked its early discursive formation. 
Julia Margaret Cameron was born Julia Margaret Pattle on June 11, 1815 in Calcutta, 
India.
60
  She was the third daughter of James and Adeline Pattle. James Pattle was an official 
with the East India Trading Company. The family was comparatively well off and young 
Margaret was educated in France. Julia Margaret met Charles Hay Cameron, a rising legal 
scholar and practicing lawyer who was twenty-six years her senior and also in the employ of the 
East India Trading Company. Charles Cameron’s intellectual interests were not confined to law. 
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He was also avidly interested in aesthetics. In the early 1840s, Charles published his Essay on the 
Sublime and the Beautiful. Charles’s interest in aesthetics was one reason he was supportive of 
Cameron’s decision to pursue photography. The couple married in February of 1838 in Calcutta 
and moved to London in 1848. 
In England, Cameron began to cultivate an impressive social network that would 
eventually include the poet Alfred Lord Tennyson, the philosopher Thomas Carlyle, and the 
biologist Charles Darwin, among many others. Cameron was an expert socialite and her 
connections proved invaluable for her studio practice. Around 1850, Cameron began to spend 
more and more time at the family’s retreat in the village of Freshwater on the Isle of Wight. Her 
life there was enlivened by frequent visits from Tennyson and other notables from her elite social 
circle. But she was also often lonely as her letters from this time clearly indicate. As her children 
grew, married, or left for school, and with Charles frequently away on business trips abroad, 
Julia Margaret found herself increasingly bereft of the daily domestic routine she was 
accustomed to.  
 By the late 1850s, Cameron began making photography albums as a hobby. These 
lovingly and carefully decorated albums were often made as gifts to her family and friends. It 
was Cameron’s interest in making photographic albums that likely motivated her daughter Juley 
and her husband Norman to give Cameron a camera for a Christmas gift in 1864. Cameron began 
to study photography in earnest at this time. At Freshwater she converted the family chicken 
coop into a studio, which she called (as was common at the time) her “glass house” owing to the 
many skylights she had installed as was needed in the days before electric lighting. Her social 
network provided her with models of means, which enabled her to establish her reputation as a 
portraitist in influential social circles. But her ambitions did not stop there.  
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By the late 1860s, Cameron followed the pictorialist turn and began making art-
photographs based on Classical and Christian themes. She forged a unique aesthetic marked most 
significantly by her use of “soft-focus.” In 1874, Cameron’s work was publicly recognized 
through a travelling retrospective that toured England, America, and the Continent. Cameron 
wrote a short autobiographical memoir titled Annals of My Glass House to accompany the 
exhibition. The text traces Cameron’s entrance into photographic practice and charts her early 
successes and failures. Her writing, like her work, as chapter five demonstrates, offers a 
profound rethinking of the act of photography by foregrounding the body in motion as opposed 
to the poised or forcibly restrained body of “still” photography. The Annals recasts photography 
as a fluid medium in contrast to the rigid codification of techniques espoused by dogmatic 
pictorialists. The Annals marks out a position in the field of nineteenth-century photography 
beyond the stylistic enclosure of pictorialism and its unspoken identity crisis. The very ambiguity 
of photography offered Cameron degrees of freedom for the practice of photography, which in 
turn opened up novel social and psychical spaces within the otherwise restrictive field of 
Victorian gender and class relations. 
Schematically, the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron illumine three distinct 
subject positions within the variegated and contradictory field of nineteenth-century 
photography. Robinson marks the position of the photographer as middle class professional and 
aesthetic challenger to the fine arts. Rejlander marks the confrontation with photography’s 
ontological identity crisis giving rise to a split subject position of the photographer. Cameron 
marks the gendered space of photographic production and the challenge to that space and to the 
rigid, inflexible aesthetic norms of popular and pictorialist practice.  
2.2 Points 
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 The texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron mark social and psychical stress points in 
the constitution of the nineteenth-century photographer. These points or positions lie at the 
interstices between art and science, between nature and machine, between subjective expression 
and objective truth, and masculine and feminine. From a subject position perspective, Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron are names for differing sets of statements and the correlative conditions 
of possibility for making them. It is the Foucault of The Archaeology of Knowledge who 
radically sets the terms of this form of historical reading when he notes:  
the subject of the statement should not be regarded as identical with the author of the 
formulation – either in substance, or in function. He [or she] is not in fact the cause, 
origin, or the starting-point of the phenomenon of the written or spoken articulation of a 
sentence; nor is it that meaningful intention which, silently anticipating words, orders 
them like the visible body of its intuition; it is not the constant, motionless, unchanging 
focus of a series of operations that are manifested, in turn, on the surface of discourse 
through the statements. It is a particular, vacant place that may in fact be filled by 
different individuals.
61
 
Foucault jettisons the idea that a statement is the product of an intentional subject. Rather for 
Foucault it is the speaking or stating subject which is produced through discourse. At any given 
historical moment there exist, Foucault argues, implicit and explicit social rules that regulate 
what can be said. But these rules are flexible.  
 In an earlier text, The Order of Things, Foucault stressed that discourse in any historical 
period is governed by a fixed set of rules that he calls an “episteme.” But in Archaeology he 
abandons the use of that term and calls the system of rules the “archive.” The archive, for 
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Foucault, is not simply a collection of historical facts or documents. Foucault writes: “The 
archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements 
as unique events.”62 Archival analysis, in Foucault’s sense, aims to understand how new or 
“unique” statements appear as such within the regulative structure of a given historical epoch. 
The Foucauldian archival researcher thus seeks out not only what constrains statements at a 
certain historical moment, but also what makes it possible for novel ones to appear. The archive 
(unlike the episteme) is conceptually characterized by flexibility, by the recognition of the 
possibility that the rules of statement making are subject to change. As Lois McNay notes in her 
study of Foucault, “the archive is...not a limiting or constraining formation but an enabling 
system of rules which is never entirely complete and which is, therefore, always open to 
change.”63 Researching the archive, in Foucault’s sense, means researching not merely what it 
was possible to say or do during a certain historical period, but also what rules enabled the 
transformability of statements and acts during that particular time. 
 While the Foucault of Archaeology aims to discover the rules for the production of novel 
historical statements, he is for the most part silent on how “individuals” arrive on the scene of 
discourse and embody positions within it. As McNay notes, “the social processes that determine 
how individuals come to occupy the ‘vacant place’ [of discourse]...is not considered” by 
Foucault.
64
 McNay continues:  
Discursive subject positions become a priori categories which individuals seem to 
occupy in an unproblematic fashion. Indeed ‘different individuals’ [Foucault’s phrase] 
creates difficulties because it implies that individuals have a unified, prediscursive 
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existence which enables them to step freely in and out of the different available subject 
positions.
65
 
Foucault’s later work, however, does seek a more nuanced account of subject formation. 
From the third volume of his History of Sexuality, titled The Care of the Self, clear through the 
Collège de France lectures, Foucault’s thinking focuses squarely on the question of how 
subjectivity and specifically selfhood are constituted through what he calls “techniques of the 
self.”66 Foucault traces the emergence and transformation of the care of the self from Ancient 
Greece and Rome through the Christian era. Foucault’s aim in this later work is to show how the 
care of the self transformed from an ascetic practice in the Ancient world to a moral hindrance in 
the Christian era. Foucault’s late work shifts to a micrological focus on how power and 
knowledge are exercised in intimate relations, including the introspective relation between one’s 
thought and one’s sense of self. Foucault asserts in an interview in 1984 that his later work seeks 
to grasp the historical evolution and function of the “exercise of self upon self by which one tries 
to work out, to transform one’s self and attain a certain mode of being.”67 The interviewer finds 
this surprising. He confesses that he assumed that he, Foucault, had always steadfastly “refused 
to speak about the subject in general.”68 Foucault responds: 
No I had not ‘refused.’ I perhaps had some formulations which were inadequate. What I 
refused was precisely that you first of all set up a theory of the subject –as could be done 
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in phenomenology and existentialism –and that, beginning from a theory of the subject, 
you come to pose the question of knowing, for example, how such and such a form of 
knowledge was possible.
69
 
Foucault is keen to point out that, in his view, his work does not seek to displace the subject per 
se, but rather to displace the philosophic practice of inquiring into the conditions of knowledge 
according to a trans-historical, a-priori model of the subject. Foucault insists on a methodological 
reversal of the ratio-centric knowledge schema. Foucault theorizes the subject as an “effect” of 
certain knowledge practices or what he later calls “games of truth.”70 Foucault’s historico-
ontological method does not jettison the subject; it jettisons the idea that there is one, unique, and 
true subject that is the ground of all knowledge. Foucault here, as in his essay “What is an 
Author?,” is keen to distance his position from an uncritical rejection of the subject tout court. 
Foucault instead sees the subject as a historical variable. For the philosopher there has been a 
host of subjects produced though historically specific processes of discourse formation and 
diffusion. Where there is a discourse, there forms a subject is the constant refrain of Foucault’s 
work. His late work supplements a macroscopic view of the subject as a product of socio-
historical discourse with a microscopic focus on processes of self-constitution – the discourse of 
the self to the self. Foucault comments: 
You do not have towards yourself the same kind of relationships when you constitute 
yourself as a political subject who goes and votes or speaks up at a meeting, and when 
you try to fulfill yourself in a sexual relationship. There are no doubt some relationships 
and some interferences between these different kinds of subject but we are not in the 
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presence of the same kind of subject. In each case, we play, we establish with one’s self 
some different form of relationship.
71
 
Foucault here presents a model of the subject as changeable from moment to moment as it is 
(re)produced though relations of knowledge and power. Foucault concludes that “it is precisely 
the historical constitution of these different forms of subject relating to games of truth that 
interest me.”72 This concluding remark exposes the central problem of Foucault’s late work, 
namely, how to align his macroscopic view of the subject as an effect of historical discourse with 
his microscopic view of the subject as an effect of a continually shifting set of power/knowledge 
relations. Added to this, Foucault’s late work also seeks to account for the role of the self in its 
very constitution without falling into psychologism. The task was and remains immense. 
Foucault’s late work clearly tries to move beyond his earlier formulation of the subject as 
a one-dimensional, historically specific and discursively situated position or point in a 
constellated field of historical discourse. Although it is manifestly evident in his late work, traces 
of his dissatisfaction with this point schema also show up in his early work. Consider his 
enigmatic aside in Archaeology, that discourse should not be imagined as having the “appearance 
of a monotonous, endless plain that I attributed to it…when I spoke of ‘the surface of 
discourse.’”73 Foucault goes on to note that if discourse could be morphologically figured it 
would be comprised of a plurality of “heterogeneous regions,” each with a “complex volume.”74 
Foucault’s effort to see discourse as a shape may have sprung from a desire to better picture how 
discourse not only positions but psychically inhabits its subjects. While Foucault voices passing 
interest (in the same interview) in Freudian inspired psychological and psychoanalytical 
                                                          
71
 Fornet-Betancourt, et al. “The Ethic of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 121. 
72
 Fornet-Betancourt, et al. “The Ethic of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 121. 
73
 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 145. 
74
 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 145.  
 
 
  45 
concepts, including “repression and interiorization,” he is suspicious that this way of thinking 
inexorably reinforces individualistic conceptions of the subject that serve to obscure the shaping 
power of history and society. Foucault’s nascent attempt to re-picture the relation between 
discourse and subject or even outside (social and historical forces) and inside or interior life 
(dreams, memories, fantasies, etc.) has found its metaphysical pioneer, I argue, in the person (or 
persona) of Peter Sloterdijk, to whose work I now turn. Sloterdijk’s work provides a salient 
supplement to Foucault’s concept of subject position. Taken together these two perspectives 
allow for a richer description of the historical and psychical processes through which Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron constituted themselves as photographers. 
2.3 Bubbles 
 
 Sloterdijk advances his theory of the subject in Bubbles, the first installment of his 
philosophico-historical trilogy titled Spheres. Bubbles aims at nothing less than a wholesale re-
theorization of the relation between subject, object, and world in the Modern Age as told and 
imaged through the form of the sphere. This at first might sound whimsical if not preposterous. 
However, with reference to a dizzying array of examples from art, cosmology, psychology, 
mysticism, medicine, literature, philosophy, and much else, Sloterdijk shows how the sphere has 
been central to the imaginary of the Modern Age.  
Sloterdijk begins with an oft-repeated truism. The Copernican Revolution destroyed the 
comforting illusion that humans dwell under the protective spheres of the heavens watched over 
by their creator. The ascent of humanism in the Renaissance, the scientific and political 
revolutions of the Enlightenment, the Industrial Age, Darwin, Nietzsche, Freud, Einstein, Bohr, 
Heisenberg, in short the Modern Age, repeatedly exposed humanity to the cold indifference of an 
accidental world. In response, the Modern Age furnished itself with new structures designed to 
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protect it from the effects of its own progress. Sloterdijk writes: “To oppose the cosmic frost 
infiltrating the human sphere through the open windows of the Enlightenment, modern 
humanity...attempts to balance out its shellessness in space, following the shattering of its 
celestial domes.”75  
For Sloterdijk, modernity is not simply The Age of Reason. It is also a deeply 
metaphysical even mystical period. It seeks through a host of means to recapture the protective 
guarantees of the pre-modern world. Sloterdijk’s analysis has a certain affinity with the view 
advanced by Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment, namely that modern Reason 
never broke with its supposed enemy – mysticism.76 As Adorno and Horkheimer argue, Reason 
underwent a mystical enchantment as it promised nothing short of redemption for a blind and 
ignorant humanity. Sloterdijk, however, takes an imaginative leap that would have made Adorno 
and Horkheimer deeply uncomfortable. Sloterdijk proposes a psychical and social metaphysics: 
human subjectivity is described as a fragile bubble—a self-enclosed sphere—floating 
haphazardly amidst the sharp edges of the modern world. The danger of the modern world has 
given rise, Sloterdijk argues, to a whole host of social, political, and psychological therapies 
designed ultimately to shield fragile subjectivities from the brute materiality of an unkind world. 
Sloterdijk writes:  
What makes the Modern Age special is that after the turn to the Copernican world, the 
sky as an immune system was suddenly useless. Modernity is characterized by the 
technical production of its immunities and the increasing removal of its safety structures 
from the traditional theological and cosmological narratives. Industrial-scale civilization, 
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the welfare state, the world market and the media sphere: all these large-scale projects 
aim, in a shelless time, for an imitation of the now impossible, imaginary spheric 
security.
77
   
Modern subjects are “disappointed, cold and abandoned;” hence, Sloterdijk argues, they “wrap 
themselves in surrogates of older conceptions of the world, as long as these still seem to hold a 
trace of the warmth of old human illusions of encompassedness.”78  
Sloterdijk pictures the history of the Modern Age as a morphological venture on the part 
of humanity to create in-dwelling spaces – bubbles – to shield itself from the world it made. 
These bubble worlds seek to form inter-globular links through intimate encounter, love, 
domination, exchange, and so forth. Bubbles presents a history of the Western subject as a 
subject in search of a lost metaphysical shelter to protect its transparently fragile self. 
Sloterdijk’s model, contra much contemporary theory of the last forty-plus years, privileges the 
concept of interiority (indeed the title of chapter two of Bubbles is “Thinking the Interior”). 
Sloterdijk favors an epistemological prioritization of the psychical over the social – the inside 
over the outside – but with the caveat that the two in the end must be thought together. He writes: 
“though sphere theory by its nature begins as a psychology of inner spatial formation...it 
inevitably develops further into a general theory of autogenous vessels. This theory provides the 
abstract form for all immunologies.”79  
Sloterdijk refuses to refuse the concept of interiority as many of his contemporaries do. 
Rejecting what he calls “interior deniers,” Sloterdijk’s aim, however, is not to credit a notion of 
interiority as a pre-given innate kernel of identity exemplified by Descartes’ “I.”  Sloterdijk 
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instead is interested in charting the various ways in which the modern human subject has thought 
of itself as an interiorized and interiorizing being. Sloterdijk seeks to supplement the Foucauldian 
focus on the shaping power of external social and political forces with a psychological emphasis 
in order to render a fuller picture of the history of the Western subject. Sloterdijk conceptualizes 
interiority as at once inside and outside the subject. Taking a cue from psychoanalysis, Sloterdijk 
sees the inside of the subject as composed of experiences had in the world “out there.” But this 
inside is seared by the residuum of memory, which through individuated action in turn affects the 
outside world. Willem Schinkel and Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens note that the Sloterdijkian 
bubble resembles “elements of a Foucauldian dispositif in its mesh of discourse, practice and 
objects and in its potential to ‘shape’ subjects.”80 Foucault’s term “dispositif,” which can be 
translated as “apparatus,” refers to the assemblage of discourses, practices, bodies, and 
institutions through which subject formation occurs.
81
 Schinkel and Noordegraaf-Eelens go on to 
note that Sloterdijk “directs his attention to what Foucault call[s] ‘practices of self.’ Indeed, 
Sloterdijk’s work appears to move through similar phases from macro-spheres to micro-spheres 
and practices of the self.”82 But the Foucauldian dispositif and the Sloterdijkian bubble are 
different in that the dispositif is not a theory of subjects but of the process of subject formation, 
whereas the bubble is a theory about subjects that stipulates that a subject – at least a Western 
modern subject – is a being that seeks with typological regularity to ground and enclose itself. 
Schinkel and Noordegraaf-Eelens note: “With Sloterdijk, ontology becomes ontotopology.”83 
They conclude: “What Sloterdijk gains with his description of ‘spheres’ is, ontologically, a way 
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to conceptualize social life as consisting of the precarious building and break-down of spatial 
collectivities.”84 
Sloterdijk thus proposes a psycho-sociological history of the subject. He credits the 
modern study of the psyche (psychology and psychoanalysis principally) for “explaining that all 
humans live constructivistically, and that every one of them practices the profession of a wild 
interior designer.”85 Sloterdijk sees modern psychology as archaeological evidence that the 
Western human subject sought to fashion its identity in the form of a psychical container filled 
with memories, regrets, dreams, ambitions, and so forth. Foucault would surely bristle at 
Sloterdijk’s praise for modern psychology’s poetics of interiority. Foucault’s work insists over 
and over that it is necessary to look outside the subject to understand subjectivity at all. But 
Sloterdijk’s bubble project in no way disputes this. To illustrate this, consider for a moment a 
soap bubble.  
A bubble begins its existence as a flat shimmering liquid surface suspended precariously 
in the bubble blower’s loop. When blown upon, this thin fragile sheet expands and folds upon 
itself and forms a bubble. Now imagine that the bubble loop represents a certain point in 
historical time and space, and the soap represents a certain admixture of discourse. Foucault sees 
the subject as framed by the apparatus or dispositif of its production.  He sees the subject as the 
soap suspended in the loop – a concentration of discourse at a particular historico-temporal 
juncture. Sloterdijk sees the subject as the formed bubble floating in historical and social space. 
What this illustration is designed to show is that Sloterdijk’s perspective does not replicate 
Cartesianism. The interior of the bubble is made of the same stuff as the exterior – air and soap. 
But the spaces are distinct. Likewise the interior of the Sloterdijkian bubble is composed of the 
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world “out there” –society, history, and experience. But the inside space is different from the 
outside, and this difference matters. The process of bubble formation is a process by which the 
outside becomes the inside – a process of interiorizing – which produces and is driven by the 
subject simultaneously. 
Despite its somewhat esoteric nature, Sloterdijk’s project has affinities with some recent 
work in the sociology of knowledge. Neil Gross, a pioneer in this field, offers a methodological 
point of departure in his recent socio-biography of the American neo-pragmatist philosopher 
Richard Rorty (1931-2007). Gross’ work may seem far from the concerns of this study. But what 
is salient for the present discussion is Gross’ re-theorization of the relation between discourse 
and the formation of selfhood. The first section of Gross’ study presents a straightforward 
biographical account of the life and work of Rorty. But in the second section of the book, Gross 
offers an account of how it was historically and socially possible for a figure like Rorty to 
emerge within the academic sphere of mid-twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. Gross 
asks: what made it possible for Rorty to reject the analytic tradition in the name of a revival of 
nineteenth-century American pragmatism and nonetheless continue to achieve academic 
success? How was it possible for Rorty to pull off this institutional shake-up and continue to 
thrive within the American philosophical establishment? 
 The finer points of Gross’ argument are obviously not relevant to this study. What is 
significant is that Gross argues that it is illegitimate to focus exclusively on social, historical, and 
institutional factors, and to ignore how a given historical actor understands oneself since the very 
process of self-understanding is part and parcel of the social mechanism. Gross describes the 
relation between discourse and selfhood not in terms of a unidirectional flow as Foucault seems 
to. Gross sees the relation between the external world of discourse and the interior psychical 
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sense of self as an autopoietic system. Gross writes that “much research by social psychologists 
and others suggests that social action is typically mediated by actors’ own self-
understandings.”86 Self-understanding, the processes by which it occurs, the categories it 
comprises, the means of narration it offers, are all, Gross argues, socially and historically 
conditioned, but the mediating action of self-understanding recursively generates different modes 
of social action that inflect the social environment and in turn transform the discursive spaces in 
which selfhood is fashioned. The external world of discourse is interiorized, as it were, in the 
fashioning of self-understanding which then loops back out into social space in the form of 
different social actions that are inflected by “actors’ conceptualizations of themselves and their 
lives.”87 Practices of self-understanding such as autobiography in Gross’ view function within a 
dynamical socio-psychical process that produces the subject of the statement at the same time 
that the statement itself reconstitutes the social field, if only very slightly, and thus the individual 
in turn. Gross, like Sloterdijk, thus argues that subjectivity is best described as a constant 
dynamical relay between outside and inside – between the building of interiorized selfhood as 
response to and product of external social and historical conditions. 
2.4 Language and Embodiment 
 
To posit the spherical model (Sloterdijk) over the point model (Foucault) would simply 
replace one abstract model for another. What goes missing in Foucault and Sloterdijk’s 
contrasting views on interiority is an account of lived experience. Despite their divergent 
perspectives, Foucault and Sloterdijk share the same underlying methodological bias, which is 
that it is proper to treat interiority as a matter of archaeological research. Both steer clear of 
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opening the question from the perspective of its lived conditions. Both share – for different 
reasons – a resistance to phenomenology. But, as this study will show (particularly in chapter 
five), phenomenology offers an immensely powerful philosophical means for negotiating the 
complex relations between photographic practice, life-writing, the constitution of identity, and 
the performance of selfhood iterated in the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. 
 For the archaeologist, phenomenology names a stratum of historical discourse 
(philosophic discourse in this case). The archaeologist can speak about phenomenology but not 
through it. To the archaeologist or the genealogist phenomenology is a subject to be investigated 
solely in terms of its historical conditions of possibility. But phenomenology, whose primary 
investigative subjects are sense, embodiment, and perception, lived experience is accessible to 
philosophical reflection. Phenomenology is not for this reason superior to archaeology. Nor 
should a facile distinction be drawn between the two perspectives. Archaeology investigates the 
historical conditions of possibility for phenomena. Phenomenology investigates the experience 
of phenomena. But arguably they both utilize a methodological procedure derived from the 
founder of phenomenology – Edmund Husserl. 
 Husserl’s method for investigating experience required what he called “bracketing” the 
truth/appearance distinction. The phenomenologist, for Husserl, is not to ask: is what I 
experience merely an appearance or the truth? Rather one is to bracket that question and 
concentrate one’s philosophic energies on describing the experience as a phenomenon in its own 
right. On this view, for example, a dream, though imaginary, is experienced as real. The fact that 
the dreamer wakes up and realizes she was dreaming, for the phenomenologist, is immaterial 
with respect to the reality of the dream as experienced. The procedure of bracketing also obtains 
– in a different form – for archaeological research. The archaeologist, as evidenced by Foucault’s 
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early studies, brackets the epistemological truth-value of the discourse under examination. This 
question is bracketed or suspended in favour of inquiring into the conditions of possibility for the 
discourse itself. Foucault, however, remained deeply suspicious of the concept of the 
phenomenological “given” of experience. In Foucault’s view, the power of discourse is primary 
in that it is discourse that shapes and to a large extent makes experience intelligible. Discourse 
for Foucault both describes and constitutes phenomena. Still, Foucault’s archaeological method 
employs a quasi-phenomenological bracketing procedure as Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus 
have shown in order to epistemologically open discursive practices to view.
88
 
 Phenomenology and archaeology/genealogy both “bracket” the question of truth in an 
absolute sense in order to inquire into the specific conditions of phenomena. One could plot this 
intersectional relation between phenomenology and archaeology as a chiasm. The 
phenomenologist studies the experience of phenomena. The archaeologist studies the history of 
phenomena. But at the centre of each project – and thus at the centre of this chiasm – is the 
bracketing procedure. In both instances, the elucidation of phenomena depends on a procedural 
decision to bracket the question of what is true in an absolute sense in favour of asking what is 
the experience of the phenomena (phenomenology) and what are its conditions of possibility 
(archaeology). To use a term favoured by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, there is an “intertwinement” 
of archaeology and phenomenology at the level of their fundamental methodological 
procedure.
89
 The passage from archaeology to phenomenology follows a folded path like passing 
from one side of the Mobius strip to the other. Thus to pass now from the historical question of 
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interiority raised by Foucault and Sloterdijk to the question of autobiographical experience via 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is to pass along a methodological continuum.  
To write the story of one’s life – to write autobiography – is a fraught task. But one need 
not rehearse the tired epitaphs that there is no “I” qua self for “I” is always a grammatical subject 
and not a person. Foucault, Barthes, Derrida, and many others have insisted on eschewing 
metaphysical conceptualizations of the self as a discrete entity, complete unto itself and existing 
prior to acts of speech or writing. For poststructuralists, the self comes into being retrospectively 
through discursive acts either initiated by the subject or projected onto him or her by exogenous 
forces, and frequently both. The self that becomes accessible by writing is a paradoxical 
phantasm: it at once provides the language of personhood, identity, and individuality, and yet 
these very categories are linguistic and hence generalizable as an abstract code of signification. 
Language is understood to be not expressive, but rather productive of, the subject. This view, 
now well-entrenched, admirably broke free of metaphysically inflated conceptions of selfhood; it 
also obscured to some degree the complexity of self-creation. For it is one thing to insist that 
writing produces the self – in the form of the author, for example, retroactively – but it is another 
thing to assert in a general manner that all claims to selfhood necessarily lose their respectability 
on these grounds. Rather, one might say that it is precisely that a model of a non-stable, shifting, 
and linguistically iterable self opens with the structural/poststructural insight.  
It is this conception of the self that proves methodologically useful for interpreting the 
texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. Their texts are case studies in the emergence of 
selfhood in and through photographic and textual production. Their work bears testament to a 
desire to know who they were becoming through photography and writing. To read Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron thus means reading not only the words signed by their texts, but the 
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desire to be readable for themselves and for others. Autobiography is not only a genre: it is also a 
desire.  
To claim that autobiography is both a genre and a desire is to theorize language as an 
intersectional medium that spans body and system. To speak and to write is a gesture. It is a 
bodily event. But meaningful articulation is possible only by virtue of the existence of a 
linguistic system. A linguistic system is also a system of rules (grammar), and these rules are 
abstract, arbitrary—a matter of convention as Ferdinand de Saussure argued.90 The subject as a 
thinking being, the poststructuralist declares, is impossible to conceive outside the conditions of 
language, since it is through language that thought is made. Even the claim to be a thinking being 
is, of course, itself a linguistic claim. If it is through language that any account of the “I” is 
possible, then it would appear that all that can be said about oneself must be said through a 
linguistic system that is in essence an impersonal, abstract, and arbitrary set of rules – a code –
that makes communication possible: “I” is a pronoun and never a person. Much important work 
has been accomplished through this perspective, and deconstruction is one name for that 
accomplishment, but other conclusions can be reached. One is offered by Maurice Merleau-
Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception.  
Merleau-Ponty takes aim at two views of language. One view of language he calls the 
“intellectualist” and the other the “empiricist.” The intellectualist sees language as a container 
and vehicle—a medium—for thought. On this view, language has no meaning in itself. Meaning 
is a matter of thought not of words. The intellectualist will ask for the “thought behind the 
words” and seek meaning there. Merleau-Ponty rejects this view on the same grounds as many a 
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poststructuralist would later. (But these reasons can also be found in many other philosophers, 
including Wittgenstein.) The position that there are thoughts behind words falls into a logical 
trap. The question – what thought lies behind words? – is answered always in words. The 
argument that “thought” determines the meaning of words can neither be confirmed nor falsified 
since “thought” in itself (if such a thing exists) is effaced at the instant it is cited or described. 
The “empiricist” view, on the other hand, sees linguistic meaning as entirely determined by the 
mechanical rules of a linguistic system: meaning just is linguistic in essence. The meaning of 
words, in this view, is determined by the system of which they are a part. The empiricist view 
holds that no thoughts – and thus no subject – can properly be said to “lie behind” words. The 
intellectualist view is an argument for the existence of a rational agent – a subject. The empiricist 
view is an argument for a subjectless system. Merleau-Ponty argues that this apparent antimony 
– subject or system – should be reformulated as subject and system. 
Spoken and written meaning is, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, both a bodily gesture and an 
operational effect conditioned by a linguistic system. Meaning is made at the intersection of the 
two. Neither pole is solely determinate. Meaning in this model is neither prior to the utterance or 
inscription (the intellectualist’s view) nor is it determined ipso facto by the rules of a language 
system (the empiricist’s view). Meaning is a making, a process, which occurs through the 
intertwinement of body and system.   
Taking bodily movement as his starting point, Merleau-Ponty writes: “I do not need to 
visualize external space and my body in order to move one within the other. It is enough that 
they exist for me, and that they form a certain field of action spread around me.”91 Conceiving 
language as a space too – a space through which the gesture of articulation moves – Merleau-
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Ponty continues: “In the same way, I do not need to visualize the word in order to know and 
pronounce it. It is enough that I possess its articulatory and acoustic style as one of the 
modulations, one of the possible uses of my body.”92 To make meaning in language is to involve 
one’s embodied self in the logic of a linguistic system: neither system nor subject remains the 
same in this encounter. Articulation “brings to life...an organism of words, establishing it in the 
writer or reader as a new sense organ, opening a new field or new dimension of our 
experience.”93 An instance of language is an instance of a subject: the two are created in the 
ephemeral simultaneity of articulation. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, “thought is no ‘internal’ thing, 
and does not exist independently of the world and words.”94 Thought imagined as “prior to 
expression is thought already constituted and expressed...through which we acquire the illusion 
of an inner life.”95 
On this last point – “the illusion of an inner life” – one could argue that Merleau-Ponty is 
rejecting interiority. Not so. He is rather re-thinking the experience of inner life as a process 
cultivated intersubjectively. Inner life – selfhood – is philosophically retained as a phenomenal 
experience, but it is understood as an effect produced by moving through the shared articulatory 
space of language. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, “word and speech...cease to be a way of 
designating things or thoughts, and become the presence of that thought in the phenomenal 
world.”96 This “presence” is not a mere wrapping for thought. Nor is it an idea, a thought, 
statically present. It is the trace of movement in the space of language. It is the phenomenal 
registration of the act of meaning making that in one instant opens both a system and a body to 
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view. One becomes an “I” though the gesture of articulation. The “I” is a thin index of the 
coming into presence of a subject. The subject here is a subject of language, but not subject to it. 
Collapsing the two into one another effaces the difference between body and system: a difference 
registered in the torsion of language itself. 
 Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s texts can be understood in Merleau-Ponty’s sense as 
figurations of a subject in the process of becoming. This subject is “the photographer.” The 
photographer emerges in and though their autobiographical articulations. To read the texts of 
Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron as evocations of the photographer as a subject of becoming 
provides a methodological pivot point to move back and forth between the discursive viewpoint 
offered by Foucault’s concept of subject-position (the point model) and Sloterdijk’s interiorized 
perspective (the sphere model). Phenomenology offers a go-between – a passage – between the 
archaeological conception of the subject, which privileges exteriority, and the spherological 
conception, which privileges interiority. 
2.5 Interiors 
 
 In the case studies to follow, archaeology (research into historical discourse) and 
phenomenology (especially in chapter five) are intertwined in an effort to keep in view the 
biography of the photographer in question, and the autobiographical becoming of the subject of 
the photographer at the moment of its historical advent. Between historical system and lived life, 
between body and a language system, the following case studies are themselves studies in a 
method that refuses to relegate autobiography to linguistics or to the mere “illusion of inner-life.” 
To jettison what Sloterdijk calls “thinking the interior” is to abandon historical processes of self-
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understanding to the realm of ideological mystification.
97
 To be clear discipline in its 
epistemological and punitive forms does shape one’s sense of self as Foucault rightly argues. It is 
also clear that the autobiographical “I” is not the expression of an indivisible, motionless, 
intentional being enclosed within a structure of self-identity. This is metaphysics and it is reified 
in the cultural sphere in the myth of the Author as both Foucault and Barthes demonstrate in 
different ways.
98
 But if taken as far as Foucault seems to in Archaeology, this framework leads to 
a drastic and hasty conclusion: the “I” is simply an ideological illusion that compels humans to 
ignore how social and historical factors shape them and therefore leads to political and social 
apathy.  
With Sloterdijk and Merleau-Ponty, however, it is possible to draw a distinction between 
interiorizing processes and interiority as such. Firstly, one can justifiably abandon the concept of 
the self as an indivisible kernel of interiority on the grounds that this is confuted by everyday 
experience. Martin Heidegger gave this practical experience a philosophic term: “beings-in-the-
world,”99 and as Luce Irigaray notes, one of the effects of being in the world is that “cultivating 
interiority” becomes a necessity.100 To live in the difficult modern world requires fragile human 
subjects to establish conscious and unconscious strategies to withstand its onslaught. 
Photography was surely part of, and a response to, that onslaught. 
 Photography hurled modern subjects headlong into a regime of invasive visibility. 
Personal character and outward appearance already linked in the nineteenth century by 
physiognomy and phrenology became matters of seemingly “scientific objectivity” with the 
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advent of photography. Writing on the invention of the “mug-shot” in nineteenth-century 
photography, Alan Sekula notes: “A physiognomic code of visual interpretation of the body’s 
signs – specifically the signs of the head – and a technique of mechanized visual representation 
[i.e. photography] intersected in the 1840s”101 The body was thus transformed into a site for the 
mapping of the self’s inner character. Physiognomy, as Shawn Michelle Smith argues in 
American Archives, underwrote the persistent belief that a photograph of someone can reveal 
something about that person. Smith argues that nineteenth-century photography “produced a 
model of subjectivity in which exterior appearance was imagined to reflect interior essence.”102 
Smith subtly and powerfully extends the work of Alan Sekula and John Tagg among others by 
focusing on how nineteenth-century photography, bolstered by the “scientific” blessing of 
physiognomy and eugenics, constructed the idea that the external body visibly bore evidentiary 
traces of a person’s mental and moral profile. Photography appeared to promise the nineteenth-
century observer not only an empirical record of the body, but also a readable text of interior 
essences. The utopia of at last securing a science of the visible via photography was extended to 
the fantasy of seeing the unseen inner essences of one’s character. Hence, Smith draws the 
profound insight that nineteenth-century photography “highlighted the very constructed and 
contingent nature of interiorities.”103 Smith continues that if  
interiority was the essence imagined to be stable as external signs fluctuated, it was 
stabilized only through the proliferation of surface signs, of representations of the body, 
called upon to make such essences readable, apparent, knowable. The photographic sign 
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invited one to participate in a leap of faith whereby the body might serve as an index to 
an imagined essence.
104
  
Smith illuminates the problematic emergence of the photographic-based discourse she calls 
“superficial depths.” Of course, “superficial” signifies in two ways for Smith. On the one hand it 
refers to the depthless surface of the photographic image and on the other to the constrained and 
limiting character of the discourse of interior essences. But it must be asked: are “interior 
essence” and interiority absolutely synonymous?   
 Interiority need not be construed as solely the metaphysical assertion of the existence of 
interior essences and as such diametrically opposed to a social constructivist viewpoint. Indeed, 
the force of social construction may be said to produce the very division between one’s position 
within a social matrix and the unseen character of the experience of occupying that very position. 
Hence photography may be said to both reify the physiognomic gaze while simultaneously 
creating a discursive gap between what the photograph purports to show and what it does not or 
cannot. On this score, it is worth noting that the writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron 
speak most to what is not clear, articulable, visible, and knowable about being a photographer, 
and thus give voice to experiences of inarticulacy, conceptual invisibility, and sometimes 
downright stupefaction as to what photography might be and what it might mean to identify as a 
photographer. In their very struggle to articulate what it might mean to be a photographer, 
Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron indexed the emergence of a new form of subjectivity created 
in the interstices of photographic practice, photographic imagery, and modern technologies of 
reproduction as Walter Benjamin so aptly demonstrates in his reading of August Sander’s famed 
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photo-essay Face of Our Time.
 105
 A brief digression through Benjamin’s text will help to clarify 
this point.  
Face of Our Time is a suite of portraits of people. Almost all the people in Sander’s 
photographs are left unidentified save for a single line denoting their profession. The book 
showcases the diversity of Weimar culture at a moment when, with the advent of National 
Socialism, such diversity was becoming the object of paranoia and oppression. For Benjamin, the 
book allegorizes the modern physiognomic imperative to be seen and judged by one’s outward 
appearance alone. It illuminates this gaze – as ramified by photography – the photographic gaze. 
Benjamin grasps this gaze’s corrosive effect on the conception of the self as a private, 
autonomous agent. It’s this imperious photographic subjection that the photographer sets in 
motion with the clicking of the camera. This gaze, Benjamin argues, however, also establishes a 
new sociality bound by the demands of a new technology, a new form of seeing, and a new mode 
of subject production – photography. Benjamin expands on this point in his essay on Baudelaire. 
Following to an extent the model of cultural historiography inaugurated by Baudelaire in 
“The Painter of Modern Life” of 1848, Benjamin seeks out the trace of his own time in the new 
gestures of the body or what Baudelaire calls “the sketch of manners.”106 Benjamin writes: 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the invention of the match brought forth a number of other 
inventions which have one thing in common: a single abrupt movement of the hand 
triggers a process of many steps…With regard to countless movements of switching, 
inserting, pressing, and the like, the “snapping” of the photographer had the greatest 
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consequences. Henceforth a touch of the finger sufficed to fix an event for an unlimited 
period of time….Haptic experiences of this kind were joined by optic ones, such as are 
supplied by the advertising pages of a newspaper or the traffic in a big city. Moving 
through this traffic involves the individual in a series of shocks and collisions. At 
dangerous intersections, nervous impulses flow through in rapid succession, like the 
energy from a battery.
107
 
The hand of the photographer functions here as what Benjamin calls a “thought 
figure.”108 Its sudden movement captures the speed of modernity: in a flash the body is made into 
an image; in a flash the haptic collides with the optic. The shock, the trauma, of modernity on 
individual and social bodies manifests itself, Benjamin argues, in a symptomatology of abrupt 
movements from the convulsions of the hysteric to the snap of the photographer. The body of 
modernity is convulsive. It is spurred on by schizophrenic commands to accelerate: work faster, 
drive faster, spend faster, produce, and reproduce. Thus the body of modernity is subjected to a 
new and brutal training commanded by the abstract logic of automation, which speeds and slows 
the body’s progression through the “dangerous intersections” of the modern maelstrom. The 
modern body is a battery for Benjamin: both battered and energized by a constant stream of 
shocks, collisions, and “nervous impulses.” The photographer, for Benjamin, thus figures the 
collision of industrial technologies and human bodies. Like the lighting of a match or the sudden 
lurch of the automobile as it shifts into drive at the instant the traffic signal goes green, the 
photographer’s “snap” is a symptom of life lived at modern speed.  
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Benjamin sees modernity as a time of trauma. His experience of the trauma of modernity 
was part of his living memory. Consider these lines by Benjamin that recount the introduction of 
the telephone into his childhood home. 
Not many of those who use the apparatus [the telephone] know what devastation it once 
wreaked in family circles. The sound with which it rang between two and four in the 
afternoon, when a schoolfriend wished to speak to me, was an alarm signal that menaced 
not only my parents’ midday nap but the historical era that underwrote and enveloped this 
siesta. Disagreements with switchboard operators were the rule, to say nothing of the 
threats and curses uttered by my father when he had the complaints department on the 
line. But his real orgies were reserved for cranking the handle, to which he gave himself 
up for minutes at a time, nearly forgetting himself in the process. His hand, on these 
occasions was a dervish overcome by frenzy.
109
 
Benjamin portrays the introduction of the telephone into the home from a personal and 
paradigmatic perspective. The ring of the telephone was an alarm in the Benjamin household: it 
awoke his parents not only from their daily nap, but from the historical epoch in which it had 
been possible to sleep undisturbed by its ring. Suddenly awakened by the ring of the telephone, 
the tempo of the Benjamin household was reset by the rhythms of modernity. Cranking the 
phone, snapping the camera, striking the match are indices of an emergent grammar of modern 
gestures; they are Benjamin’s freeze-frame studies of the traumatized modern body in 
movement. The Benjamin household was both the object of technological modernity’s intrusive 
reach and the subject from which protests and “curses were uttered.” The caller, as figured by 
Benjamin, like the photographer, is a combination portrait – a figure made of multiple images – a 
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figure of trauma, adaptation, and resistance. The snap of the photographer, like the cranking of 
the caller, were new gestures, new actions, by which the pelting abuse of technological 
modernity was both further energized and interrupted. The photographer, like the caller, for 
Benjamin brings the over-accelerated speed of modernity at least to the image of a halt and offers 
the chance to pierce its illusion of instantaneity and transparency.  
Sloterdijk like Benjamin sees the modern subject as having to work tirelessly to insulate 
itself from the technological environment it creates supposedly to make its life easier. The 
photographer seen in the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron (on this Sloterdijkian-
Benjaminian view) is likewise a figure who carved out a space for itself from which it was 
possible to momentarily arrest and redirect the flow of visual modernity. The autobiographical 
work of thinking one’s self as photographer can be understood then as a means of surviving the 
process of modern subject formation by cultivating a measure of interiority – at once an inside 
and an outside – which established a place or space for the photographer within the harsh light of 
modern visibility. The “I” of the photographer that Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron enunciate 
in different ways is not some prediscursive, motionless, subject sealed within the solid carapace 
of interiority. It is rather an “I” formed through a machinic and social relay between the operator 
and camera, a prosthetic assemblage, a complex discursive amalgam, which produces an 
interiorizing experience. Robinson sought to carve out a place, a studio, in the sphere of 
professionalized bourgeois labor. The “Apology” expresses Rejlander’s autobiographical desire 
to hollow out a place for his emergent sense of his self as photographer. And in writing the 
Annals, Cameron opened new dimensions, even a new “society” as she calls it, within the 
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strictures and structures of Victorian domesticity and femininity.
110
 These texts show how each 
photographer, in different ways, was engaged in processes of self-formation. The quest to 
understand what it meant to be a photographer was the lens through which Robinson, Rejlander, 
and Cameron surveyed the relation between human and machine in the age of industrial-scale 
modernity. By posing the question of what it meant to be a photographer, Robinson, Rejlander, 
and Cameron were in their own way seeking to find or construct a place, a shelter, a protective 
sphere or bubble to withstand the onslaught of the Modern Age. 
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Chapter 3 
Photography and Pedagogy: 
The Case of Henry Peach Robinson 
 Chapter two theorized the historical emergence of the nineteenth-century photographer 
by combining Foucault’s concept of subject position and Sloterdijk’s bubble model. This chapter 
examines the case of British photographer Henry Peach Robinson (1830-1901) from these two 
perspectives. Robinson is widely recognized by photography scholars as one of the most 
influential of nineteenth-century photographers.
111
 He was a founding member of the 
Brotherhood of the Linked Ring in 1892, a group of photographers committed to establishing 
photography as an art. This group proved instrumental in developing a style of art-photography 
that came to be known as “pictorialism.” Robinson did more than any other photographer of his 
time to codify the principles of pictorialism (these will be explained in time) through the 
publication of instructional manuals. One of these manuals – The Studio and What to Do in It 
(1891) – is key to understanding the tremendous difficulty that early photographers had in not 
only conceptualizing what photography was or could be, but also what it meant or could mean to 
be a photographer. Robinson’s Studio seeks to establish not only a cultural place for photography 
on par with the fine arts, but also an opening, a space, for the photographer as an autonomous 
cultural figure. In a Sloterdijkian sense, Robinson’s Studio attempts to open a space for the 
photographer simultaneously within the sphere of fine arts and within that of the bourgeois order.  
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The Studio looks to the arts of writing and painting as aesthetic models for an art of 
photography. But by the end of the text, the argument encounters a problem. After having made 
the case that art has rules that can be learned and mastered, Robinson argues that art is ultimately 
un-teachable because the artist, he claims, is reliant on a form of knowledge that is unconscious. 
This problem positions the photographer in the text between art and photography in a conceptual 
space bereft of the cultural legitimacy of the former and the latter’s particularity. The text 
wanders over aesthetic, moral, and class themes in search of a framework to critically establish 
the cultural autonomy of the photographer. The Studio attempts, but ultimately fails, to ground 
the identity of photography and the photographer. 
3.1 Pedagogy of Pictorialism 
 
Robinson was a practitioner and an avid promoter of photography’s first artistic 
movement – pictorialism. He was also the movement’s chief theoretician. Beginning in the late 
1860s, Robinson began publishing texts on photography. Almost all of his best-known texts, 
such as Pictorial Effect in Photography, Picture Making by Photography, Elements of a Pictorial 
Photograph, and The Studio and What to Do in It are a combination of instruction manual and 
aesthetic treatise. Robinson’s project in these texts aims to lay out the aesthetic program of 
pictorialist photography in teachable formulas that could in principle be learned by anyone. The 
aim of Robinson’s pedagogical project is to grant pictorialist photography the legitimacy of a 
bona fide art-historical style by making explicit its formal rules.  
Pictorialism derived its aesthetic codes largely from the so-called Pre-Raphaelites of 
England, who flourished between the 1820s and the 1860s. Led by poet and painter Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti (1828 –1892), the Pre-Raphaelites included notable artists such as William 
Hunt, Ford Maddox Brown, as well as the critic John Ruskin. The Pre-Raphaelites sought to 
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displace the prevailing norms of realism. They reacted against the legacies of Renaissance 
idealization and the brute realism of mid-nineteenth-century modernism. They took their cues 
from medieval art (pre-Renaissance or pre-Raphael). Beyond these vague aesthetic alliances and 
inclinations, however, it is difficult to define pre-Raphaelitism precisely. As art historian Robert 
de la Sizeranne notes in The Pre-Raphaelites, the movement was beset by internal 
contradictions. Pre-Raphaelitism “was composed of the most diverse and contradictory 
elements.”112 Sizeranne continues:  
There was a preference for imitating the thin, hard style of the Primitives [the nineteenth 
century’s term for pre-historic art and much of the art of Africa and Asia], whereas a 
single glance at the ample bosoms, round shoulders, and sensual  mouths of Rossetti’s 
women evokes all the opulence and splendor of the  Renaissance. There was realism, 
“uncompromising truth,” forbidding the addition of any imaginary element, but it is 
precisely the imaginary that is striking.
113
 
Pre-Raphaelitism is perhaps better defined as an outlook rather than a coherent stylistic 
framework. It favored realism but an enchanted one. It took inspiration from simple scenes 
imbued with pastoral, allegorical, magical, or spiritual meaning. It was this preference for 
enchanted over realist realism that marked pictorialism. 
                                                          
112
 Robert de la Sizeranne, The Pre-Raphaelites, trans. Andrew Bird (New York: Parkstone Press International, 
2008), 77. 
113
 Sizeranne, The Pre-Raphaelites, 77. 
 
 
  70 
 
Plate 1. Henry Peach Robinson, Fading Away, 1858. Courtesy of the George Eastman House, International Museum 
of Photography and Film. 
Robinson’s Fading Away of 1858 exemplifies the pictorialist style.  Fading Away depicts 
a young girl lying on her deathbed. Mother and sister look on while father gazes out the window. 
The scene, like much of Robinson’s work, is highly staged with actors serving as sitters. The 
truth that the photograph aims to show is not that of so-called photographic “objectivity” but 
rather the truth of human emotion, in this case, grief over the loss of a child. Pictorialist 
aesthetics center on the depiction of “scenes” in both the pictorial and dramaturgical sense. 
Indeed, theatrical considerations including props, accessories, and backdrops figure prominently 
in Robinson’s texts.  
In the Studio, for example, Robinson devotes one chapter each to backgrounds and 
accessories. Writing on the latter, Robinson advises the aspiring photographer to keep in store a 
wide variety of props and furnishings for every conceivable setting. He writes: “There is a great 
virtue in variety…. The monotony of making all men and women lean on the same chair, in the 
same position, and photographing them one after another, from week’s end to week’s end, must 
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be dreadful. The continual use of even a good thing is objectionable.”114 After carefully weighing 
the pros and cons of certain styles of gates, fences, chairs, screens, and so forth, Robinson goes 
on to carefully consider the use of somewhat more esoteric studio props. He writes: “The same 
remarks apply to the ship’s mast and the swing, both good of their kind, when used occasionally 
and in season, but not when they are pressed into service for all purposes against nature and 
art.”115 As for seaside scenes, Robinson recommends that the photographer obtain a full-sized 
row boat if possible “or half of one if you must economize space.… I have seen the bows of a 
real old boat used with great effect, and it was found to be very suggestive of poses. A bit of old 
rope, some netting, crab baskets, and other objects of the seaside, also aided in the realistic 
effect.”116 Robinson’s ideal studio thus resembles a theatre barn with a whole range of props, 
accessories, and backdrops for every conceivable scene.  
The theatricality of pictorialism stems from its emphasis on narrative. Robinson argues in 
Elements of a Pictorial Photograph that photography should aspire to more than mere imitation. 
He writes: “In aiming at the truth we must not forget the spirit.”117 Robinson seeks to liberate 
photography from the pursuit of visual objectivity. He writes: “It is not the copying of nature that 
gives artistic delight, so much as the intellectual pleasure to be derived from getting the best 
effect out of any given materials, or adding a beauty to that which is already beautiful.”118 
Pictorialist practice systematically refuses the imperatives of visual fact. It prioritizes the 
beautiful over the true. Robinson writes: “In photography fortunately, we are gradually 
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  Plate 2. Henry Peach Robinson, A Merry Tale, 1882. © British Library Board, 1757.b.14 (6) 
emancipating ourselves from the trammels of rigid fact, and are rising into the finer regions of 
artistic truth.”119  
The apparent incongruity of anti-modernist Pre-Raphaelitism and photography (paragon 
of modern image making) is symptomatic of pictorialism’s rejection of photographic realism, 
which differs in kind from the realism of nineteenth-century painting. Realism, even gritty 
realism such as Courbet’s, could still be counted as art in the nineteenth century simply because 
it was made with paint and canvas. But photographic realism came to be associated with an 
emerging regime of empirical visual objectivity. It is this objectivity that pictorialism rejects and 
which it seeks to aesthetically transform and transvalue. And it is narrative above all else that 
pictorialism deploys in order to raise photography out of empirical servitude into the “finer 
regions of artistic truth.”  
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Robinson defines the pictorialist picture this way: “our sort of picture—is a flat surface 
calculated to give pleasure to the beholder by the skillful way in which the intention of the 
producer is expressed by pictorial means, consisting of lines, lights, and shades.…This is the 
material part of the picture and is held by some, a dwindling minority, to be all sufficient. 
Beyond, and as I think necessary to the complete picture, is poetry, sentiment, story, the literary 
part of the picture.”120  This emphasis on literary content or narrative is manifest in Robinson’s A 
Merry Tale of 1882. The scene depicts a group of women gathered on a country path sharing an 
intimate and evidently merry tale. The image speaks to the literary “beyond” at which pictorialist 
photography aims in its artistic effort to transcend base photographic empiricism.  
While Robinson’s photography certainly aided in the dissemination of pictorialism, his 
writings did as much, if not more, to establish pictorialism’s cultural profile. Of all of Robinson’s 
texts, it was his Pictorial Effect in Photography of 1881 that was to have the most lasting and 
widespread impact on the development and dissemination of pictorialism. As photography 
historian Robert Hirsch notes, Pictorial Effect in Photography “was the most widely read 
textbook on photography in the nineteenth century.”121 In Pictorial Effect, Robinson elaborates 
on the concept of the picturesque, the cornerstone of pictorialist aesthetics. Robinson writes, 
“every scene worth painting must have something of the sublime, the beautiful, or the 
picturesque….The most obvious way of meeting with picturesque and beautiful subjects would 
be the possession of a knowledge of what is picturesque and beautiful.”122 The “picturesque,” for 
Robinson, is a specific combinatory of formal effects: light, shade, line, and overall composition. 
A photographer who learns this formal language, Robinson writes, “will be better qualified to 
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discover the picturesque in the visible world.”123 Pictorial literacy enables the photographer to 
look at the world “with the eye of an artist.”124 This seeing is also a form of knowing insofar as it 
is an informed seeing that can distinguish what is beautiful from what is not according to 
pictorialist principles. With this knowledge the photographer can learn to see not only “what is 
beautiful but why it is beautiful.”125 Thus a “new world is open to him who has learned to 
distinguish and feel the effect of the beautiful and subtle harmonies that Nature presents in all her 
varied aspects.”126 
Robinson skips over the problematic meaning of the sublime, which in principle cannot 
be anticipated or governed by rules, in order to proceed on to a discourse about how the sublime, 
as a pictorial effect, can be produced. The text passes from a philosophical moment to a practical 
and pedagogic moment. A discourse on beauty shifts into a pedagogy of how to make a beautiful 
picture. This elision is symptomatic of Robinson’s two-fold aim: to produce a manual on how to 
make artistic photography while defending the cultural legitimacy of that aim. 
Robinson was writing at a time when the question of the aesthetic potential and artistic 
legitimacy of photography was a matter of open and hotly contested debate. This debate was 
largely determined by two competing visions of photography. Conservative critics saw the 
camera as a mere machine for objectively recording visual phenomena and thus as fundamentally 
incapable of subjective expression. Those who promoted the merit of art photography stressed 
the technical skills necessary to compose a photograph. Robinson’s writing exemplifies the latter 
view. His pedagogical project is premised on the idea that a single formal language is common to 
painting and photography. Robinson’s answer to the question of whether photography is an art is 
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that art is not determined by the medium, but by the knowledge possessed by the one who wields 
it.  
Robinson’s pedagogic strategy is to redirect abstract considerations on aesthetics towards 
matters of technique: he continually shifts from discussing photography writ large to prescribing 
techniques for the photographer to follow. The subject of Robinson’s pedagogy is always in the 
last instance the photographer. As he writes, “however prolific a man may be in his [creative] 
ideas, he cannot express these ideas intelligibly until he has learned a language and its grammar, 
or laws of construction.”127 Robinson notes: 
[I]t has happened too often that the art-teaching which has been supplied to 
photographers has dealt rather with the thoughts to be expressed rather than on the modes 
of expressing them; it is of little use endeavoring to teach a man to write poetry until he 
has learned to spell.
128
 
Robinson’s stresses the necessity of learning visual grammar. The visual sign of pictorial 
grammar in a photograph, for Robinson, is the signature of the non-machinic presence of a 
thinking being – the photographer. Robinson writes that just as the writer “must write 
grammatically or he will offend his readers. So with the photographer; if he does not show that 
there is a man behind the machine with rules…his result will be a machine-made article, and not 
an individual impression as every work of art should be.”129 Robinson directs his pedagogical 
energies towards developing his ideal photographer by laying out the grammar or rules the 
practitioner is to follow.  
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Robinson’s pedagogical effort is given its most cogent and clear formulation in The 
Studio and What to Do in It, one of his final texts, published in 1891 at a time when Robinson 
himself had ceased his photographic practice due to ill-health. The Studio details everything a 
photography studio requires from foundation to skylights, from sitting room to dark room, as 
well as an entire set of instructions for what to do in the studio. The text hails, solicits, or 
positions the reader as a student-photographer and Robinson as a correspondence teacher 
conveying studio instruction across the distance between text and reader. The Studio sets up an 
educative environ in the manner of what Jacques Rancière in The Ignorant Schoolmaster calls 
the “explicative order.”130 For Rancière, pedagogy is a social practice that constitutes and relies 
upon a set of power relations. It is also an aesthetic formation. Educational instruction, writes 
Rancière, is a “singular art…the art of distance.”131 Pedagogy involves an entire repertoire of 
implicit and explicit signs and codes through which a pedagogic performance is enacted, the 
roles of student and teacher are assigned, and the social distance between the two positions 
maintained.  
  The explicative order positions the pedagogue as an agent of power, which Rancière calls 
an “explicator.”132 The distance of the explicator to the student confers an aura, in Walter 
Benjamin’s sense, of power upon the explicator. For, as Rancière surely knows, it is Benjamin 
who defines auratic power as “the unique appearance of a distance no matter how close.”133 
Indeed, Rancière strikes a Benjaminian chord when he notes:  
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The master’s [or explicator’s] secret is to know how to recognize the distance between 
the taught material and the person being instructed, the distance also between learning 
and understanding. The explicator sets up and abolishes this distance—deploys it and 
reabsorbs it in the fullness of his speech.
134
 
  Through his texts, Robinson surely sought to define himself as the chief explicator of 
pictorialism. But he neither had the benefit of full speech nor a robust educational apparatus, 
such as the academy, at his disposal. However, he was working in a genre that did have a certain 
social status—the training manual. The genre of the training manual was a common form for the 
dissemination of photographic instruction in the nineteenth century. It helped establish the 
popular practice of photography on a mass scale. This genre rests on the implicit assumption that 
if one is in a position to author a training manual, then one must be an authority on the subject.  
 The training manual projects its writer into the pedagogic power structure of the student-
teacher relation. But the training manual as such demands from the reader a measure of 
autodidactism. The training manual institutes a form of pedagogy parallel to the form of the 
correspondence course. While the training manual sets its author up as a master of sorts, this 
master is also divested of the voice – the teaching tool par excellence of the explicator. Without 
the fullness of explicative speech and without a fully bureaucratized educational order, Robinson 
had  no direct knowledge of how his teaching was received by his readers. This pedagogic 
anxiety is echoed in the manifest anxiety registered in the Studio concerning what photography is 
and what it means to be a photographer. These two questions or lacunae mark the text. They are 
signified by rhetorical tensions, contradictions, and above all absences and invisibilities. The 
Studio registers the ontological anxiety of nineteenth-century photography. This anxiety attains a 
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paradoxical visibility by the very invisibility of the subject “behind the camera,” in Robinson’s 
words – the photographer.  
3.2 The Vacant Studio 
 
 The opening pages of the Studio contain blueprints complete with elevation diagrams for 
building a photography studio. Building a proper studio was a primary concern for the 
nineteenth-century photographer. Natural lighting was an imperative as the light bulb had yet to 
enter into photographic practice. Photography studios thus had to be designed so as to maximize 
and control sunlight. Ever the pragmatist, Robinson writes: “The arrangements for managing the 
light should be simple, so that they may be under the immediate and instant control of the 
operator; all complicated systems of blinds should be avoided.”135 Robinson’s preferred 
architectural model resembles a small lean-to cottage, facing northeast to catch diffuse rather 
than direct sunlight. It has a rectangular floor-plan topped by a partly slopped and flat roof. The 
slopped section is outfitted with skylights and the flat section houses the darkroom and is 
necessarily windowless. Ideally the size of the studio is supposed to “be large enough to admit of 
every necessary operation without inconvenience, but should not be so large as to…be difficult 
to manage.”136 Robinson quips that a large studio, “like a great book, is a great evil.”137  
Robinson also offers instruction in how to decorate the interior of the studio. He advises 
that the interior should be sober and above all practical. “I prefer that the studio have the effect 
of a moderately furnished living room, such as sitters may be expected to occupy in their own 
homes; avoiding shabbiness on the one hand, and ostentatious show on the other. Don’t let there 
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be a great display of anything, not even your own good taste.”138 A middle class sentiment 
informs Robinson’s taste for interior design. The interior design that Robinson prefers is squarely 
opposed to the interiors a client of means would expect to find in the studios of the best portrait 
painters of the day, such as John Singer Sargent’s (1856-1925) studio, for example, which was 
richly decorated with antiques, tapestries, and Japanese screens. Robinson by contrast opposes 
extravagance or clutter of any kind in the studio. But he is not opposed to the prominent display 
of the photographer’s tools. On the contrary, he notes: “You will not be able to hide the 
implements of your art, nor is it desirable that you should do so.”139 Indeed the camera is to take 
centre stage in the studio: “I like to keep the centre of my studio absolutely free, except for the 
camera.”140 Robinson also offers careful and thrifty advice for setting up a darkroom.  
No room is more neglected than this one. Any closet is thought good enough for a dark 
room; but no part of the establishment [the studio] should call for more thought and 
attention…There should be sufficient space to conduct all the operations in comfort. 
Table space should be ample, and there should be sufficient shelves to hold everything 
but dust [ruinous to film plates]. The sinks used to be made of wood…lined with pitch 
[but these]…were always causing trouble; white porcelain sinks were expensive…For 
several years I have used Doulton’s sinks; they are made of glazed stoneware, are very 
cheap, can be got of any size, and are useful for other purposes.
141
 
 The attention to the minutest details notwithstanding, Robinson’s descriptions of the 
interior of the studio underscores a strange invisibility. One asks: where is the photographer? The 
figure of the photographer is signed only in the traces of the tools of the trade and the places of 
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work: camera (photographing room) and sinks (darkroom). The text describes the studio down to 
the smallest details complete with many diagrams and visual aids that establish a visual matrix 
that supports the pedagogy. But no explicit figuration of the photographer animates this 
pedagogy. The Studio is a vacant studio. What goes unseen and unspoken is the photographer.  
And yet the vacant place of the photographer is precisely the space – the “absolutely free center,” 
in Robinson’s words – which the reader is silently solicited to occupy. The rhetorical absence of 
the photographer – marked by the vacant studio with its empty rooms – circumscribes the open 
space that the reader comes to inhabit. The Studio textually constructs an open space. It allows 
for what Heidegger calls “making room” or “giving space” for the photographer.142 The Studio 
opens this “giving space.” It gives space and “makes room” for the being and becoming of the 
reader-as-photographer. This open, “absolutely free” and “giving space,” demarcates the subject 
position that a photographer can come to occupy. This open space is at once an open space for 
the reader-photographer to inhabit and a trace of the textual invisibility of the photographer.  
 This invisible dimension of the photographer of the Studio can be understood, in a 
slightly revised sense, as what Walter Benjamin calls an “optical unconscious.” Benjamin writes 
in “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility” of 1936 that it is “through 
the camera that we...discover the optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual 
unconscious through psychoanalysis.”143 Benjamin’s point is that prior to photography, the eye 
held sovereignty over knowledge in the oft-repeated formula: to see is to know. But photography 
exposed to view the fact that entire visual worlds – the very fast particularly – escape the grasp 
of the eye and human consciousness. The camera’s ability to see beyond range perceived by the 
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eye throws into question the entire tropological entanglement that links vision, self, and 
knowledge. Photography, and thus the photographer, renders visible and knowable phenomena 
that might otherwise go unseen and unknown. But this vision and knowledge is not one that the 
photographer possesses. The photographer simply marks the point at which this vision and 
knowledge is captured: the photographer is the figure that captures, while not possessing, the 
optical unconscious. Robinson’s Studio exposes to view a textually figured optical unconscious. 
What goes unseen in the text is the photographer or rather what is seen is the open space itself 
yet to be occupied by a photographer. In this sense, the space left vacant can be understood as the 
open subject position of the photographer that a photographer comes to inhabit. These spaces of 
openness and non-presence or invisibility frequently open at the site of comparisons to the art of 
painting. Consider the following passage: 
The first aim of the student in lighting a head [a portrait] – leaving out the question of 
what may be called “fancy” lighting such as Rembrandts [sic] – should be to get 
roundness and relief, to obtain gradation, and to avoid patches of black and white; to so 
light the head that beauties are made prominent and defects hidden. Or as [the 
photographer] Mr. [John] Mayall once summed up the object of lighting: “To render age 
less garrulous; make beauty more lovely; to impart an expression of intelligence where 
nature has not been over bountiful; to light up the intellect, and to impart the quality of 
power in those heads on which she has lavished her most precious gifts; in short, to 
present human nature in its best form, by aid of a camera and a properly-lighted room.”144 
Rembrandt here figures the technique of “fancy” lighting or chiaroscuro. Against “fancy” 
lighting, Robinson invokes the popular photographer John Mayall (1813-1901) who advises the 
                                                          
144
 Robinson, The Studio and What to Do in It, 37. 
 
 
  82 
photographer to light the face in a way so as to soften nature in the manner of a pre-Raphaelite 
painter. A strange encounter and aesthetic debate is thus figured. The anti-modernist realism of 
pictorialism and pre-Raphaelitism is set against “fancy” realism as figured by Rembrandt. This 
opposition to what is presumed to be “fancy” is more than an aesthetic choice: it is a class 
choice. Rembrandt stands for a set of aesthetic values against which Robinson valorizes the 
middle class popularity of John Mayall. Here class and aesthetics cross the pedagogic matrix of 
Robinson’s pictorialism. The affirmation of Mayall over Rembrandt speaks to the emergent 
middle class sympathy for a photographic aesthetics of practicality: the simple over the “fancy,” 
the “properly lighted” over the dappled “patches” of chiaroscuro. 
Pictorialism’s codification of a pragmatic poetics has had historical effects that have far 
outlived the movement, as the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu found in his 1965 study of 
photography.
145
 In Photography: A Middlebrow Art, Bourdieu presents his findings after having 
surveyed amateur photographers from across the socio-economic spectrum. His research leads 
him to conclude that there exists a “canon” of “ordinary” or “popular” photographic practice. 
This practice, he argues, is primarily symbolic. Its function is to “solemnize” the individual, 
event, or place photographed.
146
  
Opposed to popular practice are those who seek, as the pictorialists did, to establish 
artistic legitimacy for photography. In words that seem to capture the pictorialist attitude, 
Bourdieu writes that devoted practitioners seek “to ennoble themselves by attempting to ennoble 
photography” by constructing a “body of technical and aesthetic rules” to distinguish their 
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practice from the norms “that govern popular practice.”147 This was certainly true of the 
pictorialists who likewise sought to “ennoble” photography and photographers by emulating the 
fine arts, particularly painting. As Robert Castel and Dominique Schnapper note in their 
contribution to Bourdieu’s study: “Painting is a noble art [hence it]…provides the clearest 
guarantee of aestheticism for an activity [photographing] in search of security.”148 The encounter 
Robinson stages between Mayall and Rembrandt dramatizes the central agon of nineteenth-
century photographic culture—which continued in some form through the twentieth century: 
photography was seen as both handmaiden to, and middle class usurper of, high art. The gaze of 
pictorialist photography impressed itself most radically and explicitly upon such scenes of 
antagonism: painting versus photography; highbrow versus middlebrow tastes; Rembrandt 
versus Mayall. 
3.3 Moral Education 
 
The antagonism between painting and photography comes most forcibly to the fore in the 
second to the last chapter of Robinson’s text—“The Itinerant Painter.” The chapter outlines what 
a good portrait painter must do in order to be a success. While certainly not the mainstay of 
pictorialism, portraiture was the way most pictorialists, including Robinson, achieved a level of 
financial independence which was often necessary to pursue their artistic ventures. The “Itinerant 
Painter” figures the photographer as a responsible middle class entrepreneur in contrast to the 
rootless, irresponsible, and indeed immoral, “itinerant painter.” Robinson writes: 
 When a well-established photographer takes a portrait he looks for his profit, not only to 
the sum he receives for the first order of copies, but to the contingent potentialities which 
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may arise from the possession of the negatives, and to that end he goes to a great deal of 
trouble and expense cataloging and storing them. Of course the great portion of these 
negatives are never wanted again, and are an encumbrance; but all professional 
photographers know that there is so good a demand for copies from old negatives, that 
they find it to their interest to keep all they take, and to print prominently on the back of 
their cards, “All negatives are preserved. Copies or enlargements of this portrait can 
always be had.”149 
Copies can always be had – for a price, that is. “Copies” in nineteenth-century photographic 
practice signified quite differently than they do today. The norms of photographic production and 
circulation today (especially in the case of digital and online photography) have decreased (at 
least philosophically) the value of the copy, and indeed rendered the distinction between original 
and copy less meaningful. But in the nineteenth century, the copy was fixed, or at least Robinson 
wanted to fix it, within a fully rationalized system of exchange.  
 Robinson’s photographer is circumscribed by the norms of capitalist exchange. He is one 
“who looks for his profit.” Robinson’s Studio establishes a place for photography and hence for 
the photographer within the settled life of the small business owner. Robinson’s photographer is 
not only a master of certain photographic techniques, but a competent and prudent member of the 
professional class. This point is underscored when Robinson goes on to tell his reader a story 
from his own studio practice. He writes: 
One day some years ago, a shabby old gentleman came into the reception room, and said 
he wanted his portrait taken. He was shown specimens [i.e. examples], but he said they 
were all too dear; he could only afford half a guinea….I liked the appearance of the old 
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man, who looked poor but respectable, so as a kind of charity I took a negative of him. I 
was so pleased with him that I offered to send him a dozen copies without charge, but he 
would not accept this offer…and paid his half-guinea. I found afterwards I had 
entertained an angel—a business angel—unawares, for I have done nearly £300 from that 
negative since. The fine old gentlemen died soon afterwards, and then I found out he was 
a famous manufacturer.
150
 
The “shabby” patron turns out to be a “business angel” and by the end of the story becomes a 
“fine” gentleman. The transparency of Robinson’s class values rivals a nineteenth-century 
parody of the middle class man on the make. Money, production, manufacturing are the means 
by which a “shabby” man becomes “fine” and “respectable.” The story rhetorically stages a 
photographic-like sequence in which the “shabby” patron becomes – by being photographed – a 
rare, even angelic creature. But this moment of aesthetic (even quasi-spiritual) transcendence is 
almost instantly commodified: the angelic photograph becomes a “business angel.” The aesthetic 
image is transfigured into a commodity. 
 Robinson’s middle class aesthetic emerges even more forcefully, however, in the 
chapter’s eponymous story: “The Itinerant Painter.” It is a complex tale and as such necessitates 
a long quotation. 
There is a class of painter who misuse the great name of artist...who go round the 
country, and, by means of introduction or impudence, obtain orders for portraits, usually 
enlargements painted from photographs. As they never take an original [photographic] 
portrait themselves, they require the negative, and use every means, fair or foul, to obtain 
it, and are usually successful. The method of proceeding is something like this. A father 
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of a wealthy family has been dead a short time; the itinerant painter hears of this, and 
before she [the widow] has time to apply to a photographer, [the itinerant painter] gets an 
introduction to the widow. A great deal of his success in his business depends on fluent 
and persuasive speaking, and the lady [the widow] is soon induced to order a portrait of 
her late husband.... [T]he “tramps” are so pressing and plausible that they [even]...get the 
widow to write for the loan of the negative…. [T]he photographer consents, seeing no 
way out of it; or properly and wisely refuses to lend the negative. In this case the itinerant 
brings more pressure to bear, showing his patron how selfish and inconsiderate the 
photographer is in preventing her from having a splendid portrait of her husband…. [T]he 
unfortunate photographer is placed on the horns of a dilemma; if he consents to lend the 
negative, he loses the benefits for which he has speculatively kept it for years, and if he 
refuses, he runs the risk of losing [a]…customer.151 
 The itinerant painter, like the professional photographer, is a man in search of profit. But 
the itinerant painter establishes no fixed address. He has no established studio, no place of 
business, and hence no place in the order of town or city life. The itinerant is a figure of wanton, 
ungrounded, non-localizable, or nomadic circulation. Unlike the professional photographer, the 
itinerant painter has no genuine fidelity to his clients. He is solely an opportunist who preys on 
innocents as figured by the widow. He is a mere “tramp,” a con-man, whose success relies on 
fast talking. He also preys on the photographer who in the account is forced into a moral 
“dilemma.” Should he keep the negative – the wiser choice in Robinson’s view – or give it away 
and keep his client happy? Unlike the itinerant painter whose only fidelity is to profit, the 
photographer is figured as a moral subject who must choose between profits and persons. While 
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Robinson counsels that the wiser choice is for the photographer to protect his property, he 
sympathizes with the photographer who, in having to make this decision, is caught on the “horns 
of a dilemma.”  
The story of the itinerant painter exemplifies the tense relation between pictorialism and 
painting. Painting is pictorialism’s model, and even muse. “Painting” is a code word for a visual 
grammar that the pictorialist photographer is expected to master. But the photographer is to 
establish his studio, his practice, within the “respectable” order of the professional sphere. The 
itinerant painter may be a “brother artist” to the photographer, but this brother belongs to an 
itinerant, and ultimately, lower class. While both the itinerant painter and Robinson’s 
photographers are capitalist subjects seeking to maximize their profits, the photographer is the 
more moral of the two. The photographer “looks for his profit” but does not stoop to the conning 
strategies of the itinerant painter. Hence while painting is the well-spring of pictorialist wisdom, 
the photographer is portrayed as morally superior to its master (painting).  
3.4 The Subject Supposed to Know 
 
 The final chapter of the Studio, titled “The Education of a Photographer,” attempts to 
resolve pictorialism’s moral and social antagonism with painting. Robinson returns to the theme 
of the sublime. He moves from pedagogy (formal and moral) back to aesthetic philosophy. 
Robinson re-affirms the central tenant of the text – photography can be learned. But then 
Robinson argues that beyond technical facility lies the un-teachable realm of art. Here things 
become pedagogically contradictory. Robinson writes: 
The study of art in its most comprehensive sense is, doubtless, the work of a lifetime; but 
there are one or two initial truths that should be clearly understood, and thoroughly 
impressed on the mind of the student. First, that very little art can be taught. Second, that 
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the chief portions of art which can be taught consist in tolerably definite and simple rules 
and principles easily understood and remembered, and not difficult to apply. These rules 
are to art what grammar is to literature. They will no more enable the painter to paint a 
Transfiguration than grammar taught Shakespeare how to write Hamlet; but neither the 
great picture nor the great poem could have been produced without, on the one hand, a 
knowledge of composition, and on the other an acquaintance with the construction of the 
English language. And third, that after the mastering of certain rules, art studies chiefly 
consist in constant observation and appreciation of the beauties of nature and art, and in 
attempts to realize in practice these beauties, aided by the principles and rules before 
acquired.
152
 
 There is a tension at play between what can be taught, under the sign of “principles,” 
“rules,” and “grammar,” and a comprehensive talent to make art. For Robinson, art in the last 
instance cannot be taught. Rules of composition – grammar – can be taught. But the study of art 
comes under the tutelage of nature. Rules are useful for the conversion of observations gleaned 
from the “beauties of nature” into representations. But knowledge of rules alone, cautions 
Robinson, is not enough to make art. There is an obvious contradiction: the student must first set 
about “mastering” rules and principles of composition in order to see the beauties of nature 
compositionally. The demarcation that Robinson makes between observation and practice is in 
this way a false one: to observe the beauties of nature as Robinson expects necessitates mastering 
the aesthetics or grammar of art. Robinson seeks a resolution to the contradiction via an 
elaboration of the aesthetic philosophy of William Thompson (1819-1890).  
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 In An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought of 1879, Thompson discusses the rules 
of logic as a means to examine the nature of human reasoning. Robinson quotes the following: 
“The whole of every science may be made the subject of teaching. Not so with art; much of it is 
not teachable.”153 Robinson in fact misquotes Thompson or more exactly puts words in his 
mouth. Thompson does say: “The whole of science may be made the subject of teaching.” But he 
does not follow by concluding: “Not so with art; much of it is not teachable.”154 Those words are 
Robinson’s. What Thompson does say is that logic is like art, but logic differs in one key respect. 
Whereas logic is a conscious operation, art is bound up with “the notion of unconsciousness.”155 
Thompson continues: “The man of science possesses principles, but the artist, not the less nobly 
gifted on that account, is possessed and carried away by them.”156 Further clarifying his point, he 
writes: “Shakespeare is admitted to be a consummate artist, but no one means by this that his 
plays were composed only to develop a certain express theory of Dramatic Poetry.”157 Thompson 
then goes on to quote philosopher William Whewell (1719-1866), who notes: “The truths on 
which the success of Art depends, lurk in the artist’s mind in an underdeveloped state – guiding 
his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of 
enunciated propositions.”158  
Thompson serves as a philosophical buttress for Robinson’s claim that art is on the whole 
un-teachable. Since the special knowledge that the artist possesses is unconscious, it cannot be 
consciously transmitted in the form of clear pedagogical principles and rules of mastery. So even 
though Robinson misquotes Thompson, who bases his argument on Whewell, he appears to hold 
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to the spirit of Thompson and Whewell’s point: the knowledge of art is instinctual or 
unconscious and hence cannot be taught. In a conventional sense, education demands that things 
be clearly teachable and as such that pedagogy – its contents and its transmission – be fully 
amenable to conscious learning. But if art is a matter of the unconscious, then it cannot be taught 
consciously and conscientiously.  
Art, as a teachable subject, might then be said to constitute the center and the aporia of 
Robinson’s pedagogic project. It is at once the heart of Robinson’s pedagogy of pictorialism and 
its recalcitrant and resistant kernel. This tension between the unconscious and education is 
explored in depth by Shoshana Felman. In “Psychoanalysis and Education,” Felman notes that 
the unconscious names the “discovery that human discourse can by definition never be entirely 
in agreement with itself, entirely identical to its knowledge of itself, since as the vehicle of 
unconscious knowledge, it is constitutively the material locus of a signifying difference from 
itself.”159 For Felman, psychoanalysis remains at bottom “a critique of pedagogy.”160 The 
resistance of the unconscious marks every pedagogical endeavor. Read in terms of Robinson’s 
pedagogic project, “art” is the term that auto-critiques or deconstructs the possibility of a 
pedagogy of pictorialism. This deconstructive fissure marks finally the “I” that carries 
Robinson’s authorial authority – the sign of Robinson qua explicator. This “I” fits the profile of 
what Jacques Lacan terms “the subject supposed to know.”161  
Lacan develops the idea of “the subject supposed to know” through a discussion of 
Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave. Lacan transposes Hegel’s terms: the psychoanalyst is 
                                                          
159
 Shoshana Felman, “Psychoanalysis and Education: Teaching Terminable and Interminable” Yale French Studies, 
No. 63(1982): 21-44, 28. 
160
 Felman, “Psychoanalysis and Education,” 28. Italics are in the original. 
161
 Jacques Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII, trans. Russell 
Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton Inc., 2007), 26. 
 
 
  91 
positioned as a master in that the analyst is “supposed to know,” but, Lacan argues, it is the 
analysand, the object of the master’s gaze, who makes this supposition unconsciously. In seeking 
out a psychoanalyst, the analysand has already answered to an interpellative solicitation which 
auto-positions the psychoanalyst as the master, or the subject who is “supposed to know,” what 
is wrong with the analysand. Even before the analysand sits down with the psychoanalyst, the 
scene of interpellation has already occurred and the position of mastery has been assigned to the 
psychoanalyst. Mastery in Lacan’s sense is not an attribute the psychoanalyst has innately; it is a 
position (of power and knowledge) that the psychoanalyst occupies as a function of an 
institutional discourse (the psychoanalytic discourse) and the interpellation that this discourse 
accomplishes.  
It is insignificant whether or not the one who assumes the master’s position is actually a 
master. The master does not need to have knowledge to be a master. The master merely occupies 
the position of the master. Lacan puts the matter humorously by noting that student teachers 
know first-hand that one can play the role of a master while knowing very little about a given 
subject. Lacan writes: “It was students at the Ecole normale [supérieure]…these little princes of 
the university who know quite well that you don’t have to know something in order to teach 
it.”162 As Lacan scholar Bruce Fink notes, “the master is unconcerned with knowledge: as long 
as his or her power is maintained or grows, all is well.”163 Lacan uses the example of citation to 
help illustrate the paradoxical nature of the master’s discourse.  
When one cites Marx or Freud – I haven’t chosen these names by chance – one does so as 
a function of the part the supposed reader takes in a discourse. The citation is in its own 
                                                          
162
 Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 26. 
163
 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 131. 
 
 
  92 
way also a half-said. It is a statement about which someone is indicating to you that it is 
admissible only insofar as you already participate in a certain structured discourse.
164
 
Here Lacan is doing a bit of autobiography. When Lacan cites Marx or Freud he invokes their 
authority on the presumption that his readers (and auditors) are already participating in the 
discourse of his version of psychoanalysis in which these names have already assumed the status 
of masters.
165
 
Citation in Robinson’s text functions similarly. In quoting Thompson, Robinson’s text 
invests his name and discourse with mastery, which recursively lends authority to Robinson’s 
“I.” The citation of Thompson is a philosophical alibi that supports the supposition of mastery 
that the reader invests in the Studio, which itself is a function of the reader having already 
presumed that Robinson’s name signifies a master who is supposed to know what photography is 
and how one is to become a photographer. Robinson’s text sets his “I” up as a master, but 
Robinson the person in fact has no mastery over this position. The position of mastery is 
discursively produced by virtue of the fact that the Studio is a bona fide instructional manual. 
The genre of the text qua instructional manual positions Robinson’s “I” as an instructor supposed 
to know—a master of pictorialist photography. This position is ascribed by an automatic 
discursive function. In this sense, Robinson, like every supposed master, is in effect mastered by 
the discourse of mastery itself.  
3.5 The Itinerant Photographer 
 
Robinson situates his ideal practitioner at a nexus between aesthetics and commerce 
within the order of middle class professionalism. But aside from this, the Studio is silent on 
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salient points. Why should one be a photographer? What is photography apart from its relation to 
the other arts such as painting? How can art-photography be taught if art is finally un-teachable? 
What is it that the Studio teaches one to do? These questions can be collectively restated as: what 
does it mean to be a photographer? The Studio gives no direct answer. Yet the question “what is 
a photographer?” is made strangely visible by its manifest textual obscurity.  
Unable to establish an autonomous definition of photography, pictorialism as a program 
loses its pedagogical coherence. It is dispersed over a set of antagonistic scenes of class and 
aesthetic conflict. The pedagogy of pictorialism iterated in the Studio positions the photographer 
on “the horns of a dilemma” in Robinson’s words. Neither able to sufficiently close the gap 
between art and photography nor to set photography on its own path, Robinson’s pictorialist 
program for establishing cultural legitimacy for photography paradoxically produces the figure 
of an ungrounded, aleatory photographer or what might be ironically called the “itinerant 
photographer.” Unconscious or “blind” to its own ontological doubts concerning photography 
and the cultural status of the photographer, the figure of the photographer in the Studio hovers in 
the contested space between art and photography, paintings and photographs, the moral and the 
immoral, the itinerant and the settled middle class entrepreneur, Rembrandt and Mayall. The 
photographer exists only as an open space, an outline, thinly delimiting a middle class subject 
position, a hollow figure, haunting the pages of the Studio.  
What the Studio accomplishes, however, is the opening of this very space into which the 
reader-photographer may enter. That is, the Studio, like an actual studio, contains an open space 
that the reader-student can inhabit. The open space of the pictorialist photographer provides a 
place for the reader-student to become a photographer. The Studio provides an imaginative place 
for the germination of the pictorialist photographer. The text creates a space apart, at a distance, 
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from the rhetoric of photographic objectivity. It is in this sense that the Studio functions as a 
Sloterdijkian bubble that encloses around the would-be photographer-reader. This space, to quote 
Sloterdijk, exists “initially only in constructs…of language” but from this develops, like a 
photographic negative, a photographer through the act of reading into the open space of the 
text.
166
 Hence, Robinson’s demonstrative failure to provide a clear definition of photography and 
the photographer, paradoxically, and perhaps unconsciously, nevertheless opens an in-dwelling 
space through which the reader-student projects a sense of self as photographer. The Studio 
provides a place for a photographer to develop.  
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Chapter 4 
Ways of Life: 
The Case of Oscar Gustave Rejlander 
Henry Peach Robinson’s The Studio and What to Do in It positions the photographer in a 
classed space caught between an uneasy attachment to the fine arts and a nascent desire for 
autonomy. A very different conception of the photographer appears in the writing and work of 
Oscar Gustave Rejlander (1813-1875). This chapter examines Rejlander’s most important essay, 
“An Apology for Art-Photography,” published in 1863.167 The text traces in microcosm art’s 
paradigmatic shift into the age of its technological reproducibility and the emergence of 
photographic seeing – all from the perspective of Rejlander’s personal recollections.168 The 
narrative of the “Apology” is told through a motley collection of figures and settings: a market in 
Rome, a London gallery, a “young Miss” playing piano, a “ready-made photographer,” an 
anonymous gentleman, and a neighborly artist. Each of these figures is examined in the course of 
this chapter with an eye to how they illuminate the emergence of photographic seeing and the 
discursive context of the photographer as demonstrated by Rejlander’s struggle to see himself as 
a photographer. 
4.1 Painter and Photographer 
 
As noted in chapter two, Rejlander left his native Sweden for England as a young man 
and married an English woman, Mary Constable. The couple settled in the town of 
Wolverhampton in 1846. It was not a bucolic location for a struggling painter. Art historian and 
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Rejlander specialist, Stephanie Spencer, notes that the “Wolverhampton region was commonly 
called the Black Country owing to the intensity of its ugliness.”169 An actor famous at the time 
once memorably remarked that the “route from Wolverhampton to Birmingham by night is the 
best guide to Dante that I know. The huge heaps of slag, the blast of the roaring furnaces, the 
sulphurous stench of the hell pits, the horde of half savage colliers...the gangs of half-naked 
women...amazed and horrified me.”170 Rejlander’s struggle to establish himself as a painter in 
Wolverhampton met with little success. No record of his participation in any major exhibitions 
survive from this time, save notice of a single painting – provocatively titled Oh yes, Oh yes! –
which appears on the exhibition register of the Royal Academy’s annual Salon of 1848.  
Rejlander underwent a conversion (or diversion) that propelled him from his outcast 
invisibility as a painter in Wolverhampton to the centre of nineteenth-century photography. This 
transformation began in 1852 when he traveled to Rome. While browsing in a market, he came 
across a number of photographic reproductions of artworks. He recognized what a benefit these 
images could be to a painter. When he returned to England he took lessons with Nicholass 
Henneman, who had been an assistant to William Henry Fox Talbot (1800-1877), one of the 
chief inventors of photography. Over the next decade Rejlander honed his craft. He began by 
making art studies of figures, draperies and the like, which he sold to fellow painters. In time his 
practice expanded and deepened. By the 1850s he had begun experimenting with the production 
of art-photographs, and shortly after he began to exhibit them widely. In 1855 he won his first 
medal at the Universal Exhibition in Paris.  
His success as a photographer, however, did not inspire him to stop painting. He 
continued to paint right up until his death. The British Journal of Photography noted this in their 
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obituary for Rejlander: “Until within a very short period of his demise he [Rejlander] was 
occupied in the duties of his beloved profession, resting at short intervals, moving from his 
couch to the camera or the easel feebly and slowly.”171 The obituary fittingly captures the sense 
of Rejlander’s creative life as caught within, and moving between, the poles of painting and 
photography. It was in this movement between these two worlds that Rejlander negotiated his 
self-understanding and autobiographical figuration as a photographer.  It is within this drift back 
and forth that he established a sense of continuity with, and autonomy from, the nineteenth-
century discourse of art and the figure of the artist. 
 The “Apology” marked the highpoint of Rejlander’s writing. He first read the essay 
before the prestigious London Photographic Society, to which he had been elected president in 
1856. As president, Rejlander often gave addresses at the Society’s meetings. But as Spencer 
notes, “he often arrived unprepared” and would default into giving a casual talk on purely 
“technical” matters instead.172 This was not altogether surprising since throughout the mid-
nineteenth century photographers were consumed with technical questions. Indeed the journal 
Athenaeum noted in 1850: “Perhaps, like young painters, the photographists are too intent at 
present on the mechanisms of their art to attend to its highest capabilities.”173  
 By the 1860s, however, considerable technical advances had been achieved. As a result 
photographers increasingly turned their intellectual energies to addressing and debating 
philosophical and aesthetical matters. By 1863, the world of photography was ready for a paper 
like the “Apology.” Its influence was highly significant. The paper soon went into print and was 
disseminated widely though the expanding network of photography associations and societies in 
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England and abroad. The paper struck a chord with photographers (and critics) because it zeroed 
in on the central debate in photography at that time: the question of whether or not photography 
was a form of art. Rejlander’s paper was one of many such essays of the time that tried in one 
way or another to resolve the question of photography’s artistic legitimacy. What makes the 
“Apology” unique, however, is that it addresses this question in the form of an autobiographical 
narrative. In the “Apology,” Rejlander’s narrative “I” re-traces how he “drifted into making 
photographic pictures.”174 Rejlander’s use of the word “drifted” is quite fitting. The “Apology” 
does not tell a linear story. It drifts from one origin story to another and deploys a host of figural 
personae along the way. The “Apology” is at once the story of a developing photographer and a 
study in the struggle to narrate this development. 
4.2 When in Rome 
 Rejlander begins his story in Rome. “In 1852 I was in Rome, and saw photographs of the 
Apollo Belvedere, the Laocoon, the Torso, Gibson’s Venus, &c., &c., which I bought and 
studied.”175 Rejlander’s list of photographed artworks spans centuries. The Apollo, the Torso and 
the Laocoon of Ancient Greece appear alongside John Gibson’s neo-classical rendition of Venus, 
completed shortly before Rejlander’s arrival in Rome. The market scene presents in miniature 
the anarchic disordering of art-historical time wrought by the advent of photographic 
reproduction. By 1863, art of all periods was steadily being archived within the virtual enclosure 
of photography – a “museum without walls” – as André Malraux would later famously term it.176 
The repeated etcetera of the passage signifies in brief what Rejlander could only intimate at the 
time: the archival potential of photography to reproduce any artwork. The repeated etcetera 
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functions as a minimalist maxim that fittingly allegorizes the historical logic of technological 
reproducibility. Like the ellipses of a mathematical set, the doubled etcetera signifies that the 
logic of photographic reproduction is virtually unbounded. Every artwork can be 
photographically miniaturized and virtualized. The cultural treasures of Rome (or anywhere) can 
now be shipped in a tourist’s suitcase. The opening passage of the “Apology” thus contains in 
condensed form a first-person account of the paradigmatic shift that Walter Benjamin would 
later theorize as the historically irreparable loss of “aura” that attended the passage of art into the 
age of its technological reproducibility.
177
  
4.3 Ackermann’s (Seeing Photographically) 
 Rejlander’s recollection of buying art-reproductions in Rome drifts into a narration of a 
prior scene in London: “I merely recollected having seen some reddish landscapes at 
Ackermann’s [gallery] in Regent Street [London, England].”178 Around the same time Rejlander 
also saw a show of daguerreotypes, but of these he noted that they “made no impression on me. 
What I saw...proved as evanescent as looking at myself in a glass.”179 The reader has been 
catapulted from Rome, city of the former Renaissance where the treasures of art are being 
cheaply sold as photographic reproductions to London, the present capital of the industrial 
revolution where photographs are being sold as art. Rejlander bears witness to the emergence of 
a new aura – the art-photograph – that in due course will become an insurgent medium in the art 
world of the industrial era.  
The account also includes something else: Rejlander’s reflection in the glass. To be sure, 
Rejlander’s reflective recollection may have stemmed from Rejlander having actually seen his 
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reflection on the glassy surface of the daguerreotypes he saw. But even if this is so, it does not 
exhaust the statement’s autobiographical significance.  
The scene as seen can be productively understood in terms of what Freud terms 
“condensation.” In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud identifies condensation as one of the 
means by which “dream work” is done. Condensation is the unconscious act by which multiple 
dream images are composited to form a single image. Freud references the combination 
photographs of Francis Galton (1822-1911) to analogically illustrate his point. Galton was a 
pioneer in the now defunct and dubious “science” of eugenics. In an effort to discern racial 
essences, he made studies of the human face by overlaying multiple negatives of different faces 
to make a single photographic portrait. Freud sees in Galton’s portraits a fitting visualization of 
the dream-work of condensation. He explores this aspect of dreams through an analysis of one of 
his own dreams—the so-called “R. is my Uncle” dream.  
Freud writes of having a dream in which a strange face appeared before him. Freud’s 
analysis reveals that the face he saw was in fact a composite or “condensation” of his Uncle 
Josef’s face with that of R., a friend and fellow colleague (Freud keeps the name confidential). 
For present purposes, the analysis of the dream is less important than the conclusion about 
psychical life that results from it. For Freud, the unconscious can see photographically. For as 
Freud notes: “What I did was to adopt the procedure by which Galton produced...portraits: 
namely by projecting two images on a single plate.”180 Freud’s analysis of the “R. is my Uncle” 
dream would not have been possible without the advent of photography generally and the 
technique of composite printing specifically. The conclusion Freud reaches – that he adopted the 
“procedure by which Galton produced…portraits” – opens a speculative wager that exceeds the 
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interpretive locus of Freudian dream interpretation. It opens a way towards thinking how 
consciousness, and the thinking about consciousness, are impacted, shaped, and transformed by 
the optics of photography. Freud’s analysis of his “R. is my Uncle” dream exemplifies how 
photography can impact the image of the psyche and hence the image of the self in a radical way. 
Freud’s interpretation of his own dream shows both how one’s psychical sense of self, and the 
reinterpretation of that sense of self, can be reconstituted photographically. It shows that 
photography can serve as a prosthetic device in service of a technique – in this case a 
psychoanalytical technique – of self-understanding and self-constitution. It is precisely this that 
Rejlander’s “reflection” also shows. 
 The evanescent reflection of Rejlander’s narrative “I” in the “Apology” is indicative of a 
psychically internalized photographic optics. Photography is textually entwined in that instant 
with Rejlander’s self-constitution as the subject of his autobiographical narrative. At that 
moment, Rejlander sees himself retrospectively as the photographer he would become, and he 
sees that image in the text through the literal frame of photography. He sees himself as the future 
photographer in a photographic frame: he sees himself photographically. Rejlander’s emergent 
“I” “adopts” (pace Freud) the landscapes at Ackermann’s for the purposes of constituting the 
image of itself as photographer.  
Rejlander’s recollection, like Freud’s dream interpretation, exemplifies what Celia Lury 
describes as the peculiar and particular “subject-effects of seeing photographically,” a theoretical 
notion that Lury develops on the “assumption...that the photograph, more than merely 
representing, has taught us a way of seeing and that this way of seeing has transformed...self-
understanding.”181 Rejlander’s use of the optics of photography in order to frame and focus his 
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autobiographical image is a study in the use of a prosthetic technology, photography in this case, 
to frame a novel self-understanding or what Lury calls a “prosthetic autobiography.”182 
 Prosthetic autobiography as Lury powerfully elaborates renders transparent an implicit 
structure of dependency external to the subject in order for the autobiographical subject to be 
constituted in the first place. This prosthetic autobiography via photography, Lury argues, 
catalyzes novel modes of individuation. Lury writes: 
experimentation as a technique of the self makes possible a relation to the individual so 
produced (including previously defining characteristics of consciousness, memory, and 
embodiment) in which aspects that have previously seemed (naturally or socially) fixed, 
immutable or beyond will or self-control are increasingly made sites of strategic decision-
making, matters of technique or experimentation.
183
  
Such experimentation can take a host of forms, but Lury argues that it is photography that has 
most profoundly and paradigmatically catalyzed the development of modern prosthetic culture in 
which “visibility is an imperative.”184 Historically, photography initiated “novel configurations 
of personhood, self-knowledge and truth.”185   
To tell the story of one’s life as a photographer is to enunciate a relation to an outside 
view – a view through the lens of photography. The life of the photographer denotes in 
autobiographical terms specifically the life lived in relation to photography. While this life is 
bounded by its prosthetic engagement with the camera, it is also freed from the totality of the life 
proper to the normative subject of autobiography. The photographer as subject of a “prosthetic 
autobiography” can be “dissociated from his or her biography, consciousness and memories but 
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may then...acquire a prosthetic auto/biography or biographies.”186 Lury re-signifies the 
autobiographical subject as a human maker. With a nod to philosopher Rosi Braidotti, Lury 
argues that prosthetic autobiography reimagines the human as “a crafty homo faber” who uses 
tools like photography for the purposes of “copying and multiplying the potencies of the human 
body.”187  
A photographer fittingly illustrates Lury’s point. A photographer comes into being 
through a prosthetic engagement with the camera. This prosthetic engagement also involves 
writing. It is in and through this prosthetic assemblage that Rejlander’s narrative “I” qua 
photographer emerges. It is through this assemblage of technological and psychological seeing – 
photographic seeing – that Rejlander’s autobiographical self-image as photographer develops.  
This assemblage constitutes an apparatus in Foucault’s sense. It is at once what Foucault 
would call a “technology of the self,” which constructs a “relationship to the self,” as well as a 
medium through which to perform and produce “the work of the self on the self.”188 Together 
this apparatus and the psychical form of seeing photographically conditioned by it make possible 
what Foucault calls the “discovery of the self by the self.”189 By the “discovery of the self,” 
Foucault means a historically and culturally specific conception of the self. It is to this concept of 
the self – not the self itself – to which Foucault refers. For Foucault, the modern self as the 
inborn reference of one’s identity, is a Christian variant on the Ancient Greek “culture of the 
self.”190  
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In Foucault’s view, Rejlander’s autobiographical project – a search for the discovery of 
the origins of his self as photographer – is the sign and symptom of a particularly modern 
conception of self as something that lies within – a veritable kernel or soul. This modern 
conception of self, Foucault argues, is the historical effect of the workings of a discursive 
dispositif or an apparatus that emerged in the early modern period. It effected the production of 
the image and idea of the self as an interior essence that can be discovered by introspective 
reflection. That is, the modern discourse of the self produced the very idea that the self is 
discoverable through self-searching acts like confession and autobiography. The apparatus of the 
modern discourse of the self is what, in his translation of dispositif, Paul Veyne terms a “set-up” 
that frames a certain way of speaking about and acting in relation to the subject of the self.
191
 
This “set-up” is constructed around the idea that the self is waiting to be discovered by 
introspection. For Foucault, it is precisely this mode of self-surveillance that produces the object 
of its gaze – the modern self. It is in this sense that autobiographical narratives can properly be 
described as a kind of set-up or dispositif that catalyzes a “process of subjectification,” which is 
to say that autobiographical narratives “produce their subject[s].”192  
On Lury’s account, which is heavily influenced by Foucault, the subject of a prosthetic 
autobiography is effectively the subject of a photographic and discursive apparatus or a set-up 
that conditions and produces the idea that the self is discoverable through technological and 
linguistic prostheses. Lury’s point, following Foucault, is that the self that is discovered through 
the prosthesis of photography is in fact produced by this prosthesis. For Lury the subject of a 
photo-prosthetic autobiography makes, extends, copies, multiplies, and re-signifies itself through 
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photographic action. Through this prosthetic engagement, the photographic operator multiplies 
the possibilities of becoming and self-constitution. Seeing photographically, as Lury defines it, is 
one of the most visible aspects of this mode of becoming open to the photographic operator; it 
transforms not only the optical but also, as Rejlander’s case will show, the psychical aspects of 
seeing. 
4.4 Coat Sleeve 
 The scene that Rejlander describes at Ackermann’s gallery soon fades and a new origin 
story takes its place. He recalls an event from his portrait painting days that unexpectedly 
impressed upon him the power of photographic vision. As Rejlander describes, it was a 
photograph of an anonymous gentleman with a curious fold in his coat sleeve that spurred him to 
devote himself seriously to the study of photography. He writes: 
It is curious to notice how frequently trifles decide some men’s actions. What really 
hurried me forward [towards photography] was having seen the photograph of a 
gentleman, and the fold in his coat sleeve was just the thing I required for a portrait I was 
then painting at home, and could not please myself in this particular point. My sitter had 
no time or inclination to sit for it...but this [photograph] was just “life-like!” “Now,” said 
I, “I shall get all I want.” I could not exercise proper patience. I therefore took all the 
[photography] lessons at once, to turn out a ready-made photographer the next day.
193
 
 A mere trifle, a fold in a coat sleeve seen in a photograph, was “just the thing,” Rejlander 
recalls, which finally propelled him to consciously and conscientiously take up photography. 
That this tiny detail so captivated Rejlander points to the cultivation of a sensitivity to minute 
visual detail, which as Szarkowski argues in The Photographer’s Eye, is indicative of 
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photographic vision.
194
 The camera attunes the eye to see details that can otherwise go unseen. 
There is a parallel here with the thought of Walter Benjamin on two points: the detail of the coat 
sleeve and the force of the optical unconscious. In his essay “Little History of Photography,” 
Benjamin writes the following about a photograph of the philosopher F.W.J. Schelling: “Just 
consider Schelling’s coat. It will surely pass into immortality along with him: the contours it has 
borrowed from its wearer are not unworthy of the creases in his face.”195 Like Rejlander, 
Benjamin’s photographic eye hones in on a mere trifle, a detail: a small fold in a coat sleeve. The 
curious fold in Schelling’s coat at the crest of the shoulder becomes a code by which Benjamin 
reads the lines of Schelling’s face and forces a dialectical coupling of the materiality of the coat 
and the philosophical idealism of its wearer. The fold itself folds a complex quasi-Marxist 
material reading of a modern image of one of the nineteenth century’s most important 
representatives of German Idealist philosophy.  
 The same visual detail – a fold in a coat sleeve –“spurs on” Rejlander’s narrative. This 
tiny detail functions as the keystone that critically supports the narrative arc that 
autobiographically spans the before and after of Rejlander’s passage into photographic practice. 
The form of seeing (photographic seeing) that the picture of the gentleman offers Rejlander is 
speedily appropriated by an emergent and insurgent “I” determined “now” to “get all I want.” 
What does it want? It wants to close the prosthetic distance between optical and photographic 
seeing. Rejlander’s “I” establishes a fantasy of self-sufficiency. The ego’s dream of liberation 
from dependency on anything outside itself finally expresses itself in the paradoxical 
pronouncement that this “I” is a “ready-made photographer.”  
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 There is an incongruity between the image of a “ready-made photographer” who by 
definition is already a photographer and thus was always already a photographer, and the 
photographer who took “lessons” in order to develop into one. Rejlander’s emergent ego as 
photographer seeks to efface the “other” of photography and supplant it with an image of a self-
sufficient “I.” But the “lessons” shine like a penumbra that reveals what is otherwise eclipsed by 
this egoical claim: seeing photographically must be learned, whether consciously through 
“lessons” or unconsciously by mere exposure to photography. Photographic seeing is a technique 
and a technology for the production of the self qua photographer.  
4.5 A Young Miss 
 No sooner has the confident persona of the “ready-made photographer” appeared in the 
“Apology” than it is effaced by a more ambivalent figure that speaks of the trials of tutelage, 
training, and “lessons” in development. Rejlander writes: “Alas! for a very long period my 
attempts at photography resembled those of a young Miss at the piano, looking alternately at the 
music and the keys. If I had to speak at the time of operation [photographing], I very easily went 
wrong.”196 The time of learning that previously had been signaled by one day of formal training 
thickens and expands into a story of apprenticeship that now is said to cover a “very long 
period.” The autotelic “I” of the ready-made photographer now gives way to an “I” that “easily 
went wrong.” This “I” is figured as a “young Miss at the piano” clumsily playing both a music 
and an instrument she has not yet mastered. 
 This “young Miss” is an example of what Cheryl Walker might call an autobiographical 
“persona.”197 Walker argues that because the “I” is never self-sufficient, it emerges in an 
autobiography through a collection of more or less visible personae. Personae in Walker’s view 
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emerge through a complex interleaving of the “I” or ego, lived life, and the multiplicity of 
“literary voices” and intertextual traces that bear on the scene of writing.198 The “I” of 
autobiography “functions like an outline,” writes Walker, “a potentiality, rather than a fullness, 
which is always already depleted as it renders itself in discourse. One might even call a persona a 
thin description.”199 The persona is a vessel more than a mirror that conveys and transforms the 
subject, the self, or the “I” of the autobiographical reference. Coming as it does after the 
figuration of the “ready-made photographer,” the “young Miss” at once signifies and splits the 
“I” of the “Apology.” It at once makes possible its figuration while rendering that figuration 
manifestly multiple. With the appearance of the “young Miss,” Rejlander’s narrative “I” can no 
longer be read as a singular, self-sufficient ego. The self-sufficient “ready-made photographer” is 
exposed as a fantasy by the secondary iteration of the “young Miss.” 
The “young Miss” appears on the scene of recollection playing the piano in media res. 
Assuming that the “young Miss” is the persona of Rejlander as novice photographer, and that the 
music this figure plays is photography, some striking questions follow. Did she, photography, 
begin playing for Rejlander that fateful day in Rome or was it London? When did this music 
begin in Rejlander? The “young Miss” autobiographically personifies a place beyond which 
questions of Rejlander’s beginnings as a photographer become ever more clouded as if 
consumed in what Benjamin calls the “fog that surrounds the beginnings of photography.”200  
Rejlander’s narrative “I” cannot ground itself as an origin since photography conditions 
the very possibility of his seeing himself as a photographer. And strictly speaking photography 
did not have a singular origin. The modern photograph dates to the early nineteenth century. But 
                                                          
198
 Walker, “Persona Criticism and the Death of the Author,” 114. 
199
 Walker, “Persona Criticism and the Death of the Author,” 115. 
200
 Benjamin, “Little History of Photography,” 274. 
 
 
  109 
the building blocks of photography – optics, chemistry, and rules of visual composition – vastly 
predate the invention of the mechanical camera. The fog that surrounds the origins of 
photography is re-imaged in Rejlander’s account by the confused and multiple origin stories of 
his beginnings as a photographer, which is itself iterated by the plurality of figures that narrate 
those beginnings. 
The narrative drift in the “Apology” from the “ready-made photographer” to the “young 
Miss” splits the autobiographical trajectory and introduces a swerve, a clinamen, into Rejlander’s 
account. Rejlander intimates this when he notes: “I drifted into making photographic pictures.”201 
This drift erodes the surety of the account and fractures the normative expectation that the “I” of 
autobiography is singular, and unique. It serves as unintentional critique of the illusory idea that 
the “I” is complete, coherent, and whole. The multiple personae of the “Apology” render the “I” 
as a series of images and fragmentary figures. On this point Szarkowski notes something 
especially prescient. Writing on the photographer’s problematic attempt to capture the world in 
fragments he notes: “The photographer...[can] not assemble these clues into a coherent 
narrative.”202 With the appearance of the “young Miss,” Rejlander’s autobiographical project 
loses its unity and coherence. At that moment it drifts into a narrative form that, like 
photography, is marked by reproducibility and fragmentation. Thus the “Apology” bears the 
impress of seeing photographically insofar as it catalyzes a logic leading ultimately, as Lury 
notes, to the “dissolution of the individual, the proliferation of multiple” personae and “the 
emergence of an optical unconscious.”203  
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4.6 You Photographers 
The “young Miss” soon fades and is replaced for yet another figure and yet another origin 
story. Rejlander writes:  
A very good artist was staying in the neighborhood, engaged in some commission. He 
called, saw [one of my] picture[s], was very much delighted with it, and so was I. Before 
he left my house he looked at the picture again, and said it was “marvelous;” but added—
“Now, if I had drawn that, I should have introduced another figure between them, or 
some light object to keep them together. You see there is where you photographers are at 
fault.
204
 
Rejlander’s autobiographical persona is the object of the artist’s rebuke: “that is where you 
photographers are at fault.” But this negative identification soon assumes a more affirmative 
tone. Rejlander continues: 
I snapped my fingers after he [the artist] had left – but not at him – and exclaimed out-
loud, “I can do it.” Two days after I called at my artist friend’s hotel, as proud as 
anybody.  He looked at my picture and at me, and took snuff twice. He said—“This is 
another picture.” “No,” said I, “it is the same, except with the addition you suggested.” 
"Never!" he exclaimed…“how is it possible?” Our interview ended with another 
suggestion that if a basket or [something] else had been on the left side in the foreground 
it would have given greater depth to the picture...I agreed fully with my friend’s 
criticism; and, after a week, I sent to him, in London, the picture amended as a present.
205
 
The passage showcases Rejlander’s skill at combination printing. At the prodding of the painter, 
Rejlander added figures and objects to his initial photograph by shooting the new elements 
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individually and compositing them into the original negative. But the passage indexes something 
else that for present purposes is of more interest. In the course of the passage, the painter drifts 
from the pole of a neighbor to that of “friend.” This “friend” is very different from the “brother-
artist” figure found in Robinson’s Studio. Robinson’s use of the term “brother-artist” underscores 
an evolutionary theme internal to his pedagogic program: common descent. Photography, for 
Robinson, descends from painting which descends from a supreme source of Art. According to 
Robinson, one becomes a photographer by adapting the techniques and standards of art, 
particularly painting, to that of photography.  
 Rejlander, by contrast, images the photographer as a figure drifting between painting and 
photography. Rejlander writes: “The same way a painter goes if he means to paint a 
photographer must go if he wishes to make a composition-photograph.”206 But he adds: “The two 
go together – part here and meet again.”207 Finally he notes that where art and photography part 
“photographic art does not stand still, but proceeds and gathers other merits along another 
road.”208 This “parting” of the photographer from the artist signifies a swerve, a clinamen, in the 
historical development of the nineteenth-century photographer. The photographer for Rejlander 
takes another route, another “road,” that diverges from the path of the artist. 
4.7 No Mind 
Rejlander specifies further that photography can be distinguished from painting in terms 
of the contingencies involved. Whereas the pedagogic ideology of Robinson’s Studio is 
committed to the proposition that photography can be learned and practiced as an intentional 
activity. The “Apology” by contrast conceptualizes photography as a practice devoid of the 
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guarantor of intentionality. Consider the following strangely worded passage: “there is no mind 
in a photographic picture, so according to some it cannot contain any new idea, pose, light or 
expression.”209 The “some” was directed at critics, most especially Thomas Sutton whom the 
essay later mentions by name.  
For Sutton, and like-minded critics, photography was not and could not be a form of art. 
Critics like Sutton held that photographs had “no mind;” they were thought to be devoid of the 
stamp of human consciousness and feeling. Such critics saw the photograph as a mechanically 
degraded and impotent copy of the vitality of phenomena comprehended by the human mind. An 
artwork by the hand of an “inspired” artist was thought to be indubitably imprinted with the vital 
power of the artist’s imagination. Rejlander’s rejoinder to Sutton and like-minded critics turns on 
a subtle revision of the concept of intentionality upon which his critics’ view rests.  
Rather than presume that art is a matter of planned procedures by which the artist’s ideas 
and emotions are transferred to a material and relayed to the viewer, Rejlander instead highlights 
the contingencies of photographic production. Rejlander suggests that photography proposes a 
new “idea,” a new “expression,” a new “pose” (a new way of appearing); above all, he suggests, 
that it throws a new “light” on the conception of creative action. But the practice of photography 
also exposes the operator to the contingencies of the technological apparatuses involved, and to 
the contingencies of time, place, point of view, and angle of vision any of which can “easily go 
wrong.”  
Rejlander intimates in brief a major insight that twentieth-century commentators on 
photography would develop, namely, that the frame of a photograph is a contingent boundary 
framing a contingent moment. As Barthes beautifully observes, a photograph “is wholly 
                                                          
209
 Rejlander, “An Apology for Art-Photography,” 144. 
 
 
  113 
ballasted by the contingency of which it is the weightless, transparent envelope.”210 In the 
“world” of photography (Rejlander’s word), things can “go wrong” because, as he notes, 
photographic practice is marked by a contingent “drift.”211 This movement of drift, drifting, or 
deviations amidst the contingencies or those “trifles that decide some men’s actions” is the 
aleatory axiom upon which Rejlander establishes his life-story and his conception of 
photography. The drift of photography, Rejlander suggests, leads the photographer inexorably 
beyond the boundary of intentional certitudes. “I very easily went wrong” is yet another 
minimalist maxim that economically signals the “new” potential, the “new light,” but also the 
new darkness, the new opacities, revealed by photography. The photographic capture of the 
world, Rejlander suggests, involves the photographer in the contingencies that mark the 
precarious space of the present. To capture, to frame, to freeze, to fix the world in photographs is 
to become involved in what Barthes calls the “vast disorder of objects” – the vast disorder of 
things and times that is the world seen through the viewing pane of the camera.
212
 To photograph 
is to drift amidst the contingencies of the present in its fragile moment to moment temporality – 
brief moments in which so much “can easily go wrong” – times in which a flicker, a passing 
shadow, a twitch, a blink, a “trifle” can decide everything.  
4.8 Two Ways of Life 
 The concluding pages of the “Apology” are devoted to a defense of what was to become 
Rejlander’s most famous photograph, Two Ways of Life of 1856. The photograph (of which there 
are multiple versions) is composed of thirty-two separately shot negatives that were  
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Plate 3. Oscar G. Rejlander, The Two Ways of Life, 1856. Courtesy of the George Eastman House, International 
Museum of Photography and Film. 
painstakingly combined in the darkroom to form a single photographic image. The photograph 
depicts a wide but shallow-stage-like space framed in the center by an arch and columns. At 
center, an old man leads two young men into a throng of figures, some clothed and some nude or 
semi-nude. On the right is arranged a group of allegorical figures representing the path of virtue. 
These include figures of learning, industry, and chastity. On the left are figures of vice depicting 
slothfulness, promiscuity, and corruption. The picture presents a moral drama in which youth 
must choose which way in life to go. Rejlander elsewhere gave the following explanation of the 
work.  
In the background is represented a country scene, where, far from the tumult of life, two 
youths have been fondly reared [the country side is visible in the photograph’s 
background]. The time has arrived when duty calls then to perform their part in the busy 
haunts of men. The father, with many misgivings, but with many prayers, conducts them 
from the home of their childhood, through an archway, which is symbolic of the 
boundary between town and country. Left [as] orphans at an early age, the spirit of the 
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mother is seen still hovering near them [in the foreground], instilling into their minds 
good desires.
213
 
 Initial public reactions to Two Ways of Life were good. One critic wrote: “This 
magnificent picture, decidedly the finest Photograph of its class ever produced, is intended to 
show of how much photography is capable.”214  However, over time the tone began to change. A 
critic writing for the Art Journal wrote: 
Virtue and Vice—Industry and Pleasure—are here displayed with an allegorical felicity, 
which is—under all the circumstances of producing  such a picture—surprising. The pose 
of each figure is good, and the grouping of the whole as nearly perfect as possible. We do 
not, however, desire to see many advances in this direction. Works of high Art are not to 
be executed by a mechanical contrivance. The hand of man, guided by the heaven-born 
mind, can alone achieve greatness in this direction.
215
 
In 1857, the Council of the Society of Photography in Scotland refused to hang the picture at its 
annual exhibition on moral grounds.
216
 The Council reversed its decision the following year but 
they hid the vices-half of the photograph behind a curtain.
217
 Thomas Sutton later wrote:  
When the Council of the Society, some years ago, banished from the walls of its 
Exhibition a photograph entitled...Two Ways of Life, in which degraded females were 
exhibited in a state of nudity, with all the uncompromising truthfulness of photography, 
they did quite right, for there was neither art nor decency in such a photograph…There is 
no impropriety in exhibiting such works of art as Etty’s Bathers Surprised by a Swan, or 
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The Judgment of Paris; but there is impropriety in allowing the public to see photographs 
of nude prostitutes, in flesh-and-blood truthfulness and minutest of detail.
218
 
The debate between art and photography here the form of a moral contest. Nudity in art for 
Sutton and the like is acceptable, but nudity in photography is an obscenity. Despite the fact that 
the photograph was known to be a contrived composite image, the reality principle of 
photography foreclosed for critics like Sutton the possibility of seeing nudity in photography as 
little more than pornography.  
 It is in the context of this critical and moral condemnation of Two Ways of Life that one 
should also read the “Apology.” The reading of the text before the London Photographic Society 
was Rejlander’s chance to defend his work, and as Spencer points out, he was also keen to 
defend his female models from the charge of impropriety. Rejlander writes:  
Those that objected to...Two Ways of Life being exhibited had a perfect right to their 
opinion; but they have no right to ask the names or profession or religion of [the] models, 
still less to use vile epithets in speaking of them, as Mr. Sutton has done in his paper read 
before the Photographic Society of Scotland.
219
 
Despite Rejlander’s effort to defend his work and his models, he could not stem the rising chorus 
of moral outrage. Rejlander never quite recovered. He felt his foray into art-photography had 
produced, as he later wrote in a letter to Robinson, “only cavil and misinterpretation.”220 
Spencer’s archival research has conclusively shown that of the nearly four hundred photographs 
attributed to Rejlander only twelve of them were intended by Rejlander to be seen as art-
photographs. By 1860, perhaps due to negative criticism, Rejlander abandoned his practice of 
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art-photography. He would continue to make portraits and study aides for painters, but his 
aesthetic ambitions by 1858 had all but died out.  
The textual re-presentation of Two Ways of Life in the “Apology” might be said to 
constitute what W.J.T. Mitchell calls a “metapicture.” Mitchell elaborates on the concept of 
metapictures first in Picture Theory of 1995, but it is his formulation in his more recent What Do 
Pictures Want of 2005 that proves particularly useful for present purposes. Mitchell is interested 
in pictures (and images broadly) that picture their own picturing. Self-referential pictures are 
typically associated with postmodern imagery. But they can be found throughout history in 
sources like Rembrandt, Vermeer, Velasquez and many others whose pictures prominently 
feature painted images of paintings. Such works draw attention to their material status as 
pictures. Metapictures can also be found in photography as can be seen in the many pictures of 
photographs and cameras. The trope has been exploited to great effect by photographers such as 
Duane Michaels, Louise Lawler, Jeff Wall and others. Mitchell argues that metapictures make 
visible the fact that “all media are mixed media” and that diverse media are always “nested” 
within one another.
221
 Mitchell takes media in the broadest sense. Media are made up of 
mediums. And a medium, Mitchell argues “is not just a set of materials, an apparatus, or a code 
that ‘mediates’ between individuals. It is a complex social institution that contains individuals 
within it and is constituted by a history of practices, rituals, and habits, skills and techniques, as 
well as by a set of material objects and spaces.”222 In Mitchell’s view, a photographer is a 
medium as much as photography since each mediates the transposition of the visual into 
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photographic form. Through Mitchell’s lens, Two Ways of Life might be conceptualized as what 
might be termed a metaphotograph of the photographer as a medium.  
This reading intersects critically with Jordan Bear’s profoundly ingenious interpretation 
of Two Ways of Life.  In “Dangerous Combinations,” Bear reads Two Ways of Life not as a moral 
allegory of virtue versus vice but as a political allegory of labour organizing. The invisible 
“joins” that make up the photographic image are read by Bear as signifying an “invisible” union 
of labour.
223
 Baer writes: “The idiom in which the critical response to Rejlander’s photograph 
was issued was one with striking affinities to a contemporary political condition that likewise 
seemed to be comprised of an invisible collusion: the organization of labour.”224 Bear goes on to 
point out that the term “combination” resonated in the England of the 1850s with “any 
undesirable community of men, who sought, in the words of the Combination Acts meant to 
suppress their activities, to ‘raise wages, or to increase or diminish the number of hours of work, 
or quantity of work, to be done.’”225 In short, Bear ingeniously suggests that both the means by 
which Two Ways of Life was produced and what it depicts – combination on the one hand and 
labour on the other –created a rhetorical and pictorial resonance that “would have been 
understood almost exclusively in relation to trade unionism” and labour more generally.226 
Extending Bear’s insight, one might argue that  Two Ways of Life, and the photograph’s 
re-figuration in the “Apology,” can be read as an allegory not solely of labour in general but also 
as an allegory of the labour specifically of the photographer at the very moment of its coming 
into historical existence alongside the art and labour of modernity. The “Apology” and Two 
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Ways of Life textually “nested” within it may be said to metapicture the nineteenth-century 
photographer as a split, internally divided, and contested cultural figure. The image (like the 
“Apology”) depicts the medium of photography, and thus also the photographer “nested” within 
it as composed of two figures bound to a world split by competing images of photography. The 
two paths confronting the young men may be said to personify two seemingly conflicting choices 
that confronted the nineteenth-century photographer. Should the photographer follow the path of 
art and sensual beauty or the path of rational and instrumental technology? The photograph as a 
metaphotograph figures the split historical figuration of the photographer emerging against the 
culturally and aesthetically contested backdrop of nineteenth-century photography.  
The drama of the “Apology” passes from Rome to London; from a young girl clumsily 
playing piano to two young orphaned boys adrift in a “world” that branches and splits. The 
various figures of the photographer emerge in the “Apology” through multiple and multiply 
recollected photographic situations, apparatuses of desire, technology, image, and self-
imagining, together point beyond the anemic outline of pictorialism and the whole edifice of the 
photographer-as-artist paradigm that went along with it. Unlike the ideal pictorialist figured in 
Robinson’s texts, the photographer of the “Apology” is a figure of self-division as signified by 
the multiple accounts of Rejlander’s entry into photographic practice and the plurality of 
personae that dramatize them. Whereas the photographer of The Studio is framed in terms of a 
narrowly defined, aesthetic program, the photographer of the “Apology” is a wayward figure 
whose meanderings in the world of photography lead the photographer in ways neither 
prescribed nor even envisioned by the pictorialist program. The “Apology” marks a moment in 
the historical emergence of the photographer when the question of what it might mean to be a 
photographer finds no single, direct, answer. But in its very uncertainty it carves out a possibility 
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only dreamed of in pictorialism: the possibility that the photographer could yet “gather merits 
along another road” parallel to that of the artist. The “Apology” establishes the possibility of 
autonomy for the photographer if only through the specific questions and uncertainties thrown up 
in the interstitial space between the practice of photography and the sphere of recognizably fine 
art. In the pages of the “Apology,” the photographer appears for what it was for a moment in the 
nineteenth century: a divided figure marking an uncertain field. 
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Chapter 5 
A Transport of Delight: 
The Case of Julia Margaret Cameron 
 Chapter four argued that Rejlander’s “Apology” illustrates a then emergent subject 
position in the field of nineteenth-century photographic discourse and practice: the photographer 
as a divided and fractured subject position split by the competing interests and demands of art 
and photography. The identity crisis in which the nineteenth-century photographer was 
embroiled was, however, interpreted by some photographers as license to reject the imposition of 
norms drawn from outside photography’s borders. This was the case with Julia Margaret 
Cameron (1815-1879).  
This chapter examines Cameron’s brief autobiographical text, Annals of My Glass House. 
The text was published on the occasion of Cameron’s 1874 retrospective titled, Mrs. Cameron’s 
Photography, which toured England, Australia, America, and the Continent.  “Glass house” was 
a common name for a photography studio in the nineteenth century owing to the fact that a 
studio in the days before electricity required many windows and skylights to sufficiently light the 
space. The central principle of the Annals, and arguably of Cameron’s conception of 
photography as a whole, is that of movement. Cameron often allowed her subjects, especially 
children, to move during the long exposure time, which created blurs in the final photograph. She 
also intentionally employed “soft focus” rather than the sharp and hard focus favored by most 
nineteenth-century photographers. Cameron’s stylistic emphasis on movement signified by the 
blurriness of many of her most important photographs parallels her philosophic prizing of 
mobility and fluidity in the Annals. Cameron’s Annals and her photographic work together 
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served to open spaces within what Azoulay calls the “arena” of photography.227 The arena of 
Cameron’s photography was her glass house. Both her physical studio and her textual glass 
house – her autobiography – functioned as spaces for experimentation that served to open novel 
degrees of freedom within the otherwise restrictive space of Victorian norms. 
 This chapter begins with a reading of the autobiographical work that the Annals perform. 
It then proceeds to investigate how the Annals re-conceptualize photographic action and the 
subject position of the photographer from the perspective of movement and fluidity. Lastly it 
examines how this conception is given form in one of Cameron’s most complex works, Pray 
God Bring Father Safely Home of 1872.  
5.1 Safe Cover 
 Cameron was born Julia Margaret Pattle in Calcutta, India. Her father, James Pattle, was 
a British official for the East India Trading Company. Her mother, Adeline de l’Etang, had 
ancestral ties to Marie Antoinette. Julia Margaret married Charles Hay Cameron, a jurist and a 
member of the Law Commission stationed in Calcutta. By the mid-1850s the couple moved to 
the village of Freshwater on the Isle of Wight. Cameron over time cultivated an impressive 
network of influential friends, including the philosopher Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), Charles 
Darwin (1809-1882), and Alfred, Lord Tennyson (1809-1892). These contacts were to prove 
invaluable in the course of Cameron’s eventual rise to prominence as one of the most respected 
photographers of her generation. 
  The Annals opens with the following invocation: “‘Mrs. Cameron’s Photography,’ now 
ten years old, has passed the age of lisping and stammering and may speak for itself, having 
traveled over Europe, America and Australia, and met with welcome which has given it 
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confidence and power.”228 The third-person voice heard here is a function of the title of the 
exhibition, Mrs. Cameron’s Photography. Cameron, however, strategically enacts a poetics of 
prosopopoeia. The exhibition has passed the stage of stammering and matured into a “world 
traveler” endowed with “confidence and power.” This act of prosopopoeia slyly enables 
Cameron to claim her success by ascribing a voice to the exhibition.  
Although women of the Victorian period did begin to assume roles in public life and the 
arts, the prevailing nineteenth-century norms remained largely intact. Women were expected to 
remain in the private sphere of family and married life. Men governed social life by (among 
other things) regulating and restraining women’s access to the public sphere through legal fetters. 
Hence in England, as elsewhere, Victorian women had little to no status as legal subjects. And 
what little legal status women did possess was largely taken away by marriage. Mary Poovey 
points out in her study Uneven Developments that married women in the eyes of the law were 
seen essentially as property of their husbands. This legal principle was known as “coverture.” 
Poovey notes: “the principle of coverture...dictated that married women were legally represented 
or ‘covered’ by their husband because the interest of husband and wife were assumed to be the 
same; as a consequence married women were not ‘bound’ as individual subjects by contracts, 
debts, or some criminal laws.”229 Hence “in Britain, when a woman became what she was 
destined to be (a wife), she became non-existent in the eyes of the law.”230  
The principle of coverture reflected and reinforced the ideology of “separate spheres”: 
public for men and private for women.
231
 Men were to participate in the public realm of work 
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and civic duty and women were to remain at home unemployed except in unpaid domestic labor 
and child rearing. The ideology of separate spheres was reinforced by the perpetuation of the 
view that women were “naturally self-sacrificing,” a view that drew considerable support from 
the pseudo-biological principle that women were naturally maternal creatures.
232
 The domestic 
sphere was socially a “protected territory” in which married women’s “naturally” self-sacrificing 
maternal capacities were thought to “achieve their fullest expression and influence” without the 
fetters of legal oversight (or protection).
233
 Hence the paradox of Victorian domesticity was that 
married women were “free” to do what their maternal “natures” demanded: they were “free” to 
remain under the “cover” of house, home, and husband. 
 This in brief renders clearer the complex sexual politics that impinged on Cameron’s 
public emergence as a photographer and her self-figuration in the Annals. As Cameron’s 
biographer, Victoria Olsen notes, Cameron had to “walk a fine line between two poles: self-
effacement would satisfy her public persona of self-sacrifice and devotion to her family but deny 
her ambition and personal talent; self-promotion would serve her art and career but potentially 
threaten her identity within her family and community.”234 In order to walk this “fine line,” the 
Annals deploys inventive strategies of discretion designed at once to satisfy and subvert 
Victorian norms of femininity. Letting the exhibition “speak” strategically enables Cameron’s 
persona as photographer to speak through it. Playing the self-effacing woman provides safe 
cover, the necessary cover, under which the Annals could slip the societal censors that 
“protected” the feminine sphere.235 This strategy of discretion via a self-effacing persona follows 
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the cultural logic of what Homi Bhabha has called (citing nineteenth-century colonial discourse) 
“sly civility.”236  
Bhabha argues that in the restricted zone of enforced civility, colonized subjects can and 
do find means and modes of address and social performance that simultaneously satisfy and 
subvert the demands of the colonizer. In his essay “Sly Civility,” Bhabha cites these lines from a 
sermon by Archdeacon Potts in 1818: “If you urge them [the colonized] with their gross and 
unworthy misconceptions of the nature and the will of God, or the monstrous follies of their 
fabulous theology, they will turn it off with a sly civility.”237 It is the ambivalence of colonial rule 
that the colonized reflects back to the colonizer as “sly civility.”238 The self-effacing acceptance 
of the colonizer’s social norms produces anxiety within the apparatus of colonial power by 
generating a series of unsettling questions. Why would anyone submit? Does anyone wholly 
submit? Is the submissiveness of the colonized merely a mask behind which some resistant 
kernel silently refuses to yield? Are they conforming or merely being sly? The performance of 
sly civility, writes Bhabha, “reveals that the other side of narcissistic authority may be the 
paranoia of power; a desire for ‘authorization’ in the face of a process of cultural differentiation 
which makes it problematic to fix...objects of colonial power.”239 
 There are obvious complications with adopting wholesale a postcolonial perspective in 
order to chart Cameron’s public presentation of herself in the Annals since the relation between 
colonizers and colonized is not symmetrical to that of men and women. But there are resonances 
between the two sites of power and resistance. Cameron’s public persona had to slip past the 
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societal checkpoints zealously guarded by the masculine order. Cameron’s Annals deploys the 
strategy of sly civility by miming the Victorian norm of the mystique of self-effacing femininity. 
This mimicry of femininity (to use another of Bhabha’s important concepts) is, however, not 
simply a conscious strategy.
240
 It is also the sign of an ideological (which is to say unconscious) 
confirmation of prevailing norms. It was in and through this mixture of conscious and 
unconscious miming of Victorian norms of femininity that Cameron’s persona as photographer 
emerged. This conscious stratagem and ideological confirmation of Victorian femininity takes 
shape early in the Annals. Consider the following: 
I think that the Annals of My Glass House will be welcome to the public, and, 
endeavoring to clothe my little history with light, as with a garment, I feel confident that 
the truthful account of indefatigable work, with the anecdote of human interest attached 
to that work, will add in some measure to its value.
241
 
The strategy of sly civility is obliquely visible. The Annals address a public, but the address is 
dressed in a “garment” of “light.” The text purports to offer a “truthful account,” but the account 
is discreetly covered “as with a garment.” Paradoxically, the text is clothed in the very thing that 
illuminates all things – light. This creates for the reader a certain interpretive free play. One can 
read this “little history” as a “truthful account” but only on the condition that one bears in mind 
that this accounting is also an act of concealing. The Annals at once expose Cameron as 
photographer to the public, and at the same time the text covers itself “as with a garment” in the 
garb of Victorian femininity. The text exists at the crucial intersection or interstice of two sites: 
public exposure and private discretion. In this interstitial space the Annals carves out a thin 
persona within “the public” of England in the year 1874. This persona lived its life between the 
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interiorized space of the Victorian domestic sphere (feminine) and the “outside” world of “the 
public” (masculine) to which the exhibition and the Annals were addressed.  
Public address in 1874 (as now) was regulated by norms derived from the quasi-juridical 
order of acts that include witnessing, confession, testimony, and autobiography. In The Limits of 
Autobiography, Leigh Gilmore draws out the juridical dimension of autobiographical address. 
She writes, “along with the dutiful and truthful accounting of a life one might find in 
autobiography, the self is not only responsible but always potentially culpable, given 
autobiography’s rhetorical proximity to testimony and the quasi-legalistic framework for judging 
its authenticity.”242 Autobiography puts in question its own truthfulness since it is assumed that 
one’s image or story of oneself is never “objective.” But it is not only that the reading of 
autobiography is plagued with questions of veracity. The writing of autobiography is as well. To 
truthfully tell the story of one’s life to the public – to give a “truthful account” as Cameron says 
– is to put one’s life on the stand in the public court of opinion. Gilmore continues:  
In the cultivation of an autobiographical conscience, one learns to be, and even strives for 
a sense of being, overseen. Thus autobiography can be viewed as a discipline, a self-
study in surveillance. The prevalence of surveillance not only characterizes a relation 
between the self and others but becomes, as it is internalized, a property of the self as 
self-reflexivity or conscience.
243
 
Gilmore notes that the “self who reflects on his or her life is not unlike the self bound to confess 
or the self in prison, if one imagines self-representation as a kind of self-monitoring.”244 
Confessional autobiography proceeds on the implicit assumption that the public gaze is directed 
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at the self. In Cameron’s case, the public (male) gaze operationalizes a regulatory and coercive 
force, which compels the desire to give a “truthful account.” As an accompanying text to the 
exhibition, the Annals, like Cameron’s photographs, were circumscribed by a space of judgment. 
It was from within this space of aesthetic and social judgment that Cameron’s self as 
photographer emerged in the eyes of a male-dominated public gaze. Cameron had to satisfy the 
male-dominated public gaze’s demand for proof that her persona (if not person) was covered or 
clothed in the garment and garb of Victorian femininity. She had then to expose in public her 
social belonging within the private, feminine sphere.  This was the paradoxical position Cameron 
was in: how to make the private public without appearing to sully its supposed sanctity? 
Cameron was caught in the increasingly confused borders of the private and public, which in no 
small way was a direct consequence of the advent of photography. The photographic image 
became a virtual vehicle for the transgression and partial breakdown of the public and private 
distinction. The family photograph, one of Cameron’s genres, is at once a private document and 
yet made for collective and even at times, as in Cameron’s case, public consumption. As Barthes 
notes, photography “corresponds precisely to the explosion of the private into the public…the 
private is consumed as such publicly.”245 Commenting on this passage, Lury writes that the 
photographic “display of the private…the making external of the internal both denies and 
depends upon the boundary of the two. It erases only to redefine this boundary, reconstituting the 
private within the public.”246 
It is from a position within the interstice of the private and the public that the Annals 
speak. “Autobiography,” T.L. Broughton notes, “in its modern, introspective form at least, 
situates itself at the very juncture of the public world of announcement and the private world of 
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self-analysis and meditation.”247 The private world of autobiography can only be “read,” or 
otherwise understood, insofar as it conforms to (or contests) public expectations and norms 
concerning autobiographical truthfulness. And the semblance of truthfulness has to be effected 
according to the gendered genre norms of autobiography. Cameron’s “truthful account” had to be 
dressed or clothed in the language of femininity. The Annals thus symptomatically show how the 
truthful autobiography addressed to the public requires a dressing of the truth. The truth must be 
dressed as a witness is dressed for court – in conformity with the rules, regulations, and 
procedures of public truth telling. To tell a private truth to the public, one must tell it in the 
language of public address. It is within this ambivalent space of enunciation that Cameron’s 
“truthful account” must be understood as an iterative production in the present rather than a 
statement corresponding to a set of historical events only. Here one finds that, as Bhabha notes, 
“the ‘true’ is always marked and informed by the ambivalence of the process of emergence 
itself.”248 
The question of autobiography and its relation to the public/private distinction thickens 
considerably when the Annals suddenly break off into a quotation from Tennyson’s poem “The 
Gardener’s Daughter.” Cameron contextualizes her use of Tennyson’s poem by prefacing it with 
these words: “details strictly personal and touching the affections should be avoided, is a truth 
one’s own instinct would suggest, and noble are the teachings of one [Tennyson] whose word 
has become a text to the nations.”249 Cameron’s appropriation of the poem (which goes 
unacknowledged) retools the famed Laureate’s poem as an autobiographical para-text. The first 
quotation reads: 
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Be wise; not easily forgiven 
Are those, who setting wide the doors that bar 
The secret bridal chamber of the heart 
Let in the day
250
 
  Cameron’s prefatory contextualization of Tennyson’s poem appropriates and transforms 
it. Firstly it covertly buttresses Cameron’s strategy of discretion: the public will not easily 
forgive a woman for exposing the private domestic sphere as signified by the hallowed space of 
the “bridal chamber.” The poem thus signals to the public that Cameron acknowledges the 
prevailing norms regarding the privacy of the “feminine” domestic sphere. Yet this 
acknowledgement also serves as safe cover for the exposure of that sphere though the exhibition 
of her photographs, many of which were of Cameron’s family. The appropriation of the poem 
acts to solemnize the Victorian sanctity of the domestic enclosure while at the same time it opens 
that enclosure to the light of photography and public spectatorship. In light of photography, the 
“secret bridal chamber” barred from view is in a sense re-signified as a hidden “camera” in the 
original Latin sense – a chamber. The advent of the modern mechanical camera descends from 
the camera obscura: a dark chamber through which light is only permitted to enter through a 
small aperture. This optical device produces an image of the outside world on the opposite wall 
inside the chamber. In a lovely rhetorical inversion, then, the “glass house” as a text becomes a 
camera obscura (or dark chamber) that “captures” Tennyson’s poem within its photo-rhetorical 
enclosure. This inversion is significantly at odds with pictorialist sentiments.  
Cameron is considered a pictorialist. But her writing on photography demonstrates a 
conviction to dispense with fine art as a model from which to derive norms of photographic 
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practice. She asserts photography’s aesthetic rights in the Annals by re-signifying the relation 
between photography and the fine arts. She subordinates Tennyson’s poetry to a photographic 
rhetoric and in doing so slyly inverts the nineteenth-century cultural hierarchy of the fine arts 
over and above photography.  
The heliocentric rhetoric of the Annals also transforms the “The Gardener’s Daughter” 
through an intensification of the poem’s photographic resonances. The Annals re-
contextualization of the poem recodes “light” and “chamber” as elements of an amorous, even 
sexual, “bridal” drama replete with penetrative rhetoric: light flooding the chamber. But the 
penetration goes unseen. Light does not illuminate the privatized interiority of the bridal chamber 
of the heart. It is barred from view by the doors of the locked “chamber of the heart.” The heart 
chamber rhetorically houses the presumed subject of the Annals, Cameron’s true self. Cameron’s 
heart of hearts, as it were, dwells unseen in the otherwise apparently transparent autobiographical 
enclosure of the Glass House. The heart as seat of the soul or self in modern vernacular has a 
long history. The heart is the master signifier of Western interiority. As Sloterdijk writes, 
“emotional disciplines have spawned a universe of subtle physiologies whose only aim is to 
deepen and emphasize the equation of the heart and the center of the self...heartiness is the 
epitome of affective core subjectivity.”251 Cameron’s barred chamber of the heart with its 
connotations of chastity, of limit, of a barrier, a refusal to fully disclose, fully disrobe, unclothe 
or strip bare is the sine qua non of an intimacy, which functions to fabricate the assumption that 
some truth lies hidden in the Annals, but in the form of a personal and private intimacy that 
remains discreetly unexposed.  
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This strategy of photographic re-signification is echoed in a letter Cameron wrote around 
1870. Describing her relation to Tennyson, she writes: “Tennyson is the Sun of the Earth and I 
am the Priestess of the Sun of the Heavens so that my works must sometimes surpass his.”252 By 
the time she peened those lines, Cameron had completed a suite of photographs illustrating 
Tennyson’s epic poem The Idylls of the King. Cameron relished the opportunity to transform 
Tennyson’s words into images. It is in the context of that project that her statement should be 
read. Naming Tennyson the “Sun of the Earth” certainly valorizes him and by extension the art 
of poetry as a whole. Yet at the same time by giving herself the title “Priestess of the Sun,” 
Cameron fashions herself as an intercessor with the power to re-render Tennyson’s poetry into 
images made of light. Cameron’s photographic images of the Idylls of the King do in a sense 
“surpass” the poem as Cameron says. They do so in kind more than quality. The photographic re-
presentation of Tennyson’s poem surpasses it by traversing the bounds of verse by transposing it 
(with a difference) into the language of photography.  
5.2 The Gift 
 
 Having established the groundwork for a project of autobiographical discretion, Cameron 
proceeds to tell the story of her entrance into photographic practice. She writes: “I...restrain the 
overflow of my heart and simply state that my first lens [or camera] was given to me by my 
cherished departed daughter and her husband with the words, ‘It may amuse you, Mother, to try 
and photograph during your solitude at Freshwater.’”253 What Cameron fails to mention is that 
prior to 1863 she had already been exposed to photography, and was by all accounts already 
avidly interested in it.  
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As early as 1857, Cameron began making photo-albums. Many of these were given as 
gifts to her friends and relatives. These albums, often artfully decorated, were filled with 
photographs of family, famous persons, and even reproductions of artworks as well as photo-
reproductions of found photographs. Olsen points out that the gift of the camera from Juley (who 
died before Cameron published the Annals) and Charles “almost certainly at Christmas in 1863 
was a natural return gift for the photographic album Cameron had given her daughter for her 
birthday the year before.”254  
 The year Cameron obtained her first camera coincided with the arrival of Oscar Rejlander 
in the village of Freshwater. Rejlander soon found himself immersed in the Cameron’s lively 
social calendar. On occasion Rejlander used the Cameron family, sometimes Julia Margaret 
herself, as models for his pictures. Olsen notes that Rejlander’s prints “often ended up in Julia 
Margaret’s albums,” which indicates Cameron’s admiration for Rejlander’s work.255  In some 
images Rejlander is also seen in the photograph. Such pictures point to “the tantalizing 
possibility that at least in some cases Julia Margaret may have been the one behind the 
camera.”256 Olsen concludes that “the production of this series of photographs [by Rejlander] at 
[Cameron’s] home in the same year she took up photography herself suggests that there was 
some form of collaboration or apprenticeship between the two photographers.”257 While the 
scholarship on this particular point remains speculative, it is certainly true that Cameron was 
exposed to photography well before 1863. 
 To what extent, then, is the account offered by the Annals simply a fiction designed to 
facilitate Cameron’s success? This question is not easy to answer. The Annals tells the truth in 
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some respects. Cameron did receive a camera as a gift from her daughter and son-in-law. And 
the gift came at a time when the lively house at Freshwater had faded to a quiet routine. Her 
children had grown up and left, and her husband was frequently away on business. And while 
friends like Tennyson, Rejlander, and other notables were given to dropping by, they were not 
family. 
  Family life for Cameron, as for many Victorian women, was deeply tied to her own 
sense of identity. Olsen and other scholars point out that Cameron had a deep and abiding need 
to remain connected to her family throughout her life. It is therefore simply not the case that 
Cameron used her family as a cover for her own professional ambition. Rather it is more likely 
that Cameron understood her budding identity as a photographer through her family. That is, 
family was a lens through which Cameron charted and made sense of her emerging identity as a 
practicing photographer. Olsen writes, “the autobiography probably reflects an emotional truth: 
the acquisition of the camera and the resulting photographs marked a shift in identity.”258 It was 
though narratives of familial belonging that Cameron charted her passage beyond the familial 
enclosure through photography and out into the public sphere.  
5.3 From the Hen House to “My Glass House” 
 The founding of Cameron’s studio features prominently in the Annals. Cameron writes: 
“I turned my coal-house into my dark room and a glazed fowl house I had given to my children 
became my glass house!”259 The words “became” and “my” and the exclamation point frame the 
text of the “glass house” in the rhetoric of autonomy (“my”) and transformation (“became”). 
However this claim is couched in the language of mothering and feminine domesticity 
considered proper to a Victorian woman of Cameron’s class. Note that her autobiographical “I” 
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or the persona that operates through that “I” takes possession of the darkroom – formerly a coal-
house – but the glass house or studio is prefaced by a narrative of familial belonging. Only after 
this set-up does the narrative “I” take possession of it with the designation “my glass house.” 
Despite this the statement is also transformative, even, to an extent, transgressive. The “glazed 
foul house” that formerly belonged to the family “became my glass house!” In this transitional 
rhetoric of becoming, the autobiographical “I” straddles the borderland between the domestic 
interior and the world of the studio – the glass house – from which Cameron accessed the public 
sphere. Cameron continues: 
The hens were liberated, I hope and believe not eaten. The profit of my boys upon new 
laid eggs was stopped and all hands and hearts sympathised in my new labour, since the 
society of hens and chickens was soon changed for that of poets, prophets, painters and 
lovely maidens, who all in turn have immortalized the humble little farm erection.
260
 
The founding of Cameron’s glass house in the Annals is framed in the language of family 
and domesticity but it operates within a transitional framework. The cancelled profits that would 
have come from the sale of hens’ eggs function as a preamble to a transition from family to 
“society.” The hen house as domestic sphere is “changed” to a space for a “society” of artists and 
visionaries. The theme of liberation, even female liberation in the form of the once cooped-up 
and now possibly “liberated” hens, is tempered by the stress laid on the support of her family for 
Cameron’s “new labour.” So while the scene of the founding of Cameron’s glass house marks a 
transition in the Annals from the domestic enclosure to “society,” this transition remains 
transitional, occupying a liminal zone somewhere between the actualization of, and merely a 
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hope for, liberation. The narrative here (as throughout the text) straddles a precarious line. It at 
once affirms and resists Victorian standards of feminine domesticity. As Olsen notes: 
Between the lines she [Cameron] seems to be defensively saying: yes, we lose the income 
from the eggs, but we will all gain from my art and my family encourages me to do 
this!...Professional work was certainly not impossible for Victorian women, especially in 
the cultural fields, but it was difficult and strewn with obstacles. For a bourgeois woman 
suddenly to take up a paying job might imply that her husband could not support her, that 
the family was in dire straits, that the wife was insubordinate...Cameron’s autobiography, 
many of her letters, and her portraits of Charles Hay [her husband] and her children 
function rather like a signed permission slip that Cameron could present on demand.
261
   
Performing a public persona capable of straddling the line between family and society 
demanded a tightrope walker’s dexterity. Negotiating the Victorian line between family and 
society meant negotiating the hazards of self-division. As a public persona, Cameron had to be 
seen as both mother and photographer. Cameron’s autobiographical “I” had to bear the mark of 
the socially sanctioned space of the domestic enclosure. But paradoxically she had to wear this 
garment of domesticity in public. Cameron’s confirmation of Victorian values of femininity and 
domesticity strategically enabled her to (partially) transgress the social limits imposed by them.  
 Persona-making, however, is not only a volitional process. Cheryl Walker points out that 
persona production is both a conscious and unconscious process. It proceeds both (and often not 
equally) by volitional agency and by internalizing the prevailing ideologies of the social order. 
The persona is shaped not by the sole sovereignty of the “person,” but emerges in the 
confrontation with society. For this reason a persona is not always a medium for liberation or 
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self-improvement. Indeed Walker notes that “it is rarely the case” that the persona is solely a 
“delightful aspect of human experience.”262 Persona production is often a fraught and fractious 
process born of difficult conditions. Cameron saw that the only way it would be possible for her 
to occupy the position of a self-proclaimed photographer was for her to be seen to occupy the 
position of the dutiful Victorian wife and mother. 
 To what extent Cameron believed in the Victorian values she professed cannot really be 
answered. Were Cameron’s professed convictions heart-felt or was she merely being sly? The 
strangeness of the mask of persona is that it can often grow into one’s sense of self often without 
one necessarily being aware of it. As Alicia Ostriker notes, the “I’ of self-narration might in 
certain cases mark the site at which “the mask has grown into the flesh.”263 For Walker and 
Ostriker asking “who” appears behind the mask of figures in an autobiography, however, is the 
wrong question. The questions to be asked are rather: who and how many have become through 
these masks and by what volitional strategies, social norms, and ideological constraints? 
 Personae abound not only in the Annals but also in Cameron’s photography. Role-playing 
was a key feature of Cameron’s studio work. Photographs of her children dressed as cherubs, her  
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Plate 4. Julia Margaret Cameron, I Wait (Laura Gurney), 1872. Digital image courtesy of the Getty’s Open Content 
Program. 
maid as the Virgin, friends and relatives dressed as characters from literature and mythology 
appear frequently in her photographs. So while Olsen is right to point out that Cameron’s 
pictures of her family helped bolster her “respectable” public persona, it is also true that many of 
her family photographs are not portraits in the strict sense but rather character studies. Moreover, 
many of her portraits are distinctly out-of-focus. Cameron’s penchant for costuming and un-
focusing together constituted a profoundly powerful material and stylistic arsenal for de-
familiarizing her subjects and her relation to herself as mother, socialite, Victorian woman, in 
short for estranging herself from the historical norms of her gender and class. 
 Cameron’s poetics of de-familiarization cut in two ways: she de-familiarized herself and 
those she photographed. She was given to subjecting her family models to a tasking process in 
which family relations were momentarily severed and re-threaded through Cameron’s 
demanding aesthetics. Cameron’s great niece Laura Gurney Troubridge recalls posing with her 
sister as angels of the nativity. Laura remembers Cameron’s “ungentle hand” tousled their hair 
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“to get rid of its prim, nursery look.”264 Each child was “scantily clad” and had “heavy swan 
wings” fastened to “her slim shoulders.” To the young girls, “Aunt Julia appeared as a terrifying, 
elderly woman, short and squat...[d]ressed in dark clothes, stained with chemicals from her 
photography (and smelling of them too), with a plump, eager face and piercing eyes.”265 “No 
wonder,” Laura continues, “those old photographs of us, leaning over imaginary ramparts of 
heaven, look anxious and wistful. This is how we felt.”266  
 Here in a childhood memory, the reader catches a fleeting glimpse of another side of 
Cameron’s persona—the working photographer. In the “liberated” space of the ex-chicken coop 
turned glass house, Cameron could distance herself from Victorian expectations of femininity 
and maternal nurturing and become, through photographing, some other seemingly 
unrecognizable figure. Laura and her sister (like many of Cameron’s other intimates) were put 
through an estranging process in the course of being photographed in which the familial bonds 
were momentarily dissolved into a semi-anonymous encounter between model and photographer. 
Costuming intensified this sense of estrangement and de-familiarization by materially re-
configuring identities. For Cameron, the “world of theatre and fantasy allowed room to explore 
other selves and identities.”267 Upon entering the “society” of the glass house, Cameron and her 
models left behind the domestic sphere of Victorian norms of social comportment. 
5.4 I began 
 In charting her beginnings as a photographer, Cameron writes: “I began with no 
knowledge of the art. I did not know where to place my dark box, how to focus my sitter, and my 
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first picture I effaced by rubbing my hand over the filmy side of the glass”268 Of this effaced 
image little is known. Cameron notes that she paid the model, a farmer living nearby, half a 
crown per half hour for sitting and that “after many half-crowns...I effaced it while holding it 
triumphantly.”269 That Cameron makes mention of this mistake twice in this short text should not 
go unnoticed. Rejlander’s “Apology” for comparison will help to flesh out the significance of 
Cameron’s statement.  
 Rejlander projects his novice years onto the figure of a “young Miss” clumsily playing 
piano on one occasion, and on another he attempts to efface it altogether through the figure of the 
“ready-made photographer.” Cameron by contrast begins by openly declaring her beginnings as 
a photographer as an “I” that “began with no knowledge of the art.” The passage from the sphere 
of homemaking to the glass house is marked, then, as the passing into a knowing that one must 
say is Socratic, for to know that one does not know is the beginning of knowledge in the Socratic 
tradition. Cameron’s “I,” unlike Rejlander’s, does not displace its novice beginnings. No “ready-
made photographer” arrives to block from view this point of unknowing.  
Cameron’s figuration of herself initially as an “I” with “no knowledge” also follows her 
pattern of using a self-effacing gesture as a springboard to a more affirmative self-narration. 
Cameron writes, 
my son, Hardinge, being on his Oxford vacation, helped me in the difficulty of focusing. 
I was half-way through a beautiful picture when a splutter of laughter from one of the 
children lost me that picture, and less ambitious now, I took one child alone, appealing to 
her feelings and telling her of the waste of poor Mrs. Cameron’s chemicals and strength if 
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she moved. The appeal had its effect, and I now produced a picture which I called ‘My 
First Success.’270 
The “splutter” of laughter by the children breaks the photographic enclosure that connects the 
children to the photographer. The break results in the separation of the children and the singling 
out of one child, Annie. It is to this now displaced photographic subject that Cameron makes her 
appeal by placing herself as photographer in the third-person. It is as if she has steps out of her 
role as photographer like one removing a mask or costume. The photographer becomes a third 
person figure with only the property of photographic chemicals to her name: “poor Mrs. 
Cameron’s chemicals.” She then takes a step back behind the camera. Her son, the 
photographer’s assistant, readies the lens and her “first success” is realized. 
 The scene as seen traces a complex series of moves in, again, what Azoulay calls the 
“arena” of photography.271 Cameron moves out from behind the camera to the space of the 
photographed subject, Annie, and back again. This movement re-codes a series of intimate 
relations relative to the unmoving observer – the camera. The mediating presence of the camera 
recodes the mother-son relation as photographer and assistant. At the same time it recodes Annie 
as photographed subject. But when Cameron moves out from behind the camera and approaches 
her subject a shift in subject positions occur. Who is it that speaks to Annie of “poor Mrs. 
Cameron’s chemicals?” And who, figuratively speaking, is it that Hardinge sees speaking to 
Annie? Does he see his mother, a photographer, or some other figure? And who does Annie  
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Plate 5. Julia Margaret Cameron, Annie, 1864. Digital image courtesy of the Getty’s Open Content Program. 
encounter when this figure approaches her? Does she see a photographer, Mrs. Cameron, who? 
And who does Cameron see if she glances back at Hardinge from Annie’s perspective? Does she 
see her son or her assistant? The camera here is like a May Pole that sets a group of subject 
positions in motion. The photographic arena as seen here is “a montage of heterogeneous 
viewpoints.”272 The “success” of the photographic event occurs in the scene through a narrative 
remapping of positions within the photographic arena. It is within this very movement, and in the 
renegotiated subject-positions it effects, that the act of photography is seen to take place. The 
camera is at the centre of the photographic action, but it is not where the action of photography is 
seen to take place.  
The Annals’ de-privileging of the camera as the determining actor in the photographic 
situation reflects Cameron’s career as a whole. As already noted, Cameron came into 
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photography initially by making albums, perhaps serving as an assistant to Rejlander, and on 
occasion posing as a model herself. She thus encountered photography as a variety of actions, 
including the operation of the camera. The camera in Cameron’s case must be seen as 
contributing actor in a larger and complex set of photographic situations and not what it has 
become in modern histories of photography – the central historical figure.  
 Azoulay has done the most in recent years to pioneer a way out of the paradigm in which 
the camera has dominated the field of photography studies. For Azoulay, the camera should be 
seen as simply one actor in a complex ensemble of actions that take place within, while holding 
open, the social space of photography. The arena of photography delimits the space of action in 
which photographer and photographed reside. But it also marks the space of a photograph’s 
future spectators. The arena of photography thus covers a very wide spatio-temporal expanse and 
encloses within its theoretical grasp all the acts that produce and perpetuate the existence of a 
photograph. Only a fraction of this space, however, can be seen in the frame of the photograph. 
Never does a photograph show the totality of its viewers who further the life of the image by 
reproducing it through memory, conversation, or otherwise. As Azoulay notes in The Civil 
Contract of Photography, the arena of photography is a “complex theatre of relations...only some 
of which are manifested in the single photo...The photograph always includes more or less than 
what they [photographers] seek to deposit in it.”273 The photographer cannot control how the 
arena of photography will expand. How the arena will expand and what spaces of signification it 
will create over time are contingent matters from the moment the act of photography begins. 
Azoulay has provided a much needed critique of the prevailing image of photography in which 
the camera and the photograph are seen as the two poles between which all photographic 
                                                          
273
 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 389. 
 
 
  144 
meaning is created and contained. As impressive and unique as Azoulay’s insight is, however, 
Cameron seems to have reached a similar view in the late nineteenth century.  
Through her innovative photographic practice, Cameron came to see that the site or arena 
of photography is not wholly circumscribed by the camera and its cognate operations: it is an 
expansive arena of social action, as well as chemistry, and optics. Olsen captures the point 
precisely. She writes: 
Cameron’s photographic career did not begin behind the camera. Nor, for that matter, 
was it the invention of the camera that inaugurated the field of photography—it was the 
discovery of photochemicals that could fix the image. Likewise, it was not necessarily the 
gift of the camera that marks the official beginning of Cameron’s career as much as her 
experiments in printing and album making. To privilege the camera is convenient for the 
field of photography because it emphasizes the moment of interaction between artist and 
subject.
274
 
To reduce the conception of photography to the moment of photographing is to fix and freeze 
(like a photographic image itself) the relation between photographer and photographed. 
Cameron’s Annals (and her practice) depict the act of photography as a fluid exchanging of roles 
that involves, but is not wholly subsumed by, the camera. The arena of photography for Cameron 
revolves around the camera only in the sense that it is the unmoving pivot around which a 
dynamical movement of bodies and subject positions occur. 
5.5 Motion Pictures 
 Motion was central to Cameron’s conception and practice of photography. Cameron’s 
style of un-focused images resulted both from her purposeful use of soft-focus and because she 
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allowed her sitters to move during the long exposure time. One should briefly pause to note the 
unprecedented quality of the un-focused image in the history of photography prior to Cameron. 
The idea that focus was to be focused in photography was (and still largely is) assumed. 
Cameron reflects on her use of soft-focus in the Annals by noting: “when focusing and coming to 
something that to my eye was very beautiful, I stopped there instead of screwing on the lens to 
the more definite focus which all other photographers insist upon.”275  
 Cameron’s speaks here to a desire to plumb the depths of the photographed subject, a 
desire to see the physiological and psychological depth of the subject before her lens. She wanted 
to see beyond the “topographic” form of the body. Only a year after beginning her career, she 
remarked in a letter to a friend that “conventional topographic Photography” results only in 
“skeleton rendering of feature & form without that roundness & fullness of form and feature, that 
modeling of flesh & limb which the focus I use only can give.”276 For Cameron, soft focus was a 
technique for giving life to the photographic image. She saw in the sharply delineated focus 
favored by most of her fellow photographers little more than dead figures – skeletons – lifeless, 
stiff impostures of living flesh.  
 The body in its fullness and motion as a corporeal entity of flesh and bone is the figure on 
which Cameron’s re-conceptualization of photography turns. She dismisses the reduction of 
photographic seeing to the semblance or skin of the world. The dimensional fullness of the body 
is the axiom through which focus emerges as a question of phenomenological import. It becomes 
a problematic through which the fact of the corporeal body becomes photographically re-
thought. Central to Cameron’s photographic conception of the body – as evidenced by her 
photographs – is a phenomenological grasp that the living body is always a body in motion 
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through space and time. And as Cameron shows, space and time are not abstract measurements 
from the standpoint of the body. Maurice Merleau-Ponty seems to speak for Cameron when he 
beautifully observes in Phenomenology of Perception:  
In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and time are not, for 
me, a collection of adjacent points nor are they a limitless number of relations 
synthesized by my consciousness, and into which it draws my body. I am not in space 
and time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them and include them. The scope 
of this inclusion is the measure of my existence.
277
 
For Merleau-Ponty the body that one has, and through which one experiences the world, is not 
merely in space and time. It is taken up in it. The bodily experience of moving through time and 
space cannot be likened to observing a ball rolling down an inclined plane. The distances and 
times traveled by one’s body are experiential phenomena. One, for example, can observe 
someone taking a walk, and the distance travelled can be measured. But how the travel is 
experienced by the walker is disclosed only to her on account of her having the body, life, and 
memories she has. Space and time are measurable units. But the bodily experience of space and 
time is the measure of one’s existence. Cameron’s desire to grant her subjects psychological 
depth through movement and soft-focus opens a space for the subject to preserve their existential 
autonomy and mystery. In order to further explore this it will be helpful to turn to one of 
Cameron’s best known and most complex images – Pray God Bring Father Safely Home of 
1874. The photograph depicts a scene set in a sparsely furnished living room.  
On the left, brightly illuminated, sits the mother in whose lap, appearing slightly blurred 
in the photograph, sits her daughter who prays urgently for the safe return of her father. The  
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Plate 6. Julia Margaret Cameron, Pray God Bring Father Safely Home, 1874. Public Domain Image. 
mother, eyes open, gazes into the child’s plaintive face. On the right stands the father. His torso 
is shrouded in nets suggesting that he is a fisherman and at present away perhaps on a fishing 
expedition. His son, also somewhat blurred out in the photograph, wears a boyish naval uniform. 
He stands at a slight angle in front of his absent father, but remains symbolically connected to 
him by the fishing net that partly wraps about his torso. Between mother and father spans the 
hearth. On the mantle, and above on the wall, are objects of utility and mementoes: a fire 
bellows, a kettle, a jug, an iron, a hat (the father’s perhaps). The hearth visually spans the spatial 
distance between mother and father, suggesting that domesticity stretches across time and space 
uniting the family during a time of separation. This connectivity is echoed by the fishing net that 
spills across the floor and wraps around the pedestal on which the daughter wistfully kneels. But 
of course, and this is strange, the father is not absent. He looks directly out at the viewer. He is 
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not depicted as a spirit, but as a presence every bit as material as the netting he holds. It is the 
mother, by contrast, who appears spirit-like, aglow as she is an atmospheric haze of bright light.  
 Pray God Bring Father Safely Home depicts a seeming reversal of presence and absence. 
The mother is supposed to be present in the home, yet she is depicted as an ethereal emanation, 
whereas the father who is supposed to be absent is shown as solidly present. Cameron gives a 
clue for how to read this when in the Annals she notes that a photograph can be likened to “the 
embodiment of a prayer.”278 Cameron here presents an image of photography as a medium in the 
literal sense: a vehicle through which a prayer or incantation achieves materiality as if the act of 
photography is an act of conjuration. What relation is Cameron building between memory, 
prayer, concern, absence and embodiment? How is one to think this strange non-rational 
dialectic in which absence becomes material presence by a concern on the part of the mother, 
son, and daughter, but seemingly at the expense of their own visual materiality as signified by 
the bright glow of the mother and the children’s blurred faces? Here again the ideology of 
separate gender spheres surfaces.  
The space between the mother and father is almost a hyperbolic illustration of the 
Victorian ideology of the separate spheres of the paternal and maternal. Mothers were to stay at 
home and raise the children while fathers were to go out into the world and make a living for the 
family. It was thought that the domestic space was necessary to protect and nurture women’s 
“natural” maternal instincts just as it was thought that men were “naturally” suited for the 
demands of work and public life. What Mary Poovey calls “the ideological work of Victorian 
gender” stabilized and concretized not only a sexual, but also an economic order. She notes: 
“The ideology of separate spheres...positioned women as moral superiors and economic 
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dependents.”279 Women were thought morally superior from a male perspective on the grounds 
of the presumed sanctity and innocence of children which it was the mother’s duty to raise 
properly.  
The world of work and public life was seen by contrast as morally inferior, but necessary 
to support, maintain, and protect the domestic enclosure. Work was thought to be tied up with 
the brute masculine materiality of the outside world whereas the domestic sphere was coded as 
“feminine,” a space of softness, innocence, and spiritual renewal. On this point it is interesting to 
note the remark made by the novelist William Makepeace Thackeray, a close friend of Cameron. 
Recalling a social occasion at Cameron’s home, he remembers Cameron as a “strange apparition 
in a flowing red velvet dress...welcoming us to [her] fine home.”280 Thackeray’s comment 
illuminates the fact that the ideology of separate spheres of masculine and feminine could also 
cut along the materiality and spirituality axis. 
 This ideological work of gender is reproduced in Pray God Bring Father Safely Home 
through the figuration of the children. The son and daughter figure the promise of reproduction 
as the sign of the “bountiful” marriage and also signify the promise that the ideology of separate 
spheres (masculine and feminine) will be reproduced and perpetuated. This reproductive 
narrative is of course materially underscored by virtue of the fact that photography is a 
reproducible medium. The ideology of family reproduction and the reproduction of the ideology 
of the family is materially ramified through the reproductive medium of photography. It would 
appear from this vantage that the photograph’s arena of meanings is foreclosed by the theme of 
reproduction and with it the gendered significations of masculine materiality and feminine 
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spirituality. One element, however, distorts this hyper-thematic of reproduction: the blurriness of 
the children’s faces.  
The blurriness of the children’s faces introduces a visual trace that materially distorts the 
readability of the photograph and thus disturbs the placid surface of its ideology. The blurriness 
is the registered trace of the children’s movement during the exposure time. The trace of their 
movement introduces a third term between the materiality of the father and the ethereality of the 
mother. The children are photographically captured in movement through a liminal space 
between the poles of absence and presence, maternal and paternal, feminine and masculine, and 
spirit and body. Their movement opens a space within the arena of the photograph, which is 
bounded by, but not subordinate to, the polarized and fixed coordinates of Victorian domesticity. 
It is this blurriness of movement that marks a zone of autonomy. What the viewer sees and what 
the children saw are not the same. The viewer does not and cannot know what the children saw 
or what they experienced in moving as they did. Neither their vision nor their movement can be 
read clearly by the viewer. It reads only as a blur. With Merleau-Ponty, one might say finally that 
the viewer can take the measure of their movement – he or she can read the signs of movement 
in the blurs – but only the children know what it meant to inhabit and live that movement. The 
blurs signify the gap between what the viewer sees and what the children experienced. 
The blurs of the children’s faces in Pray God Bring Father Safely Home also render 
material Azoulay’s insight that a photograph is a material tracing of the “heterogeneous 
viewpoints of those who participated in the act of photography.”281 Here Azoulay echoes 
Merleau-Ponty’s crucial observation: “The space and time which I inhabit are always in their 
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different ways indeterminate horizons which contain other points of view.”282 Pray God Bring 
Father Safely Home likewise opens an indeterminate horizon made of a plurality of perspectives 
within the otherwise frozen monologic ideology of separate spheres. 
 Cameron’s prizing of motion radically displaced the entire nineteenth-century framework 
that linked photography with the so-called “still image.” Cameron’s emphasis on motion 
countered standard nineteenth-century photographic portraiture epitomized by the use of cold 
metal neck clamps and back straightening rods that held the photographed subject sill in what 
Barthes calls “the mortiferous layers of the Pose.”283 Barthes capitalizes the word pose because it 
is a proper name for a specific genre of photography. The head-on, profile, and three-quarters 
view are types of the Pose genre. The head-clamps and back rods are material traces that signify 
with brutal clarity that there is nothing natural about posing for the camera: posing always 
involves real or virtual “constraints” or norms that discipline the body to conform to the “look” 
of the photographed subject and the social norms that maintain the repertoire of poses by which 
that look is represented.  
It is in this sense that the visible artifice of works such as Pray God Bring Father Safely 
Home should be understood. Cameron’s staged photographs demonstrate with almost ironic 
clarity that photography involves elements of what Barthes calls “primitive theatre.”284 
Paradoxically by allowing for movement, Cameron’s photographs show up the artifice of the 
forcibly restrained body of the posed and poised photographic subject.   
 Cameron’s practice put movement into photography and in so doing put focus in 
question. Her intervention remade the image of photography: the still image is displaced for a 
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moving body. In this sense, Cameron’s photographs might be called “motion pictures” in the 
literal sense. Paradoxically, Cameron’s blurry images render clear a simple but powerful insight: 
the living body is always a body in motion. Even the still body still moves. Blood pulses through 
the arteries. Lungs inflate and deflate, etcetera. This has of course long been known. But 
Cameron’s photography introduces this fact into the problematic of the still-image. The body in 
motion, for Cameron, is her chosen medium and means for breaking the link between the still 
body and the photographic image. Her work shatters the illusion that the “realist” photographic 
image perpetuates: that a body is still. It shows that behind the posed and poised body of the 
photographed subject lie real or virtual constraints.  
5.6 Fluid 
 The traces of movement in Cameron’s photographs lend her subjects a sense of fluidity. 
Cameron refuses to atomize movement as did other nineteenth-century photographers such as 
Eadweard Muybridge (1830-1904). Cameron figures movement as flow. Movement for the 
mover is not a discontinuous atomized itinerary of gestures. It is fluid. Focus is her technique for 
rendering visible this fluidity. Many of Cameron’s critics, however, opposed her use of soft-
focus. In a letter Cameron responds to this criticism by asking: “What is focus and who has the 
right to say what is the legitimate focus [?]”285 In posing the question of who has the right to say 
what focus is the correct one, Cameron gestures towards the same problematic that Azoulay has 
recently unfolded: neither the rights of the camera operator nor the spectator nor the 
photographer takes priority in a photographic situation. There are always multiple viewpoints 
and differing perspectives that are actively negotiated within the situation. Focus for Cameron is 
the index of the dimensionality of bodies (camera, photographer, and photographed) that 
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comprise a photographic situation. The photographic situation is understood by Cameron not 
only as an image-space but also as body-space. It is by virtue of the dimensionality of this space 
that movement and fluidity are possible.  
 Fluidity and movement are also reflected in the fluid movement between subject 
positions in the Annals as is seen in the studio scene of her “first success” photographing Annie. 
Cameron’s emphasis on fluidity also has a gendered dimension: the lived experience of the 
fluidity of “femininity.” Cameron negotiated the problem of being identified in various contexts 
by different gazes: wife, mother, hostess, Mrs. Cameron, the photographer, and so forth. For 
women of the nineteenth century, the experience of being identified according to criteria not of 
their making or choosing had the effect of all but emptying out the “feminine” of anything but 
the meanings projected onto it by men. Luce Irigaray notes in her essay “The ‘Mechanics’ of 
Fluids” that playing multiple roles as “woman” is only “feasible by virtue of her ‘fluid’ 
character, which has deprived her of all possibility of identity with herself.”286 For Irigaray, the 
“feminine” is a space upon which identities are projected (usually from men) but precisely 
because of this it is a “fluid character.”287 Feminine fluidity is the un-thought apparition that 
haunts the presumed stability of solid (phallic) masculinity. The masculine bias for solidity, 
argues Irigaray, appears in the rhetoric of forms, grounds, and objects of philosophy and the 
postulates of the “hard sciences.”   
 Nineteenth-century photography was similarly governed by stiff bodies, rigidly posed 
portraits, sharply delimited and delineated forms. Cameron’s work visually proposes an answer 
to Irigaray’s difficult question: “how are we to prevent...the subject from being prorogated as 
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such, indeed diminished in its interpretation, by a systematics that re-marks a historical 
‘inattention’ to fluids?”288 Cameron’s work and words re-think the language of solidity through 
its necessary (albeit spectral) other. Cameron’s work and words re-mark (and deconstruct) 
photography’s complicity with the masculine language of solidity and rigidity. 
 The sense of motion, mobility, and fluidity that mark Cameron’s work does not, however, 
undermine its insistent materiality. Rather it is precisely the materiality of the moving body and 
the materiality of photography that underwrites Cameron’s aesthetic. Cameron’s work (and 
thought) points up the fact that much of what has been (and continues to be) thought about 
photography tends towards what might be called photographic idealism. Despite the fact that 
nineteenth-century photography was a material and very physically demanding practice—heavy 
cameras, dangerous chemicals, fragile glass plates, and more—the obsession with the image 
tended to blind commentators to this physicality. 
 Part of this had to do with a persistent belief that the camera shares some kind of 
resonance with mental processing (as seen in Freud). There was and continues to be a seemingly 
natural linkage between concepts and images and hence between photographic images and 
mental pictures. An iconic example of this view is found in the American philosopher George 
Santayana’s (1863-1952) essay “The Photograph and the Mental Image” of 1907. Although 
written in the early twentieth century, Santayana’s view of photography was formed by the 
nineteenth-century context. The essay abounds with the familiar earmarks of nineteenth-century 
photographic idealism. Santayana writes: “The eye has only one retina, the brain a limited 
capacity for storage; but the camera can receive any number of plates, and the new need never 
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blur nor crowd out the old. Here is a new and accurate visual memory, a perfect record of what 
the brain must necessarily forget or confuse.”289  
 The camera, Santayana thought, would surely complement and improve the faculties of 
human cognition and memory. Human thinking would be improved by photography with its 
mechanical eye, brain, and memory. Santayana notes, “a photograph is produced by a machine, 
just as the images of fancy and memory are reproduced by a machine; both the camera and the 
brain transform their impressions in many ways.”290 The nineteenth-century camera with its 
seemingly magical power of reception and impression catalyzed a whole series of false analogies 
between the mind and the camera, the eye and the lens, pictures and memories, photographs and 
mental images. Santayana’s essay epitomizes the forgetting of the body in the work of 
photography (as well as in the work of thought). Indeed it forgets the work of the work of 
photography. It forgets the physicality of the process. Santayana’s view – still popular today in 
the era of digital speed – relegates photography to a kind of non-physical, automatic reflex, 
something that happens in the blink of an eye.  
 The Annals, by contrast, bring to light the physicality of photographic action. Cameron’s 
language emphasizes the point when she writes (as already noted) “from the very first I handled 
my lens with tender ardour and it has become to me as a living thing.” The camera was a body 
for Cameron. It was a physical thing, not a disembodied recording machine. When she speaks of 
her first efforts in photography, she quite literally comes to grips with photography. As she says, 
she “effaced” her first picture by accidentally “rubbing my hand over the filmy side of the 
glass.”291 By giving voice to the physicality of the process, Cameron underscores the presence of 
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the laboring body within the photographic situation and in so doing her autobiography “re-
marks” the idealist conception of photography with an embodied and materialist accent.  
 This re-marking of photography as an embodied and materialist practice flows into the 
theme of fluidity when in the Annals Cameron writes: 
Personal sympathy has helped me on very much. My husband from first to last has 
watched every picture with delight, and it is my daily habit to run to him with every glass 
upon which a fresh glory is newly stamped, and to listen to his enthusiastic applause. 
This habit of running into the dining room with my wet pictures has stained an immense 
quantity of table linen with nitrate of silver, indelible stains, that I should have been 
banished from any less indulgent household.
292
 
Of course it is doubtful that Cameron’s husband watched over the creation of every photograph. 
The presence of her husband in the scene functions as another “permission slip” in Olsen’s sense 
that allows for the assumption of Cameron’s autobiographical “I” to revel in the delight of 
photographic creativity. The “indelible stains” of silver nitrate that spoiled the table linen 
materially signify the physicality of photography. That material sign remarks and recodes the 
domestic enclosure. The dining room is forever stained with the fluids of Cameron’s fluid 
practice of photography.  
 The image of Cameron the photographer, wife, and mother running through the dining 
room with a new picture still wet with photochemicals encapsulates the three central elements of 
Cameron’s theory and practice of photography: fluidity, movement, and embodiment. It is the 
penultimate image of a thorough-going conceptual revolution in photography. The static camera 
and its correlate the still-image are displaced for a moving body carrying an image suspended 
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like a photographic embryo in its filmic sac. Cameron here represents the photographer as a 
subject of becoming who re-marks the architecture of the enclosure of Victorian domesticity 
with an “indelible” and fluid signature. Her photography provided Cameron with what she 
memorably calls a “transport of delight.”293 The photographer of the Annals is an embodied 
actor: a subject of movement, a “transport,” a medium who reanimates the frozen stillness, the 
“skeleton rendering,” of nineteenth- century photographic imagery. Through her fluid conception 
and practice of photography, Cameron slipped the restraints of Victorian photography and 
femininity through a slyly subversive strategy of ideological conformity and contestation.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This concluding chapter argues that Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s 
autobiographical desire to narrate their emergent selves as photographers was, in part, a response 
to the imperious de-subjectivizing power of nineteenth-century photography. Their effort, then, 
was partly an effort to house or re-shell (pace Sloterdijk) their sense of self in the face of the 
very thing that did so much to shatter it – photography. I conclude with a comparative analysis of 
the nineteenth-century photographer with that of the contemporary epoch. My example is my 
mother. I argue that her example shows that identifying as a photographer and doing 
photography are no longer urgently linked matters. I argue further that the contemporary 
photographer is a performative subject that emerges through photographic practice. This shift 
represents a “pragmatic” resolution, in William James’ sense, to the question of identity that 
preoccupied the nineteenth-century photographer. The chapter concludes with a retracing of this 
project. 
6.1 The Death of Topaz 
The texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron demonstrate that the question of what it 
meant to be a photographer was an urgent problem for the nineteenth-century photographer. This 
problematic is humorously echoed in the story of “Topaz, the Portrait Painter” found in a 
collection by P-J Stahl, illustrated by J.J. Grandville, and published in 1887. “Topaz, the Portrait 
Painter,” tells the story of a monkey who fails as a portrait painter, but later finds success, albeit 
short-lived, as a photographer. The story is worth recounting here for it captures the existential 
import of the question of identity that marked the early photographer. 
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Topaz was taken from his home somewhere on the Amazon. He ended up as a pet in the 
house of wealthy Parisian socialite. All went well until the day Topaz bit the lady’s husband. For 
this, he was sent packing. His new master was a portrait painter. Topaz decided to try and follow 
in his master’s footsteps, but he found he had no talent for painting. Around this time, Topaz 
heard of Daguerre’s new invention. He decided to give photography a try. One day he stole a 
purse belonging to one of his master’s clients. With the money Topaz bought a camera and a 
boat ticket. He sailed back to his home on the Amazon.  
On arrival he set up shop. After some initial disappointments, his fame spread. Topaz 
became a successful and critically admired photographer. The elephant-king, having heard of his 
fame, invited him to his court to serve as his royal highnesses’ portraitist. Upon arriving in the 
elephant-king’s court, Topaz wasted no time in taking his first portrait. In short order, he 
presented the king with his image. The king was mystified and outraged, having expected the 
image to be life-size. He exclaimed: “it is owing to my great size and strength that I have been 
chosen king. Were I to exhibit this miserable portrait to my subjects they would imagine I was an 
insect, a weak, hardly perceptible creature, only fit to be dethroned and crushed.”294 Humiliated 
by the great king, Topaz, with camera around his neck, hurled himself into the waters of the 
Amazon and sank to his death. The story is both comic and tragic. The final image of Topaz 
drowning himself with his camera fittingly pictures the photographer as a prosthetic subject: 
camera and monkey go down together. The story of Topaz is one of the first popular stories of 
the death of a nineteenth-century photographer. Not merely a profession, the photographer here 
is a figure of life and death. 
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Grandville, the illustrator of Private and Public Life of Animals, was part of that fated 
generation of lithographers, miniaturists, and engravers whose livelihoods would all but 
disappear by the end of the nineteenth century. The story of Topaz marks a brief historical 
moment in which photography existed peaceably alongside other popular image making 
technologies. It was a brief peace. In “Little History of Photography,” Benjamin notes: “Things 
developed so rapidly that by 1840 most of the innumerable miniaturists had already become 
professional photographers, at first only as a sideline, but before long exclusively...This 
transitional generation disappeared very gradually.”295 With the disappearance of engravers, 
lithographers, and so forth, photography also suffered a loss. As photography gradually diffused 
into popular culture photography’s identity crisis of identity began to subside. It was 
“naturalized” by habituation. Through diffusion and habituation, the figure of the nineteenth-
century photographer dogged by doubt, anxiety, and ambivalence gradually disappeared. The 
death of Topaz in a sense foretells the death of the nineteenth-century photographer for whom 
one’s identity as photographer was a matter of social and cultural crisis (if not life and death). 
6.2 Identity Crisis 
The photographer was not a unified historical subject position, and its evolution did not 
follow a discrete trajectory. The photographer of the nineteenth century, like photography itself, 
was multiple. It was split and fractured along deep and divisive lines: art and non-art, aesthetics 
and science, highbrow and middlebrow, masculine and feminine. Robinson, Rejlander, and 
Cameron experienced these divisions in unique ways to differing degrees of intensity. But in 
their effort to register their experience in words, each photographer sketched out a position that 
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provides a rough guide to what it meant to identify as a photographer at that time, as well as what 
it was possible to say about that identity.  
Robinson staked out the position and promise of the pictorialist photographer. Pictorialist 
technique promised to at last set the photographer upon a firm foundation of clearly defined rules 
and aesthetic standards derived from the traditional arts, particularly painting. But Robinson’s 
texts, especially the Studio, ultimately (unknowingly) demonstrated the limits of this approach. 
The entire question concerning the identity of photography and the photographer was obviated 
through a passionate and misplaced identification with the fine arts. Robinson’s pictorialist 
orientation sought to quiet the very identity crisis out of which pictorialism emerged. 
Pictorialism sought to resolve a question that it was not really prepared to raise: what does it 
mean to be a photographer? It is this question that Rejlander (and photographers like him) sought 
to answer.  
Rejlander hoped to legitimate the cultural claim of art-photography not by codifying a set 
of rules and procedures as Robinson did. Rejlander rather sought a justification for his own 
practice of photography, and by extension to find or found a justification for creative 
photography as a whole. He reasoned that by examining his own life he could find a general 
justification by which anyone might legitimately take up the practice of creative photography. 
But the use of multiple personae and sudden shifts in location trouble Rejlander’s 
autobiographical account. The “Apology” neither provides a clear autobiographical picture nor 
does it make good on its titular promise to provide an apology or rational defense for art-
photography. But this failure renders apparent the identity crisis that underwrote pictorialism. 
The “Apology” brings that identity crisis to the surface.  
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Cameron by contrast explored and exploited the ontologically ungrounded condition of 
photography to powerful effect. Becoming a photographer meant becoming precisely something 
culturally fluid and indefinite. It was that very fluidity that provided an opening in which 
Cameron’s persona developed within the otherwise restrictive spaces of self-constitution 
available to a woman in Victorian England. What Robinson and Rejlander saw as photography’s 
chief problem –its identity crisis – was for Cameron an open space in which she could carve out 
for herself a new sphere (pace Sloterdijk) to inhabit. Each case study illuminates an important 
facet in the historical constitution of the photographer, and each case showcases the important 
role that writing played in that constitution.  
6.3 Who am I? 
The advent of the self-conscious photographer occurred at the historically non-localizable 
moment when practitioners looked out through the camera onto a new vision of the world and 
asked themselves: What am I doing? What have I become? Who am I? It was at that moment that 
the subject position space opened by the camera was inflected and inscribed by an ongoing 
process of self-understanding and self-constitution in and through photographic practice. It was 
at that moment that photography and those that practiced it became the subject of a series of 
questions and controversies that are now readable as the history of the nineteenth-century 
photographer. That is to say that the advent of the photographer as a self-conscious subject was 
neither synonymous nor synchronous with the advent of photography. There was a delay or an 
interval between the technology and the production of the self-identified photographer. Here 
what Jonathan Crary says of the nineteenth-century observer applies with equal justice to the 
case of the photographer. Crary writes that if there was a “revolution in the nature and function” 
of vision in the nineteenth century, it did “not happen independently of the remaking of the 
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subject.”296 But this in turn must be supplemented with the following: if there was a remaking of 
the subject, then there was a remaking of the discursive and technological space out of which it 
emerged. Neither a historical survey of nineteenth-century photographic discourse nor its 
technological topoi is sufficient to explain the peculiar particularities of the texts by Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron. The figurations of the photographer that animate the Studio, the 
“Apology,” and the Annals have no one, single, or discrete genealogical origin. The figures that 
animate these texts are born of a tangled web of prosthetic relations between memory, self, the 
unconscious, and photography. It is this complex of relations that historically constituted the 
nineteenth-century photographer: a historical subject position constructed of words, images, 
memory, the (optical) unconscious, and technologies of vision and capture.  
6.4 The Photo-Sphere 
 Sloterdijk argues that the story of the modern subject is a story of de-shelling. The 
sequence of metaphysical disenchantments called modernity produced a new subject that sought 
to insulate itself from the cold indifference of the world its own reason made. Sloterdijk writes: 
“To oppose the cosmic frost infiltrating the human sphere through the open windows of the 
Enlightenment, modern humanity...attempts to balance out its shellessness in space, following 
the shattering of its celestial domes.”297 The writings of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron when 
seen through Sloterdijk’s lens appear as texts seeking to re-establish an insular conception of 
selfhood through the very technology that in many ways shattered that conception, namely, 
photography. 
Many scholars, including Alan Sekula and John Tagg, have pointed out that the origins of 
nineteenth-century photography stem from the need to track and control the then newly mobile 
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and expansive population of the modern metropolis.
298
 Following events such as the Paris 
Commune of 1848, State authorities were eager to develop seemingly more reliable forms of 
surveillance for the tracking and management of social and political “deviance.” The work of 
French police officer Alphonse Bertillon (1853-1914), for example, proved crucial in the 
development of criminological photography or what became known as the “mug-shot.” The 
standardization of mug-shot aesthetics, and the use of archival methods for organizing a criminal 
database for cross-referencing images and deeds according to a method of comparative 
taxonomy, enabled law enforcement agencies to at once produce, capture, and control social 
“deviance.” Sekula writes that “photography came to establish the terrain of the other, to define 
both the generalized look—the typology—and the contingent instance of deviance and social 
pathology.”299 Photography therefore became a means of pronouncing State judgment: the 
camera functioned as the presumed panoptic seer and judger of its subjects, and its sight was 
thought to be purely mechanical, impartial, sound, and even perfect. Photography instituted a de-
subjectivizing gaze by positing an image of the subject as available to sight. Yet subjects also 
wrote back against this by seeking to remake the image of photography as something other than 
the imperious unblinking eye of technological reproduction. The writings of Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron could be morphologically figured in Sloterdijk’s terms as cases of 
bubble building – the building of immune spheres – in which photographers sought to develop a 
humane counter-image to panoptic photographic discourse. These fragile spaces were 
constructed at the nexus point of photography and its conceptualization and autobiographical 
encirclement. They were spaces in which a re-thinking of the human interior became possible 
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precisely and paradoxically through the externality of photographic apparatuses: a new inside – a 
new bubble. Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s writings transform the gaze of photography 
into a medium of self-making, or as Foucault might call it, a “technique of self.”  
The texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron are stories and studies in the historical 
adaptation of the body and the psyche to the invasive technologies of modern photographic 
surveillance and the corresponding levelling of the social down to the modern anonymous mass. 
They are texts that confront the gaze of mechanical automation with the gaze of psychical 
introspection. These texts counter the calculus of mass re-production with the idiosyncratically 
singular temperament of existential doubt and self-searching. The photographer, as Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron understood it, came into being at this interstice between the human and 
the machine. This space of collusion, combination, and conflict provided the crucible for their 
self-understanding as photographers. One may object to the humanist impulse of Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron but one cannot deny that this humanism was (perhaps paradoxically) the 
medium through which the relation to the machinic realm of photography became 
autobiographically possible. Humanist sentiment, insofar as it was the means for relating to the 
camera, is part and parcel of the social history of the emergence of the photographer. As Neil 
Gross notes, social history is in part determined by the “cognitive and affective processes” 
among which “actors’ conceptualizations of themselves and their lives figure prominently.”300 
Gross does not advocate reducing the social to a plurality of persons, but neither does he see the 
social as something utterly distinct from that plurality. His position does not exclude the thesis 
that actors often “act in instrumental” ways in accordance with the norms and policing policies 
of a social order, but “instrumental action of this sort, just like every other form of social action, 
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is mediated by interpretations of the action environment coloured by actors’ past experience and 
self-understandings – experiences and self-understandings to which they may and often do give 
conscious attention.”301 
The texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron are in effect testimonies to, and a poetics 
of, interiority. The interiority figured in these texts is not that of classical metaphysics – the 
indestructible selfsame kernel of the subject. Rather these are texts that testify to an effort to 
“cultivate interiority” as Irigaray says.302 These photographers, and many more less famous than 
they, sought to cultivate interiority not within the irretrievably narcissistic spaces of selfhood, but 
in the peculiarly prosthetic spaces that open between operator and machine: the spaces of the self 
as prosthetic autobiography. These texts speak to the interior world of selves formed at the 
intersection of external photographic prostheses and the “reflective” spaces of autobiographical 
narration. It is this dual world – what Sloterdijk calls the “dual bubble” – that formed the interior 
space of the photographer.
303
  For Sloterdijk as for Irigaray there can be no possibility of 
imagining the self without instituting a division in the self. The heart of interiority for both 
Sloterdijk and Irigaray is not the undivided, singular, univocity of selfhood. Rather the self 
comes into being qua self-consciousness only by way of the necessary division of the singular 
self. To understand oneself as a self is to institute a “double dialectic” of oneself to oneself.304 By 
producing photographs and reflecting on that production in writing, each photographer practiced 
what Sloterdijk calls “the profession of the wild interior designer.”305 The bubble model, as 
argued in chapter two, departs from the Cartesian concept of interiority. It preserves the lessons 
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of the poststructuralist deconstruction of the subject in that it proposes to figure interiority as a 
hollow center around which selfhood is manufactured. It is by virtue of its hollowness, its 
openness, that the bubble is morphologically possible. Sloterdijk thus rethinks interiority – the 
core and coring of the subject – in terms of a profound hollowness, as a radical absence, as the 
product of a division, spacing, and splitting of the subject: it is this very interior spacing that 
makes the construction (as much as the deconstruction) of selfhood possible. Sloterdijk wagers: 
“Should we not understand the strongest subject as the most successful metabolic agent – the 
person who makes the least secret of his hollowness, penetrability, and mediality.”306 Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron might then be understood as profoundly mediated figures in Sloterdijk’s 
sense. Opening their identities to the radical alterity of photography, and photographic seeing, 
enabled them to metabolize the new technology for the purposes of creating precisely what Lury 
means by a “prosthetic autobiography.” Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron each became a 
photographer by turning their photographically mediated view of the world upon themselves. 
That is, each interiorized his or her sense of self by dividing that self into a pre and post-
photographic self. The self of Robinson’s Studio asks only after it enters the space of 
photographic production: what am I to do? Reflecting back on his career after he took up 
photography, Rejlander is able to ask: what have I become in becoming a photographer. 
Cameron’s history of herself qua photographer – her Annals – chart the story of herself as told 
from the perspective of her glass house. 
6.5 Mother 
What has happened to the figure of the nineteenth-century photographer – that figure of 
introspection and existential doubt? The context in which photographers work today has changed 
                                                          
306
 Sloterdijk, Bubbles, 95. 
 
 
  168 
radically since the time of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron. By the mid-twentieth century, 
photography was at last officially endorsed by the museum and the art world. It also continued to 
service evidentiary demands of the courts, the police, and journalists, as well as an expanding 
public that continued to use it to remember. Today the question of photography and the 
photographer continues to be a question, but it is not one that is likely to provoke the joy, 
despair, and anxieties of the nineteenth century. The ontological status of photography, the 
cultural legitimacy of art-photography, and the question of photographic truth still command the 
interests of specialists, but these issues have lost much of their former urgency. Today it is 
commonly understood that there are many ways to practice photography and therefore many 
ways to identify (or not) as a photographer. And it is the latter – the non-identification of oneself 
as photographer – that is ascendant.  
My mother, to give into my own autobiographical impulse, exemplifies the contemporary 
photography practitioner. My mother grew up in an artistic household. Her father was a painter. 
Her father also loved taking photographs, although he never considered this his art. He converted 
most of his photographs to slides for the Sunday slideshows that took place in the family room of 
my youth. My mother surely inherited her passion for taking pictures from her father. But like 
him she never believed or thought it necessary to stake an identity – much less an artistic identity 
– on her practice of photography. If asked about the subject, my mother will say something like: 
“You know me, I like taking pictures.” Indeed she does. Her camera is never far from her. It’s 
usually in her purse so she can quickly fish it out when the moment strikes her. Her practice 
appears to confirm Bourdieu’s thesis regarding what he calls “canons of ordinary practice.”307 
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This practice consists in the use of photography chiefly as a means of “solemnization.”308 When 
my mother takes out her camera, the moment becomes a family event. It ceases to be simply an 
occasion. The gesture of photographing solemnly particularizes the birthday, the first day of 
school, anniversary, holiday, graduation, etcetera. But despite the vast number of photographs 
my mother has taken and will no doubt take in the future, she remains a photographer in practice 
only. She does not identify as a photographer. She never calls herself a photographer.  It would 
be wrong, however, to construe a contemporary photography practitioner like my mother as 
simply someone who thoughtlessly takes pictures. Rather practice is today the means by which 
the question of what it means to be a photographer is resolved. The existential question of the 
photographer’s identity is resolved by the immanent practice of photography as it happens in the 
moment. Contemporary practitioners, like my mother, resolve the question of the photographer’s 
identity “pragmatically.” To clarify this, a brief detour into pragmatism will be helpful. 
 In his 1907 lectures on pragmatism, William James defines pragmatism as a philosophy 
that springs from the “pragmatic method.” The pragmatic method consists in settling 
philosophical disputes by tracing what consequences if any follow from taking one view rather 
than another. James argues that in cases where no consequences follow from taking one side in a 
philosophical dispute rather than another the matter should be deemed quite literally 
“inconsequential.” James writes: 
It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insignificance the 
moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can 
be no difference anywhere that doesn’t make a concrete difference elsewhere – no 
difference in abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in a difference in concrete fact and 
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in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, 
somewhen. The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite 
difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants in our life, if this world-formula 
or that world-formula be the true one.
309
   
James argues that thought is a form of action that takes place in the world and not in 
some imaginary realm sealed off from the contingencies of everyday life. Practical action is not 
for James a secondary “reflection” of philosophical truths, but a space in which praxis as 
thinking is contested and new modes of thought-action are developed. Practice is socially 
embedded and embodied thinking. One of the consequences of pragmatism is that philosophy 
ceases to be the special province of professional thinkers, universities, or books. Philosophy, 
says the pragmatist, occurs in the seemingly mundane practice of daily life. Hence one way to 
study philosophy is to study the practice of everyday life. James captures this sentiment 
beautifully when he notes in his lecture:   
I know that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, and that 
the most interesting and important thing about you is the way in which it determines the 
perspective in your several worlds. You know the same of me.... [But] the philosophy 
which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is more or less a dumb 
sense of what life honestly and deeply means. It is only partly got from books; it is our 
individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos.
310
   
Freud too (a contemporary of James) shares this “pragmatic” respect for the practice of daily life 
as itself a profound philosophic riddle for which observation of everyday actions provides some 
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clues. To understand the psyche, Freud advised that one listen to how people talk about everyday 
experience. Likewise James advocates the study of philosophy via the study of everyday life. 
In a like manner it might be said that the contemporary photographer can be 
conceptualized by simply observing the plurality of ways in which photographers work today. 
Here however it is important to stress a Jamesian point: contemporary photographic practice is a 
philosophical practice. Practitioners like my mother are therefore in this pragmatic sense also 
thinkers whose thinking-practice, among other things, importantly de-couples the photographer 
from the field of identity questions that haunted nineteenth-century photography. If my mother, 
and contemporary photographers like her, have a philosophy embedded in their social action, it is 
one in which the whole idea of the photographer as a singular identity has been displaced for a 
pluralistic conception based on the contingent operations forged moment to moment in the 
shifting photographic field of action. My mother takes out her camera when the situation strikes 
her. My mother does photography. She doesn’t think about being or not being a photographer. 
The photographer today in practice embraces its contingent formation. This is part and 
parcel of a larger epistemic shift away from essentialist conceptions of subjectivity towards ones 
based on shifting performative contexts. The neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty captures 
this shift economically when he notes in “The Contingency of Selfhood” that today it is 
commonplace to regard the self as a “tissue of contingencies rather that...a well ordered system 
of faculties.”311 People like my mother who do photography without identifying as a 
photographer represent a lived realization of the historical shift towards thinking identity in 
terms of practice rather than being. The current paradigm of the photographer thus stakes its 
ground at a considerable distance from the territory of nineteenth-century photography ruled as it 
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was by the implicit or explicit claim of the sovereignty of the photographer as a conscious agent 
working through the pull and pressure of contested social, cultural, and philosophical debates. 
The relative ease with which my mother (and those like her) do photography while not 
identifying (or feeling the need to identify) as a photographer speaks to a significant working-
through of the problem of identity in relation to photography in the manner of what again Lury 
would call the prosthetic re-conceptualization of the self.   
The photographer as a historical figure has passed out of the nineteenth-century world of 
photographic controversy. Nobody worries much anymore about the cultural or scientific status 
of photography. What matters today is less the status of the photographer or photography itself 
than the workings and effects of the photographic situation, as Azoulay conceives it: the social 
arena of bodies, places, and times that the event of photographing contracts together. The 
contingent and spontaneous movement that organizes and punctuates the photographic situation 
has pressured to the point of dissolution the nineteenth-century conception of the photographer 
as a unique historical actor: the figure of the contemporary photographer is seen as inextricably 
tied to the field of actors and sites of seeing, which make the production and dissemination of 
photographs possible. Arguably this was always the case. But in the nineteenth century, the 
photographer’s relation to her subjects and to the present and future spectators of the image was 
philosophically mediated by a questioning after her own status within the cultural field. Today 
that philosophic mediation has been substituted for a thinking of the act of photography as more 
or less a fully habituated means of making relations: relations that knit bodies, times, places, and 
images together. The photographer of the nineteenth century – the photographer for whom the 
question: what does it mean to say “I am a photographer?” was an urgent question – has, like 
Topaz, passed away. But while the question of what it means to be or become a photographer 
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may have receded with the general acceptance of photography as a fact of cultural life, 
photography remains a powerful and popular medium for the construction of selfhood today 
6.6 Coda 
 In this dissertation I have argued that the photographer can be understood at two distinct 
but inseparable levels of generality: the photographer and a photographer. The former names a 
novel subject position that came into being with the advent of photographic technologies in the 
mid-nineteenth century. The latter refers to a particular photographic practitioner. It is my 
contention that the photographer qua subject position emerged in and through the intersection of 
photographic technologies, discourses, practices, and modes of self-understanding, particularly 
autobiography. This prosthetic, mixed-media assemblage provided a medium through which 
individuals came to see themselves as photographers, and in so doing simultaneously re-inflected 
the space of the subject position opened by photography.  
It is this dynamical process that the texts of Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron 
illuminate. Robinson opens to view the photographer as a figure in search of the ontology of 
photography. Despite having codified a system of photographic aesthetics called pictorialism, 
Robinson was unable to settle the haunting question of photography’s identity. In turn he could 
not fully settle the cultural identity of the photographer despite his attempt to carve out a space 
for the photographer in the regime of settled, middle class life. Rejlander’s account of how he 
entered into photographic practice promises to offer a defense, an apology, for art-photography. 
But his text ultimately fails to deliver a coherent aesthetic theory of the kind found in Robinson’s 
writings. Despite its theoretical failure, Rejlander’s “Apology” reveals the difficulty early 
photographic practitioners faced in understanding themselves as photographers. The plurality of 
figures and the branching narrative trajectories of the “Apology” reflect the ungrounded, 
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multiplicitous nature of photography. In Cameron’s autobiographical Annals, the ontologically 
ungrounded condition of photography becomes itself the ground for a destabilization of the rigid 
roles prescribed by Victorian norms. In the studio, her glass house, and within the spaces of 
writing, Cameron could slip the confines of family and domesticity. Cameron saw the 
ontologically open space of photography not as Robinson and Rejlander did –as a crisis to be 
resolved – but as a “transport” beyond the rigidly defined world of nineteenth-century 
photographic aesthetics, and Victorian gender and class norms. Her practice of photography 
enabled Cameron to challenge both. 
These texts offer three stories of the nineteenth-century photographer: the photographer 
in search of photography (Robinson), the photographer in search of himself (Rejlander), and the 
photographer as self-creation (Cameron). Like a triptych, these instances of the photographer are 
a series of snapshots: stations of the photographer, episodes in the emergence of a novel subject 
position, a mode of subjectivity, and a figuration of selfhood. It has been my aim throughout this 
study to show that to properly theorize the photographer, it is necessary to go beyond the 
confines of hard-line Foucauldian imaginings that would reduce the photographer to an effect of 
discourse. I have sought to counter this by showing how Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron 
were not only fashioned by the discourse of photography, but fashioners of it as well. Robinson, 
Rejlander, and Cameron as figures of the photographer must be understood as intersectional 
figures that exist at the border of photography and life-writing: from a position at once on the 
outside of photography and the psychical inside of autobiographical imagining. My effort has 
been to show that to conceptualize the photographer necessitates a rethinking of the concept of 
interiority, which, however, does not necessitate a retreat into the dark night of the Cartesian 
metaphysics of the subject. Finally I have sought to demonstrate the historical importance of the 
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nineteenth-century photographer to any understanding of contemporary photographic 
practitioners for whom, on the whole, the question of photography and the photographer are no 
longer matters of existential import. But now (as then) the photographer figures the effort to 
construct a personal relation to the technological present in and through the very means of 
technological reproduction afforded by photography. It is this process, and the attempt to come 
to grips with that process, that Robinson, Rejlander, and Cameron’s writings illuminate: writings 
born of the personal and paradigmatic effort to ask what it might mean to be or become a 
photographer. 
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